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ENTITY CLASSIFICATION AND INTEGRATION: 
PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS, PERSONAL 
SERVICE CORPORATIONS, AND THE TAX LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESS 
John W. Lee* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
The first wave of revisions to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
("the 1986 Code") has occurred, in the form of the tax provisions 
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 ("OBRA").1 As 
with the various revisions to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 
politics continued to play an important role in determining which 
reforms took place, but politics and policy resulted in the develop-
ment of revisions to the 1986 Code which broke with the tradi-
tional 1954 Code type of reform. The new breed of reform seems to 
be at least partly based on the policy of using a deep structure 
entity analysis2 to classify organizations for tax purposes and to 
determine the tax treatment of the entity and its owners. The 
study of OBRA's provisions in the "classification" of publicly 
traded partnerships ("PTPs"8 ) and application of the passive ac-
tivity loss ("PAL"4 ) rules to them, as well as the elimination of the 
benefit of graduated corporate rates11 for personal service corpora-
tions ("PSCs"6), provides a framework for consideration of the 
deep structure or tax policy of entity classification. The integration 
of the entity with its owners, the comparison of structural tax revi-
sions under the 1954 and 1986 Codes, and the interplay of politics 
• Associate Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. B.A. 1965, University of North 
Carolina; L.L.B. 1968, University of Virginia; L.L.M. (Taxation) 1970, Georgetown Univer-
sity. Research for this article was funded by the Marshall-Wythe Foundation and Alumni 
~~ . 
' Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 [here-
inafter OBRA]. 
• In other words, determining the tax treatment of a given type of entity through consid-
erations of tax policy, not politics. 
• See I.R.C. § 7704(b) (definition of publicly traded partnership). 
• See I.R.C. § 469 (passive activity losses and credits limited). 
• See I.R.C. § ll(b), which provides graduated brackets for taxable corporate income: 
15% of taxable income up to $50,000, 25% of taxable income from $50,000 to $75,000, and 
34% of taxable income in excess of $75,000. 
• See I.R.C. § 448(d)(2). 
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and policy in OBRA are also well suited to deep structure analysis. 
This article will begin with a brief overview ofthe past and pre-
sent treatment of PTPs and PSCs and the various congressional 
and administrative applications (or non-applications) of a deep 
structure analysis in approaching classification and integration is-
sues. A brief comparison of tax reform under the 1954 and 1986 
Codes follows. The OBRA changes to the 1986 Code treatment of 
PTPs regarding classification and integration will then be dis-
cussed in greater detail in Section II. Deficiencies in these provi-
sions as measured against a deep structure analysis ideal will be 
uncovered and alternatives are suggested which better meet this 
ideal. Section III follows with a similar discussion of the PAL pro-
visions of OBRA. Section IV looks at the specific congressional ra-
tionales for the OBRA changes and whether deep structure analy-
sis actually provided the basis for the changes, and Section V 
compares tax reform under the 1954 Code with that under the 
1986 Code. The article then traces the influence of politics on the 
tax reform process and the halting development of a deep struc-
ture tax policy by various administrations and congressional com-
mittees in their drafting of actual legislation during the develop-
ment of the 1954 and 1986 Codes. Next, the article shows that both 
policy and politics played roles in the passage of the 1986 Code 
and later OBRA reforms. These reforms came closer to meeting 
deep structure policy objectives than did reform under the 1954 
Code, but fell short of the ideal, largely due to political influences. 
A. PTPs and PSCs 
Superficially, PTPs and PSCs have little in common other than 
a concentration of ownership among high income taxpayers7 and 
7 Stock ownership is widespread. Forty-two million individuals owned stock directly in 
1983, and an estimated 140 million benefitted from indirect ownership of stock through 
holding such assets as pensions and life insurance policies. See Hearings on Impact of Cor-
porate Takeovers before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1111-12 (1985) [hereinafter Corporate 
Takeover Hearings] (statement of John Phelan, Jr., Chairman of the New York Stock Ex-
change). But this wide ownership is thinly spread or in non-accountable hands. Individual 
stock ownership of large corporations is extremely concentrated in high income taxpayers, 
see Democratic Staff of the Joint Economic Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess., The Concentra-
tion of Wealth in the United States, Trends in the Distribution of Wealth Among American 
Families 24 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter Concentration of Wealth] (as of 1983 top 10% 
of households owned 89.3% of all personally owned corporate stock); Feldstein, Imputing 
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misplacement on the tax entity continuum8 under the 1954 Code 
Corporate Tax Liabilities to Individual Taxpayers, 41 Nat'! Tax J. 37, 50 (1988), with 45% 
held by institutions, Corporate Takeover Hearings, supra, at 313 (Securities and Exchange 
Commission Staff Report). Stock ownership in ge.neral has been concentrated in high in-
come taxpayers for some time. See Hearings on Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth 
and Stability before the Subcomm. on Tax Policy of the Joint Comm. on the Economic 
Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 563 (1955) [hereinafter 1955 Tax Policy Hearings) (statement 
of Professor Lindner). This is particularly true in the case of closely-held corporations. See 
Hearings on H.R. 13511 (Revenue Act of 1978) Before the Senate Finance Comm., 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (Part I) 136 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Senate Hearings] (statement of Secre-
tary of the Treasury Blumenthal). The shift to institutional ownership is more recent. See 
Corporate Takeover Hearings, supra, at 313. Given the high median income of professionals, 
this pattern should be even stronger in the case of PSCs. The pattern of ownership of PTPs 
is more difficult- to determine due to street names, but other than as to tax-exempt and 
foreign ownership, PTP ownership probably parallels that of publicly traded corporations. 
See Hearings on Master Limited Partnerships before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt 
Management of the Senate Finance Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 168, 172, 198 (1987) 
[hereinafter 1987 Senate MLP Hearings) (statements of Barry Miller and Lawrence Cohen). 
• The current Federal income tax treatment of different business entities ranges along a 
continuum. At one end of the continuum are entities, such as sole proprietorships and 
grantor trusts, whose separate existence is for most purposes ignored. 
At the other end are entities, such as subchapter C corporations, that generally are 
treated as separate persons whose tax liabilities are in addition to and independent of 
those of their shareholders. 
Between these two extremes are entities such as partnerships, trusts, S corpora-
tions, regulated investment companies, real estate investment trusts, and coopera-
tives, the taxation of which reflect both aggregate and separate entity principles. 
Along the continuum, significant differences in tax treatment include, first, 
whether the income earned by the entity is taxed to the entity in full, only to the 
extent not distributed to the owners, or not at all; second, whether the entity's owners 
are taxed on distributed or undistributed income of the entity; third, whether losses 
incurred by the entity can be deducted currently by its owners, or only upon a dispo-
sition of their interests in the entity; and fourth, whether the timing or character of 
any income of the entity that is passed through to the owners is altered when passed 
through. 
Hearings on H.R. 1658, H.R. 2571, H.R. 3397, and H.R. 4448 (Issues Relating to Passth-
rough Entities) before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Ways and 
Means Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Passthrough Entity Hear-
ings) (statement of Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy J. Roger Mentz [hereinafter 
Mentz)). This "continuum" appears to be based upon Professor Eustice's schemata 
sketched in Eustice, Subchapter S Corporations and Partnerships: A Search for the Pass 
Through Paradigm (Some Preliminary Proposals), 39 Tax L. Rev. 345, 346-47 (1984) [here-
inafter Eustice]. This model in the Joint Committee Staff version is now largely incorpo-
rated in bits and pieces into the legislative history of the 1986 Act. See S. Rep. No. 313, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 783-86 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Senate Report). 
The author would further break down the tax entity continuum between the direct and 
double taxation extremes. Aggregate passthrough treatment is embodied in Subchapter K, 
the taxation of partnerships and partners. Under an ideal aggregate model the tax rules 
would treat the partnership as an entity only for reporting, collection and audit purposes, 
and would treat the partners otherwise as much as possible as direct owners. Subchapter K 
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and the original 1986 Code. The misplacement of PTPs as pass-
through partnerships and PSCs as separate entities with graduated 
inside corporate rates lower than the owners' outside marginal 
rates was due to a failure of deep structure analysis. Unfortu-
nately, the common pattern of misplacement continued in the 1987 
PSC and PTP changes, which resulted in ad hoc provisions which 
were also questionable in their technical aspects. Due to politics, 
these provisions touched only lightly upon the broad policy and 
revenue issues which needed to be addressed, and appear to be 
watered-down versions of broad proposals found in the more thor-
ough 1984-85 tax reform studies. 
B. Classification 
Since the enactment of the 1954 Code, Congress, through its tax 
committees, and the various administrations, through the Depart-
ment of the Treasury ("Treasury"), have periodically examined tax 
in actuality contains an aggregate core with optional entity features. See infra notes 125-126. 
Entity passthrough treatment is embodied in current Subchapter S. Income, and to a lesser 
extent, losses of an S corporation pass through to shareholders in the aggregate manner. See 
I.R.C. §§ 1366(a),(d). As a concomitant, investment and undistributed earnings, reduced for 
allocable share of losses, may be withdrawn tax-free. See I.R.C. §§ 1367(a)(1),(2), 1368(b)(l). 
But in all other aspects, such as allocations and distributions of appreciated property, the 
non-inclusion of "inside" entity liabilities in an S corporation shareholder's outside stock 
basis, and transfers of interest, the S corporation is treated as a separate entity. See Staff of 
Joint Comm. on Taxation, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess., Taxation of Master Limited Partnerships 
11 (1987) [hereinafter MLP Hearing Pamphlet]. Entity-conduit treatment applies to RICs 
and REITs. Separate entity prevails as to all aspects (including deferral of loss until dispo-
sal of the interest) except for limited income integration through a dividend deduction for 
earnings distributed more or less on a current basis and passthrough of capital gain charac-
ter. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Federal Income Tax Treat-
ment of Pass-Through Entities (Including a Description of H.R. 1658, H.R. 2571, H.R. 3397, 
and H.R. 4448) 10-12, 17-18 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter Passthrough Entity Hearing 
Pamphlet]. Until recently, entity conduit tax treatment comported more closely with deep 
structure-based policy than that of the other entities. Entity features prevailed because the 
owners were passive, yet integration of income (but not loss, because the owners are passive) 
derived from the absence of an active business. See id. at 17-18. In the REMIC provisions of 
the 1986 Code, Congress departed from this policy. See infra note 147. 
Prior to OBRA, PTPs were treated as partnerships and PSCs as separate entities, despite 
the fact that the owners of PTPs typically do not actively or materially participate in the 
entity's business and the owners of PSCs typically do materially participate. Material par-
ticipation should be the criterion for aggregate treatment and the absence of material par-
ticipation the criterion for separate entity treatment. See infra notes 134, 143 and accompa-
nying text. 
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entity classification.9 Viewing the alternatives as limited to either a 
• In 1960 Treasury promulgated extensive reVIsions to the classification regulations, 
Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-1-4), which had remained in essentially the same form since the 1934 
Revenue Act revision approved by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 
U.S. 344, 354-55 (1935). See Sexton & Osteen, Classification as a Partnership or as an Asso-
ciation Taxable as a Corporation, 24 Tulane Tax lnst. 95, 108-122 (1975). In response to a 
series of taxpayer victories in obtaining corporate tax treatment and, hence, retirement ben-
efits for shareholder-employees then limited to employees, the best known of which is 
United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), the Service and Treasury promul-
gated the Kintner regulations in 1960. The Kintner regulations sought to close the door on 
professional associations by effectively adopting state law form as to the establishment of 
legal relationships (no states authorized professional corporations at that time). See Tress. 
Reg.§ 301.7701-l(c) (1960). The regulations also attempted to provide certainty by mecha-
nizing the four corporate factors, see infra notes 113-116, and the resemblance test to a 
"more than test," giving the factors equal weight. See Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960). 
The bias toward partnership tax treatment for limited partnerships found in Tress. Reg. § 
301.7701-2(b)-(e), and -3(b) (1960), did not arise from a slant against professional corpora-
tions, but instead constituted a blind adoption of the Board of Tax Appeals' (predecessor to 
the Tax Court) formalistic and ill-considered opinion in Glensder Textile Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942). See Peel, Definition of a Partnership: New Suggestions on an 
Old Issue, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 989, 991; Sexton & Osteen, supra, at 126-28, 131-32. 
State legislators responded to the Kintner regulations challenge by authorizing profes-
sional corporations, prompting further anti-professional corporation amendments to the 
1960 regulations in 1965. These amendments were subsequently rejected as blatantly dis-
criminatory. See Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 111-112 (5th Cir. 1969); United 
States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157, 170 (lOth Cir. 1969). In 1970 the Service threw in the towel 
as to professional corporations, Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 C.B. 278, and in 1982 Congress 
affected parity and some rationality in the retirement plan area. See infra note 266. 
"Once defeat was admitted in the professional area, ... the Treasury quickly focused its 
atiention on the 'tax shelter' limited partnerships. Unfortunately (for the Treasury), the 
1960 regulations, designed to make it easy to qualify as a partnership and difficult to 
achieve association status, stood as a bar at the threshold of the development of an ap-
proach to attack such partnerships." Sexton & Osteen, supra, at 137. Actually, the bother-
some aspects apparently arose more from a quest for certainty and administrability, a 
theme consistently followed by Treasury. See infra note 117. Consequently, in 1977 the 
Commissioner issued proposed anti-tax shelter revisions to the association regulations which 
would have taxed many more limited partnerships as corporations. See Prop. Tress. Reg. § 
301.7701-l(b), (c); 42 Fed. Reg. 1038-44 (Jan. 5, 1977); Note, Tax Classification of Limited 
Partnerships: The IRS Bombards the Tax Shelters, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 408, 410 (1977) 
("When the Department of Housing and Urban Development protested that the regulations 
would cripple its attempts to encourage private investment in low-income housing, the regu-
lations were hastily withdrawn"); N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1977 at A-11. See Withdrawal of No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making, 42 Fed. Reg. 1489 (1977). Following withdrawal of the 1977 
proposed reclassification amendments, the "Service subsequently indicated in Rev. Rul. 79-
106, 1979-1 C.B. 448, that it would follow the Larson application of the existing regulations, 
without examining additional factors." Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, 
at n.7-8. 
After this political failure, Treasury shifted to the legislative forum, with President 
Carter's 1978 Proposals for Tax Reductions and Reform recommending to Congress "that 
new limited partnerships with more than 15 limited partners be treated as corporations for 
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passthrough partnership or a separate entity taxable as a corpora-
tion, neither Congress nor Treasury reached a satisfactory resolu-
tion of the classification of large limited partnerships with inactive 
owners, nor did they seriously consider classification of close cor-
porations in which the owners actively participate. These 1954 
Code forays were not ba8ed on a deep structure classification anal-
ysis and no consistent principles were developed for placing orga-
nizations on the tax entity continuum.10 Rather, the classification 
revisions arose from backdoor administrative attacks, first on re-
tirement plans for entrepreneursu and later on tax shelters for the 
tax purposes; however, partnerships engaged primarily in housing activities will be excepted 
from this classification rule." Message from the President, Proposals For Tax Reductions 
and Reform, H.R. Doc. 283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 President's 
Proposals). This provision, like many of President Carter's other substantive anti-shelter 
provisions, was politically unsuccessful. See infra note 344. 
In 1983 the Senate Finance Committee Staff released a "Preliminary Staff Report on 
Subchapter C," which proposed that limited partnerships with publicly traded units "would 
generally be treated as associations taxable as corporations." Staff of Senate Finance 
Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess., The Reform and Simplification of the Income Taxation of 
Corporations 80 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter Preliminary Subchapter C Report) (public 
trading was limited to trading on an established securities market). This provision, like most 
of the Staff's proposals, was based on an American Law Institute ("ALI") proposal. The 
Staff reclassification provision generated considerable political heat. See Reform of Corpo-
rate Taxation, Hearings Before the Senate Finance Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1983) 
[hereinafter Reform of Corporate Taxation Hearings) (statement of Chairman Dole). Not 
surprisingly, reclassification was omitted from the 1985 Final Report on Subchapter C, see 
Staff of Senate Finance Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess., The Subchapter C Revision Act of 
1985, 72 (Comm. Print 1985), on the rationalization that the 1984 Treasury Proposals would 
classify all limited partnerships with more than 35 limited partnerships as corporations and 
would subsume the original publicly traded recommendation; so that further piecemeal clas-
sification provisions should await the fate of the pending Treasury Proposals. Nevertheless, 
the 1985 Staff Subchapter C proposal itself was doomed politically by the tax profession's 
opposition to its repeal of the General Utilities doctrine (General Utilities & Operating Co. 
v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 200 (1935)), a core provision to Treasury. See Sheppard, General Utili-
ties Repeal: Of Ostriches and Motherhood, 30 Tax Notes 491 (Feb. 10, 1986); Reform of 
Corporate Taxation Hearings, supra, at 9-10 (statement of Assistant Secretary of Treasury 
for Tax Policy Ronald Pearlman). 
Ultimately the 1984 Treasury Proposals' numerical reclassification of large limited part-
nerships (over 35 partners) as corporations, see 2 U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Tax Reform for 
Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth-General Explanation 147 (1984) [hereinafter 
1984 Treasury Proposals], was abandoned by the President in his tax proposals to Congress, 
The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity (1985) 
[hereinafter 1985 President's Proposals]. See Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra 
note 8, at 17. 
10 See supra note 8. 
11 See supra note 9. 
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wealthy/2 which both proved to be politically unsuccessful. 
In the summer of 1986, shortly after the Senate's passage of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("the 1986 Act"),13 Representative Rangel, 
chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Select 
Revenue Measures, held hearings on passthrough entities. 14 The 
result of the hearings was a new set of mortgage-backed securities 
provisions, including Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits 
("REMICs"), as well as other conduit changes. 111 In the summer of 
1987, the subcommittee conducted hearings on master limited 
partnerships ("MLPs"16), i.e., PTPs, which, together with Senate 
hearings conducted on the same topic17 and the earlier House pass-
11 See supra note 9; Keyser, Publicly Traded Limited Partnerships: The Treasury Fights 
the Wrong War, 36 Inst. on Oil & Gas Inst. L. & Tax'n 10-1, 10-6 (1985). 
u See 1986 Senate Report, supra note 8. 
14 See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8. 
'" See I.R.C. §§ 562, 851-855, 4982, 7609 (RICs); §§ 856-859, 4981, 6697 (REITs); §§ 860A-
860G, 1272, 6049, 7701 (mortgage backed securities). 
10 Hearings on Tax Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships before the House Ways 
and Means Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinaf-
ter 1987 House MLP Hearings]. The term "master limited partnership" or MLP refers to 
the two-tier structure of many publicly-traded limited partnerships. See MLP Hearing 
Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 3-4. Such publicly traded parent limited partnership usually acts 
as a 99% limited partner of an operating limited partnership; such structure is intended to 
avoid state blue sky restrictions and having to amend the certificate of limited partnership 
in numerous states each time units of ownership are transferred. See Turlington & Beeson, 
Master Limited Partnerships: Current Issues, Techniques and Strategies, in Partnership 
Taxation 1988-An Advanced Program 211, 221, 227 n.16 (Practicing Law Institute 1988). 
The four basic types of PTPs (formed through roll-up, roll-out, acquisition, and liquida-
tion transactions) are as follows: 
In a rollup transaction, existing limited partnerships are "rolled up" and consolidated 
into one larger partnership. In a rollup, the existing partnerships are treated as con-
tributing their assets to the master limited partnership, in exchange for units of the 
master limited partnership, and then distributing the units to their partners in liqui-
dation. The master limited partnership thereby owns the assets of the pre-existing 
partnership, and has as its unit holders the partners of the pre-existing partnerships. 
MLP Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 24. The Joint Committee on Taxation Staff also 
defines a "roll-out" as a transaction in which a corporation exchanges assets for an interest 
in the PTP, typically a general partnership interest. See id. at 21. Limited partnership in-
terests are then sold directly to the public by the PTP, sold by the corporate partner, or 
distributed to the corporation's shareholders. See id. In an acquisition transaction, the PTP 
is again managed by the corporate general partner, but the PTP purchases its operating 
assets from the corporation or a third party. See id. at 23. In a liquidation transaction, a 
corporation liquidates and the PTP acquires its assets. This transaction is less desirable 
after the 1986 Act's repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. See id. at 23-24; infra note 247. 
17 See 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7. 
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through hearings, spurred the 1987 OBRA PTP changes.18 These 
House and Senate hearings, which included the testimony of then 
Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy Roger Mentz, and the 
Joint Committee on Taxation staff pamphlets prepared for the 
hearings, 19 contain the most thorough congressional and adminis-
trative examination of entity classification to date. Unfortunately, 
politics20 tended to obscure the Treasury's and Joint Committee 
staff's astute policy analysis,21 as was evident in the final 
legislation. 22 
C. Integration 
During the 1954 Code era, at roughly the same times as they 
carried on entity classification studies, the tax writing committees 
and Treasury also took up the corporate-shareholder integration 
18 See infra notes 56-107 and accompanying text. 
•• See MLP Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8; Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, 
supra note 8. 
•• Committee Chairman Rangel frequently reminded those appearing before the Subcom-
mittee on Select Revenue Measures during the 1987 hearings on MLPs that the Subcommit-
tee was seeking a policy discussion. See 1987 House MLP Hearings, supra note 16, at 4, 7, 
104-106, 205, 247, 291. 
•• The 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, detailed the taxation of 
entities spread across the taxable entity continuum, later incorporated in part of the legisla-
tive history of the 1986 Code and OBRA, but more importantly it based classification of 
active business entities as to both corporations and partnerships on whether the entity acted 
separately from its owners. See id. at 14, 17. The 1987 MLP Hearing Pamphlet set forth 
details of the tax treatment on the "continuum" even more clearly and classified the subcat-
egories of PTPs. See supra note 8. The 1987 Staff analysis is directed at the arguments for 
and against corporate classification, ultimately coming down in favor of corporate classifica-
tion. See MLP Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 29-37; H.R. Rep. No. 391, lOOth Cong., 
1st Sess. 1065-67 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 House Report]. 
•• Thus, corporate PTPs are taxed more heavily than most publicly traded C corpora-
tions. See infra note 199 and accompanying text. Passthrough PTPs are treated as aggre-
gates subject to Subchapter K. See infra note 283 and accompanying text. Close C corpora-
tions (other than PSCs) enjoy graduated Subchapter C rates on retained earnings lower 
than materially participating owners' marginal rates. See infra note 33. Adherence to the 
Staffs focus on control of the entity or its business would have avoided the legislated errors 
in the treatment of passthrough PTPs and close corporations. Only separation of the classi-
fication as separate entity or aggregate issue from the integration issue, of which the Staff 
did not conceive, could have avoided the corporate PTP treatment error. Finally, OBRA 
correctly applied separate entity treatment to passthrough PTP losses, with a complete sep-
arate basket approach. See infra notes 89, 295 and accompanying text. However, this sepa-
rate basket approach reveals the policy defect in the general PAL passive gain/passive Joss 
netting rule and results in economic inefficiency. See infra note 300 and accompanying text. 
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issue.23 Unfortunately, here too the tax committees and Treasury 
manifested no particular interest in deep structure analysis of the 
two-tier corporate tax, save in Treasury's 1977 Blueprints for Tax 
Reform.24 Indeed, on two occasions during the 1954 Code reform 
•• Chairman Wilbur Mills undertook three rounds of hearings on basic tax policy from 
1955-1960, following a format of presentations by witnesses, usually followed by questioning 
from the Chair and on occasion, debates. As to technical substantive areas Chairman Mills 
appointed advisory groups for reports on Subchapters C, J and K, with hearings on their 
reports as well. See, e.g., Hearings on General Revenue Revision before the House Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 2d Sess (Part 3) 2458-3259 (1958) [hereinafter 1958 Mills 
Hearings); Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K of 
the Internal Revenue Code before the House Ways & Means Comm., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1959) [hereinafter 1959 Advisory Group Hearings]. Integration, or at least double taxation 
and responses and capital accumulation in small businesses, was discussed in all three policy 
proceedings. See 1955 Tax Policy Hearings, supra note 7, at 502-12, 520-24, 554-56, 565, 585-
92; 1958 Mills Hearings, supra, at 57-60, 72-79, 231, 301-03, 327 (1958); Panel Discussion on 
Income Tax Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 831-
915, 921-939 (1959) [hereinafter 1959 Panel Discussion). Position papers were presented for 
the first and third rounds of the Mills Hearings. See Joint Comm. on Economic Growth and 
Stability, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing before the Sub-
comm. on Tax Policy (Comm. Print 1955) [hereinafter Tax Policy Papers]; House Comm. on 
Ways & Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Revision Compendium (Comm. Print 1959) 
[hereinafter Compendium]. An invaluable hearing pamphlet was prepared for the first of 
these proceedings. Staff of Joint Comm. on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., The 
Federal Revenue System: Facts and Problems (Comm. Print 1956) (prepared for November 
1955 Hearings held by Chairman Mills of the Tax Policy Subcommittee). Mills' studies un-
fortunately bore little fruit directly. See 131 Cong. Rec. H12,243 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1985) 
(statement of Speaker of the House O'Neill); Birnbaum & Murray, Showdown at Gucci 
Gulch 174 (1987). 
In 1978 Chairman AI Ullman took up the cry for "integration" after the Carter Adminis-
tration abandoned it due to the big C corporations' dislike of dividend pay-out incentives. 
See Hearings on the President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals before the 
House Committee on Ways & Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Part 1) 94, 95, 102, 486-88 
(statement of Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal), (Part 9) 6144-51 (statement of Profes-
sor Graetz) (1978) [hereinafter 1978 House Hearings]; Minarik, How Tax Reform Came 
About, 37 Tax Notes 1359, 1363 (Dec. 28, 1987). Espousal of radical tax changes was 
thought risky by conventional wisdom ever since the late Chairman Ullman's espousal of a 
value added tax ("VAT"), which appeared to be the direct cause of his defeat in his next bid 
for reelection. See Birnbaum & Murray, supra, at 194-195; Minarik, supra, at 1366. 
The Treasury Department undertook a study completed in 1984, 1984 Treasury Propos-
als, supra note 9, some of which eventually made its way into the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
See Sunley, A Summing Up of the 1986 Act; What Happened to Comprehensive Income 
Taxation?, 34 Tax Notes 63 (Jan. 5, 1987). However, much of what Treasury recommended 
was not included in the 1986 Act. For example, the Treasury Proposals advocated more 
economically realistic depreciation schedules for assets and greater accounting for inflation 
in not only the figuring of tax brackets, but also depreciation, inventories, and capital gains. 
See id. at 64. Treasury also recommended permitting corporations to deduct fifty percent of 
dividends paid, see id.; neither recommendation was included in the 1986 Act. See id. 
•• U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 64-67 (2d rev. ed. 1984) [here-
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process, the administrations then in office simultaneously advo-
cated a limited form of corporate-shareholder integration and 
treatment of large limited partnerships as regular C corporations,211 
an apparent policy conflict noted by those seeking to preserve the 
status quo.26 The root of this conflict was a desire to encourage 
capital formation through new equity instead of retained earnings 
or debt investment,27 rather than deep structure policy, which un-
inafter Blueprints]. The Blueprints, the first edition of which was released late in the Ford 
administration, called for complete integration of corporate-shareholder taxation with "first-
day" imputation as a corollary of a consumption tax and of elimination of the capital gains 
preference. See also Canellos, Corporate Tax Integration: By Design or by Default, 35 Tax 
Notes 999, 1001 (June 8, 1987). 
10 President Carter's administration at one point supported both integration and treat-
ment of limited partnerships with more than fifteen limited partners as corporations. See 
1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 6151 (statement of Professor Graetz), 1978 Presi-
dent's Proposals, supra note 9, at 11 (President Carter's reclassification proposal). Similarly, 
Assistant Secretary Mentz advocated classification of master limited partnerships as corpo-
rations in the same administration that earlier had unsuccessfully supported corporate 
shareholder integration. See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 10-11 
(statement of Mentz). 
•• See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 41 (statement of William Mc-
Kee). Cf. Keyser, supra note 12, at 10-5 (suggesting Subchapter S is more desirable than 
Subchapter C). 
11 Witnesses, particularly economists, frequently maintained throughout the three sets of 
Mills hearings on tax policy, see supra note 23, that the double tax structure encouraged 
financing from debt and retained earnings. Not surprisingly in the 1955 Tax Policy Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 507, 509, Chairman Mills of the Subcommittee on Tax Policy clearly 
articulated his interest in integration as producing more equity capital and thereby alleviat-
ing the necessity of as much debt financing. At the same time, members of the Subcommit-
tee learned that C corporations were actually used by high income shareholder as inside tax 
shelters through deferred tax on retained earnings. See id. at 526 (statement of Rep. Curtis), 
551 (Chairman Mills questioning Dr. Hall), 586 (statement of Dr. Hall). Indeed, in the 1959 
Panel Discussions, Chairman Mills pointed out the 1954 Code dividend exclusion provision 
was enacted "not because of the theory of double taxation so much, nor the question of 
whether or not corporate [taxes] were shifted or not shifted as much as the thought that 
this treatment of dividend income might serve as an incentive to the investment in corpo-
rate shares." 1959 Panel Discussions, supra note 23, at 855. The same purpose motivated the 
1978 Integration Proposals. See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 855 (colloquy be-
tween Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal and Chairman Ullman with Ullman stating 
that "one of our great problems in business is over reliance on debt and under utilization of 
equity. I think your restoring investment in equity in this country is one of the goals we 
should try to achieve in order to revitalize our economy.") Similarly, the motivation of the 
1984 Treasury Proposals' reduction of taxation of corporate earnings through a fifty percent 
dividends paid deduction was the encouragement of equity financing over debt financing on 
economic efficiency grounds. See 1984 Treasury Proposals, supra note 9, at 135; Hearings on 
Tax Aspects of Acquisitions and Mergers before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Subcomm. 
on Select Revenue Measures of the House Ways & Means Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 
(1985) [hereinafter Acquisitions and Mergers Hearings] (statement of David Brockway, 
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doubtedly drove the 1954 and 1986 Code integration studies. This 
emphasis on capital formation was probably a cause of the lack of 
deep structure analysis in the classification area as well. 
The desirability of close C corporation graduated rates, meant to 
encourage or subsidize capital formation in small businesses (even 
if only via increased retained earnings28) was discussed in each in-
tegration debate.29 The graduated rates generated the economic in-
efficiencies30 of horizontal disparity as to businesses conducted in 
Chief of Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation). 
18 See 1958 Mills Hearings, supra note 23 at 2956-66 (statement of Frazar Wilde, Presi-
dent of Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.), 3027-29, 3032. 
•• See 1955 Tax Policy Hearings, supra note 7, at 545-47, 551 (statement of Dr. Hall). Dr. 
Hall, a witness at the hearings, called for integration to put an end to close C corporation 
tax shelters and the conversion of low taxed retained earnings into capital gains or the date 
of death elimination of tax. See id. Other economists opposed integration because it would 
impose high outside rates on retained earnings or because a dividends paid deduction would 
tilt the playing field away from small close corporations. See id. at 554-556, 560, 562-564 
(debate between Dr. Hall, Edwin Cohen, Committee Chairman Mills, and others). See also 
1959 Panel Discussions, supra note 23, at 845-846, 854-55 (Dr. Shoup summarizing inside 
shelter use of C corporations in 1950 and suggesting full integration as to those who use C 
corporation as inside shelter), 860-61 (debate on incidence of corporate tax and premise of 
over- and under-taxation of shareholders), 863-64 (colloquy between Dr. Shoup and Repre-
sentative Byrnes on parameters of inside shelter and difficulties in measuring extent of use, 
866-69 (summation by Representative Alger of policy and impact questions raised by wit-
nesses and ensuing debate); 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at (Part 6) 3516-33 (state-
ment of Professor Gaffney advocating mandatory partnership passthrough of income, at 
least as to close C corporations, to eliminate inside shelter). The 1984 Treasury Proposals 
simultaneously advocated elimination of the graduated inside corporate brackets in favor of 
a flat 33% on net corporate income and the creation of a 50% dividends paid deduction to 
ameliorate double taxation. See 1984 Treasury Proposals, supra note 9, at 128-29, 136. 
•• Treasury explained the theory of economic efficiency or neutrality as follows: 
One of the primary advantages of a free market economy is its tendency to allocate 
economic resources to their most productive uses. For example, market forces lead 
business firms to produce what consumers want in ways that are relatively efficient 
and economical. Any tax inevitably discourages the type of activity that is taxed. An 
ideal tax system would, however, interfere with private decisions as little as possible. 
That is, it would not unnecessarily distort choices about how income is earned and 
how it is spent. It would not unduly favor leisure over work, or consumption over 
saving and investment. It would not needlessly cause business rums to modify their 
production techniques or their decisions on how to finance their activities. A neutral 
tax policy would not induce businesses to acquire other firms or to be acquired by 
them merely for tax considerations. It would not discourage risk-taking or the forma-
tion of new businesses. It would not discourage competition by granting special pref-
erences only to one industry or one type of financial institution. In short, an ideal tax 
system would be as neutral as possible toward private decisions. Any deviation from 
this principle represents implicit endorsement of governmental intervention in the 
economy - an insidious form of industrial policy based on the belief that those re-
sponsible for tax policy can judge better than the marketplace what consumers want, 
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partnership form31 and vertical disparity as to wage earners in gen-
eral,32 an example of the results of the failure to apply a deep 
structure analysis to the integration issue. Under the close C cor-
poration graduated rates, the corporate-shareholder structure 
how goods and services should be produced, and how business should be organized 
and financed. 
Economic neutrality is furthered by a few simple rules of tax design. Perhaps most 
importantly, income from all sources should be taxed equally; otherwise, too many 
resources will be devoted to activities subject to the lowest taxes. For the same rea-
son, tax liability should not depend on how income is spent. Uniform treatment of all 
sources and uses of income requires a comprehensive definition of income for tax 
purposes. 
1984 Treasury Proposals, supra note 9, at 13. 
The Joint Committee Staff succinctly explained the underlying economic theory: 
The output of the economy depends not only in the size of the capital stock but also 
on its composition. In the absence of taxes, the operation of a competitive economy 
causes capital to flow to sectors where it is expected to earn the highest rate of re-
turn. This results in the allocation of investment that produces the largest amount of 
national income. However, if non-neutral taxes are imposed, potential output may be 
reduced because too much capital will tend to accumulate in lightly taxed sectors, 
and too little capital will be invested in highly taxed sectors. Thus, in evaluating the 
effects of tax reform on capital formation it is necessary to examine both the level 
and allocation of investment. 
Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Economic Issues Relating to the 
House-Passed Tax Reform Bill (H.R. 3838), 7 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter Economic 
Issues] (footnote omitted). See generally, Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 395, 410-28 (1987). 
31 In the 1953 House Hearings accompanying the birth of the 1954 Code, F.N. Bard, an 
enterprising manufacturer and farmer from Illinois with an Arizona ranch, proposed a provi-
sion for relief of the business operating in the partnership form from the inequity of a 
higher tax rate than if operating in corporate form. See Hearings on Forty Topics Pertaining 
to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House Ways and Means 
Committee, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1364-65, 1368 (1953) [hereinafter 1953 House Hearings]. 
Bard proposed that unincorporated businesses be allowed to separate their venture capital 
income (income from direct operation of business) from income received from investment in 
stocks, bonds and other investments. Id. at 1364. A corporate rate would apply to the busi-
ness venture income and the individual tax rates to investment or non-business venture 
capital income. Id. 
•• Net business income is taxed at 15% in the case of small C corporations, see I.R.C. § 
ll(b)(l)(A) (tax on corporations is 15 percent of income up to $50,000), whereas most wages 
are taxed at 15%, some at 28%, and in the rare case, 33%. See I.R.C. § 1. Therefore, rates 
on income from capital are less than the rates on income from personal services. See gener-
ally 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 3510 (statement of Jerry Godell). This consti-
tutes the mirror image of the populist origins of the twentieth century income tax. See infra 
note 325 and accompanying text. "From the standpoint of fairness, not the slightest justifi-
cation can be offered." Chirelstein, Back From the Dead: How President Reagan Saved the 
Income Tax, 14 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 207, 211 (1986) (contrasting lower effective rate on in-
vestment income due to tax preferences with income from personal services). See also Yorio, 
supra note 30, at 401 n.49; infra note 43. 
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yielded less revenue on earnings than direct taxation would have88, 
leaving the double tax system vulnerable to a "briar patch" argu-
ment84 used by defenders of the status quo. The real issue is not 
whether a "double" tax is collected, but whether Treasury will col-
lect the equivalent of even a single tax. 811 
President Carter's Treasury, as the defender of the fisc and 
hence the policy of vertical and horizontal equity,88 strongly op-
posed the inside shelter of the close C corporation. 87 President 
Reagan's Treasury, however, abandoned this position sub silentio 
in the 1986 passthrough entity hearings, ostensibly to promote cer-
tainty and ease of administration by acquiescing in state law cor-
porate form,88 but surely due in fact to political pressures (the les-
son garnered from the political experience of the 1984 Treasury 
proposal which called for repeal of the inside graduated corporate 
•• See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Reform Proposals: 
Corporate Taxation 4-5 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter Corporate Tax Reform Proposals]. 
•• The author's colleague Charles Koch, discussing the myth of double taxation, see supra 
note 29, insightfully dubbed double taxation as a "Brer Rabbit and the Briarpatch" argu-
ment. Corporate shareholders, like rabbits in a briarpatch, never thought that the double 
tax "thorns" of the 1954 Code "briarpatch" would pierce them. Defenders of the status quo 
wanted the inside shelter of corporate and shareholder level taxation even while they argue 
that a real double tax exists, and Committee members knowingly gave it to them. Here 
Doernberg & McChesney's "tax contracts" analysis appears apt. Doernberg and McChesney 
adopt the idea that tax legislation is a contract. "Status as a legislator confers on a senator 
or representative the legal authority to help or hurt private interests through taxation. In 
exchange for being helped or hurt, private interests will compensate legislators" with contri-
butions to political campaigns, and even money for personal use. Doernberg & McChesney, 
On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 913, 
914 (1987). 
•• That this is the real issue was suggested by Professor Graetz at an American Associa-
tion of Law Schools Tax Workshop Luncheon in 1985. 
•• The authors of Showdown at Gucci Gulch paint the Treasury tax office prior to Assis-
tant Secretary for Tax Policy Roger Mentz' tenure from 1986 to 1987 as by-and-large stand-
ing "somewhat above politics, promoting 'good' tax policy and opposing 'bad' tax policy." 
Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 23, at 262. Be that as it may, Mentz himself prides himself 
on following politics and not tax ideals. See Sheppard & Rosen, An Interview With Assis-
tant Secretary J. Roger Mentz, 36 Tax Notes 465, 469 (Aug. 13, 1987). 
37 See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 136 (statement of Secretary of Treasury 
Blumenthal). 
•• Assistant Secretary Mentz admitted that few close C corporations possessed any of the 
traditional corporate resemblance factors. See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra 
note 8, at 19; infra note 120. However, he asserted that state law form, i.e., "objective" rules, 
was preferable to functional subjective classification, with the limited exception of publicly 
traded partnerships. See id. at 27-28. 
70 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 8:57 
brackets39) rather than sober-minded policy considerations. 
Corporate management's intransigence against full integration 
(due to fear of shareholder demands for distributions of earnings) 
has limited the integration debate over the past decade to dividend 
deduction or credit proposals.40 Such split-rate, partial integration 
proposals would have increased the vertical and horizontal inequi-
ties of the 1954 and 1986 Code treatment of corporations and 
shareholders.41 Not surprisingly, therefore, administration and con-
gressional attempts over the last decade, as in the fashioning of the 
1986 Code, to enact such partial integration proved unsuccessful as 
well.42 Consequently, the corporate two-tier tax system co~tinues, 
violating horizontal and vertical equity, although less so after the 
1986 Act's substantial increase of the corporate tax. •a 
•• 1984 Treasury Proposals, supra note 9, at 128-29. Early in the formulation of the Presi-
dent's proposals, Treasury Secretary Baker met with the president of the National Federa-
tion of Independent Business, "who was disturbed by the elimination of lower tax rates for 
small businesses." Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 23, at 80. 
•• See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 94, 102, 487 (statement of Secretary of the 
Treasury Blumenthal), 6148-50 (statement of Professor Graetz). Minarik describes the op-
position to Carter's partial integration proposal as splitting the investment and business 
communities. The split was widened by the proposed repeal of capital gains and helped to 
doom the Carter Tax Proposals. See Minarik, supra note 23, at 1363; 131 Cong. Rec. 
H12,243 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1987) (statement of Speaker O'Neill). 
•• See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 3504, 6107 (statement of former Commis-
sioner Sheldon Cohen). 
•• See Leonard, A Pragmatic View of Corporate Integration, 35 Tax Notes 889, 894 (June 
1, 1987); 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 25-26 (statement of Mentz). 
Then Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Ronald Pearlman has stated, however, that in 1985 
corporations were not opposed to dividend relief despite conventional wisdom; instead, op-
position arose from revenue implications. See President's Proposals, supra note 8, at 126; 
Acquisitions and Mergers Hearings, supra note 27, at 222 (1985) (statement of Assistant 
Secretary of Treasury Ronald Pearlman). 
•• One type of disparity is the horizontal and vertical disparity created by the lower rates 
that exist in a close C corporation compared to the shareholder's higher marginal bracket. 
See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The disparity as to large C corporations is more 
complex. Historically, the maximum large C corporation bracket has been considerably 
lower than the maximum outside individual bracket (e.g., 52% corporate versus 91% indi-
vidual in 1954 and 48% corporate versus 70% individual as to other than "earned income" 
in 1980 prior to ERTA), but ERTA narrowed the rate gap to 46% corporate vs. 50% indi-
vidual. The 1986 Code actually increased the maximum corporate rate (34%) above the 
nominal maximum individual rate (28%), but not by much for most high income taxpayers, 
i.e., 34% vs. phantom 33%. However, this may not be the correct comparison. The large C 
corporate effective rate (21% of economic income prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and 
26%. after the Act, see infra note 195 and accompanying text) is lower than the maximum 
individual marginal rate (28% or 33%) but not lower than the 19% to 22% of economic 
income effective rate for high income ("high income" includes two groupings of income 
. 
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D. The Tax Legislative Process 
The dominant pattern of tax reform under the 1954 Code was 
elimination of inflation-driven bracket creep through tax cuts and 
tax expenditures,•• with specific treatment of usually extreme tax 
abuses•~~ which nevertheless left basic tax expenditures in place. •e 
With the prospective (1985) wholesale elimination of bracket creep 
by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA") looming 
ahead, •7 the congressional budget and tax committees became the 
facilitators if not the driving force behind the substantial revenue 
increases enacted in 1982 and 1984,•8 during which time the ERTA 
rate cuts and indexing remained in effect. The 1986 Act provided 
an individual tax cut offset by an equivalent corporate sector tax 
increase•9 (probably adding needed progressivity to the Code110), 
levels, $100,000 to $200,000 and over $200,000) individual taxpayers before and after the 
Act. See Congressional Reports, Documents at a Glance: JCT Tables of Distributional Data 
by Income Class in Tax Reform Bill, 33 Tax Notes 73, 74 (Oct. 6, 1986) (a summary of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986). For 1988 the average income tax rate for individual taxpayers 
with income between $100,000 and $200,000 was estimated to be 18.9%; for taxpayers whose 
income exceeds $200,000, 22.3%. See id. Thus, prior to the 1986 Act, high income individu-
als and corporations carried a heavier effective rate on economic income. See infra note 195 
and accompanying text. 
•• The origins of the "tax expenditure" concept and Professor Surrey's role in its develop-
ment as Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy are traced in Forman, Origins of the 
Tax Expenditure Budget, 30 Tax Notes 537 (Feb. 10, 1986). 
•• See, e.g., the minimum tax and private foundation provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 
1969, Tax Reform Act of 1969 §§ 301, 101 (1969), and the at risk and capitalization of tax 
shelter expenditure provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Tax Reform Act of 1976 §§ 
201-214 (1976). 
•• Until the 1986 Code, individual tax shelter use continued to grow despite anti-shelter 
provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and of the tax revisions of 1982 and 1984. See 
Hearing on High-Income Taxpayers and Related Partnership Tax Issues before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight of the House Ways & Means Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 12-13, 18-
24, 43-44, 98 (1985) [hereinafter High-Income Taxpayer Hearings] (statement of Assistant 
Secretary of Treasury Ronald Pearlman). 
47 See ERTA § 104, Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172. See generally, Staff of Joint Comm. on 
Taxation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 38-40 (Comm. Print 1981). 
•• See Handler, Budget Reconciliation and the Tax Law: Legislative History or Legisla-
tive Hysteria?, 37 Tax Notes 1259, 1262-1263 (Dec. 21, 1987) (contrasting reconciliation 
driven legislation with collegial tax reform efforts, e.g., the Installment Sales Revision and 
Bankruptcy Tax Acts of 1980 and Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982); Leonard, Perspec-
tives on the Tax Legislative Process, 38 Tax Notes 969, 972-74 (Feb. 29, 1988). 
•• See Sunley, supra note 23, at 63. Questions have been raised as to whether the corpo-
rate sector increase will really be equivalent. See, e.g., The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Impli-
cations for the Future, Hearings Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, 72-
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and by indirect means substantially broadened the individual in-
come tax base (through changes often concentrated on high income 
taxpayers)111 and the corporate minimum tax base.112 OBRA, as its 
name indicates, was also driven by the budget reconciliation pro-
cess and provided further base broadening with a number of rela-
73 [hereinafter Future Implications of 1986 Act Hearings] (statement of Alan Greenspan) 
(corporate revenue assumptions based on continued high durable equipment outlays by pro-
ducers); Kiefer, The Progressivity Effects of the Individual Income Tax Revisions in the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 33 Tax Notes 1189, 1192 (Sep. 22, 1986) (timing or accounting 
changes which account for substantial part of corporate sector increase not equivalent to 
individual side permanent reductions). The preliminary data from fiscal year 1987 confirms 
this doubt as to the magnitude of the corporate sector increase. See infra note 234 . 
.. See Future Implications of the 1986 Act Hearings, supra note 49, at 15 (statement of 
Robert Mcintyre); Kiefer, supra note 49, at 1192; Ott, The Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act on Progressivity, 33 Tax Notes 1223, 1226 (Dec. 29, 1986); Sunley, supra note 23, at 63 
("while corporate tax incidence is always controversial, if one assumes that the increase in 
corporate taxes is borne by stockholders or owners of capital generally, the 1986 Act in-
creases the overall progressivity of the Federal income taxes"). The model on incidence Sun-
ley apparently uses is set forth in more detail in Ballentine, The Short-Run Distribution 
Effect of Tax Reform, 31 Tax Notes 1035, 1038-39 (June 9, 1986). 
•• The major individual side base broadeners were (1) the repeal of deduction for state 
and local taxes ($968 million in 1987, $5,197 million in 1988, $4,708 million in 1989, $4,907 
million in 1990, and $5,131 million in 1991, see Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess., General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 46 (Comm. Print 1986) 
[hereinafter 1986 Bluebook]); (2) raising the floor on deductibility of medical expenses ($186 
million in 1987, $1,223 million in 1988, $1,141 million in 1989, $1,276 million in 1990, and 
$1,427 million in 1991, see id. at 52); (3) imposing a floor on employee business expenses 
($694 million in 1987, $4,630 million in 1988, $4,716 million in 1989, $5,039 million in 1990, 
and $5,383 million in 1991, see id. at 81); (4) elimination of the capital gains preferences 
(not broken out from basic rate structure changes, see id. at 180); (5) passive activity gain 
and loss changes ($753 million in 1987, $3,008 in 1988, $4,831 million in 1989, $6,811 million 
in 1990, and $8,003 million in 1991, see id. at 251); (6) a new limitation on the deduction of 
consumer interest ($620 million in 1987,' $4,511 million in 1988, $6,260 million in 1989, 
$8,370 million in 1990, and $9,597 million in 1991, see id. at 270); and (7) a strengthened 
minimum tax ($848 million in 1987, $3,904 million in 1988, $2,251 million in 1989, $862 
million in 1990, and $334 million in 1991, see id. at 473). The effects of the last four items 
are concentrated in the upper income levels. See Kies, The Current Political, Budgetary, 
and Tax Policy Environment Suggests the Possibility of Major Federal Tax Legislation in 
the lOOth Congress, 35 Tax Notes 179, 184 (April 13, 1987) [hereinafter Kies]. 
•• See Sunley, supra note 23, at 65. The corporate minimum tax changes ($3,087 million 
in 1987, $5,387 million in 1988, $5,072 million in 1989, $4,466 million in 1990, and $4,155 
million in 1991, see 1986 Bluebook, supra note 51, at 473) pale in comparison to the capitali-
zation and long-term contract tax accounting changes ($7,243 million in 1987, $10,971 mil-
lion in 1988, $10,463 in 1989, $9,225 in 1990, and $7,384 million in 1991, see id. at 524, 530) 
and the repeal of lTC (which also impacts on individual taxpayers) ($18,879 million in 1987, 
$21,413 in 1988, $30,501 million in 1989, $37,692 million in 1990 and $46,802 million in 1991 
see id. at 126). 
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tively small revenue raising items,68 largely drawn from prior Joint 
Committee and Treasury studies. 64 OBRA maintained the 1986 
Act rate cuts and structural changes as to capital gains and PALs. 
Despite the base broadening, Ways and Means Committee Chair-
man Rostenkowski has said that he expects a major revenue in-
crease will be needed in 1989 and recently stated that he would 
"strongly resist" changes to the 1986 Code,66 presumably meaning, 
e.g., a return to the capital gains preference and higher rates of 
pre-1986 law. Such a statement may also signal that further base 
broadening, following the pattern of 1982, 1984 and 1987, may 
occur. 
II. OBRA CHANGES To TAXATION oF PTPs AND PSCs 
A. Classification of PTPs 
1. Treatment as a Corporation 
New section 7704(a) treats a PTP as a corporation for federal 
income tax purposes. 66 On the first day of such treatment, a PTP 
•• See Teuber, Ways and Means Democrats Approve $6.3 Billion in Revenue Raisers, Will 
Complete Action This Week, 37 Tax Notes 119, 121 (Oct. 12, 1987) [hereinafter Teuber, 
Ways and Means]; Teuber, GOP Maneuvering Cuts Ways and Means Markup Short, 37 Tax 
Notes 6-8 (Oct. 5, 1987). The author counts thirty-two income and estate and gift revenue 
increase provisions, including extension of effective date provisions. 
.. Senator Bentsen, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, was outwardly more re-
ceptive to looking at "leftovers" from the 1984 Treasury Proposals, supra note 9, and the 
1985 President's Proposals, supra note 9, than were the House Democrats. See Teuber, Fi-
nance to Look at Treasury I and Treasury II for Revenue, 37 Tax Notes 9 (Oct. 5, 1987) 
(Sen. Bentsen states he will look to Treasury proposals for raising revenue); Teuber, Ways 
and Means, supra note 53, at 120 (Rep. Rostenkowski reports House Democrats reject the 
Treasury Proposals). 
•• Teuber & Rosenthal, Rostenkowski and Chapoton Speak on Tax Simplification, 38 Tax 
Notes 1288, 1289 (Mar. 21, 1988). Apparently the power of the idea of low rates and eco-
nomic efficiency has now seized Chairman Rostenkowski. Earlier he saw base broadening as 
a prelude to rate hikes. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1986, at B-11, col. 1 (Rostenkowski propo-
sal to raise rates). For an excellent populist manifesto along these lines, see Future Implica-
tions of the 1986 Act Hearings, supra note 49, at 18. The idea of low rates and economic 
efficiency has gained support among others as well. See, e.g., Tax Reform Symposium Pro-
ceedings, 31 Viii. L. Rev. 1787, 1792 (1986) (statement of David Brockway, Chief of Joint 
Comm. on Taxation StafO. 
08 I.R.C. § 7704(a) (1987). The effective date contains a ten year grandfather provision for 
PTPs existing on December 17, 1987. See OBRA § 102ll(c)(l)(B). Then Assistant Secretary 
Mentz predicted this grandfather clause and so argued for immediate PTP action, as it was 
better a grandfather now than later. See 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 51 
(statement of Mentz); 1987 House MLP Hearings, supra note 16, at 11, 35-36, 40 (statement 
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is deemed to transfer all of its partnership assets (subject to any 
partnership liabilities) to a newly formed corporation in exchange 
for its stock, which the PTP then distributes to its partners in 
liquidation.117 
"Publicly traded" means that the partnership's interests are 
traded on an established securities market or readily traded on a 
secondary market or substantial equivalent.118 An "established se-
curities market" includes an over-the-counter market as well as a 
national securities exchange.119 The secondary market test encom~ 
passes partnership interests where the owners are "readily able to 
buy, sell or exchange their partnership interests in a manner that 
is comparable, economically, to trading on an established securities 
market."60 The litmus test is the presence of a willing market 
maker, but occasional accommodation transfers or buy-sell trans-
actions do not usually constitute a secondary market or its 
equivalent.61 Congress deliberately left the interstices gray so as to 
discourage aggressive taxpayer arguments which have traditionally 
sought to take advantage of provisions which were once more 
of Mentz). 
•• See I.R.C. § 7704(0 (1987). This rule contravenes the general partnership incorporation 
rule where, most recently, form has controlled. See Rev. Rul. 84-11, 1984-2 C.B. 88 (revoking 
Rev. Rul. 70-239, 1970-1 C.B. 74. The revoked ruling had adopted the rule later enacted by 
OBRA.). See generally Barrie & Jones, Incorporating an Ongoing Partnership: Selecting the 
Appropriate Method, 3 J. Part. Tax'n 335 (1987) (examination of the consequences of incor-
porating a partnership; results depend on form of transaction). Tax reform seems to be a 
time for settling old scores of administrators, as OBRA well illustrates in this provision as 
well as in other OBRA provisions. For example, § 10222, I.R.C. § 1503(e), overruled Woods 
Investment Co., 85 T.C. 274 (1985). And § 10402 of OBRA, l.R.C. § 2036(c), overturned 
prior service defeats in the area of estate tax regarding estate freezes. See Estate of Boykin 
v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 345 (1987). See generally Abbin, Taking the Tempera-
ture of Asset Value Freeze Approaches: What's Hot, What's Not, 66 Taxes 3 (1988). 
•• See I.R.C. § 7704(b). 
•• See 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1070; H.R. Rep. No. 495, lOOth Cong., 1st 
Sess. 947 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Conference Report]. 
•• 1987 Conference Report, supra note 59, at 948. Then Assistant Secretary of Treasury 
Mentz had suggested that it would be necessary to go beyond registration on a stock ex-
change to include situations "where there is a market made by one or more investment 
bankers so that you have, in effect, the same degree of shareholder liquidity as in a publicly 
held corporation." 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 52. The Conference report 
went beyond the question of whether a market had been made, and focused on the market 
characteristics of certainty and liquidity and whether they were present. See Sheppard, The 
Poker Game: Defining "Publicly Traded Partnership", 39 Tax Notes 22 (April 4, 1988). 
81 1987 Conference Report, supra note 59, at 948. Exercises of put or call rights, however, 
may give rise to such "ready tradeability." See id. 
Q 
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"bright line."62 
2. Passive Business Passthrough Exception 
If 90% or more of a PTP's gross income consists of qualifying 
· "passive-type income," statutory corporate classification does not 
attach under section 7704(a) and (c).63 The "passive-type" income 
concept is familiar in the contexts of corporations receiving special 
treatment (e.g., personal holding companies or "PHCs"64 and pass-
through separate entity S corporations66) as well as conduit sepa-
rate entities (including RICs66 and REITs67). Section 7704(d) uses 
•• Sheppard, supra note 60, at 22-24. For an discussion of publicly "offered" limited part-
nerships, "trading desks," and NAPEX (National Partnership Exchange) and public trad-
ing, see id. Sheppard correctly points out that§ 7704(b)'s standard of readily traded on the 
substantial equivalent of a secondary market was intended as a "back stop," not as a widen-
ing of the reclassification net to catch large publicly offered and traded limited partner-
ships. See id. at 22. But she raises the interesting question whether in fact some common 
public offering practices, such as trading desks, listing on NAPEX or certain redemptions 
and resales, may functionally constitute public trading. If so, this question might be more 
appropriately addressed by Congress and not the drafters of regulations. 
•• I.R.C. § 7704(c)(2), (a) . 
.. See I.R.C. § 543. 
•• See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(D). 
88 See I.R.C. § 851(b)(2). A "regulated investment company" ("RIC") or mutual fund is a 
domestic corporation meeting the Investment Company Act of 1940 registration require-
ments in that it derives at least 90% of its ordinary income from passive investment income, 
has a diversified portfolio, and distributes at least 90% of its net income to shareholders. 
1986 Bluebook, supra note 51, at 375. 
I d. 
A RIC generally is subject to the regular corporate tax, but receives a deduction for 
dividends paid to its shareholders. Thus, a RIC is treated, in essence, as a conduit for 
Federal income tax purposes. A RIC does not receive a deduction with respect to 
dividends paid unless the distribution is pro rata with respect to other shares of the 
same class (sec. 562(c)). 
A limited passthrough of entity-level long-term capital gain is provided. See id. No ordinary 
or capital loss passthrough is available; therefore, loss as to mutual fund shares is recognized 
under the general rules applicable to shares of stock. See infra notes 219-20 and accompany-
ing text. 
07 See I.R.C. § 856(c)(2). 
In general, a real estate investment trust ("REIT") is an entity that receives most 
of its income from passive real estate related investments and that receives conduit 
treatment for income that is distributed to shareholders. If an entity meets the quali-
fications for REIT status, the portion of its income that is distributed to the investors 
each year generally is taxed to the investors without being subjected to a tax at the 
REIT level; the REIT is subject to a corporate tax only on the income that it retains 
and on certain income from property that qualifies as foreclosure property. . . . 
In order to qualify as a REIT and thereby receive conduit treatment, an entity 
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a rationalized PHC-type model in defining passive-type income as 
interest, dividends and the true targets,68 real property rents and 
income from mineral or natural resource development, and gains 
from assets used in such activities.69 However, PTP passive-type 
income is not coextensive with PHC or any other passive income 
scheme, e.g., the Code's PAL or Subchapter S provisions.70 
Congress in effect made the REIT rules non-exclusive, with cer-
tain REIT -type income qualifying for passthrough PTP treat-
ment. 71 A Treasury representative and a witness for the apartment 
rental industry who testified at the master limited partnership 
hearings demonstrated that the existing REIT provisions were 
more restrictive than the PTP format as to control, management, 
distribution requirements and reinvestment of certain gains.72 But 
must satisfy four tests on a year-by-year basis; organizational structure, source of 
income, nature of assets, and distribution of income. These tests are intended to al-
low conduit treatment in circumstances in which a corporate tax otherwise would be 
imposed, only_if there really is a pooling of investment arrangement that is evidenced 
by its organizational structure, if its investments are basically in real estate assets, 
and if its income is passive income from real estate investment, as contrasted with 
income from the operation of business involving real estate. In addition, substantially 
all of the entity's income must be passed through to its shareholders on a current 
basis. 
1986 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 769. REITs also may passthrough long-term capital 
gain through a "capital gain dividend." See id. at 770. 
88 See 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 73-74 (statement of Mentz); 1986 
Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 31 (statement of Mentz); 1987 House Report, 
supra note 21, at 1068. Assistant Secretary Mentz' explanation for the Administration's re-
view of the PTP issue in 1987 after having supported the Treasury position in 1986 was its 
concern about "the effects that changes in classification of MLPs would have on activities 
traditionally conducted in partnership form." 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 
48, 55 (statement of Mentz). See also Sheppard, No More, No More: Finance Subcommittee 
Ponders Entity Classification, 36 Tax Notes 360, 361 (July 27, 1987). 
•• See I.R.C. § 7704(d)(l){C), (E), {F). The odd inclusion for fertilizer as a "natural re-
source" probably arose from a recent acquisition PTP in that field. See 1987 ~enate MLP 
Hearings, supra note 7, at 89. 
70 See generally 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1069. 
71 See I.R.C. § 7704(c){2), (d)(3). 
71 See 1987 House MLP Hearings, supra note 16, at 353-55 (statement of Lewis Sandler 
of the National Apartment Association) (listing substantive differences between REITs and 
real estate PTPs focusing on management and distribution requirements and reinvestment 
restrictions), 73 (statement of Herbert Lerner of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants), 316, 320 (statement of Myles Tanenbaum of EQK Partners). See also Pass-
through Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 11; and 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, 
supra note 7, at 47 (statement of Mentz). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 liberalized many 
existing REIT rules, see 1986 Bluebook, supra note 51, at 390, while tightening other REIT 
and other conduit entity rules, especially deferral of mutual fund income. See id. at 376-82. 
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new section 7704(c)(3) denied the continued passive business pass-
through exception to nearly every PTP which could qualify as a 
RIC or mutual fund (except for a PTP selling, for example, com-
modities or commodities futures)73 so as not "to alter the require-
ments for conduit tax treatment ... applicable to regulated in-
vestment companies";74 and the legislative history extends this 
proscription to REMICs.711 However, any policy distinction be-
tween REITs and RICs or REMICs appears tenuous. 
Rules similar to those of REITs apply to incidental rentals of 
personal property in connection with a rental of real property.78 
Rent contingent on income or profits of a non-real estate activity 
usually does not qualify for passthrough treatment, due to the 
greater degree of downside risk and upside potential for economic 
gain. 77 This is an important new distinction, focusing not on the 
activities of the enterprise, the traditional criterion for passive or 
active business status,78 but on a risk or economic analysis of the 
return on investment. 
The legislative history carefully points out that meeting the pas-
sive income tests does not imply that entities generating such in-
come are presumed to be partnerships.79 While this seemingly 
opens the door for regulatory or judicial reclassification of such 
Nevertheless, REITs were not popular to real estate operators due to inflexibility and mar-
ket perception. See 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 134 (statements of Cohen 
and Sandler). See generally id. at 198-99 (statements of Cohen and Chapoton); Sheppard, 
Sleeping Dogs: Publicly Traded Limited Partnerships Come of Age, 34 Tax Notes 1254, 
1255 (Mar. 30, 1987). 
73 The new provision does not apply to PTPs selling commodities or commodities futures. 
See I.R.C. § 7704(c)(3). 
7
• 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1068. 
70 See id. at 1068. 
78 See I.R.C. § 7704(d)(3). 
77 See 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1068-69. 
I d. 
[A]mounts based on gross income earned in connection with a non-real estate related 
activity such as a fast food operation are not treated as passive-type income. Interest 
or rent (or other amounts) contingent on profits involves a greater degree of risk, and 
also a greater potential for economic gain, than fixed (or even a market-indexed) rate 
of interest or rent, and thus is more properly regarded as from an underlying active 
business activity. Passive-type rental income also does not include income from rental 
or leasing of personal property. 
78 See Lee, Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talis-
mans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a Touch of Basics, 6 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 109-11 (1986). 
79 See 1987 House Report, supra note 20, at 1068. 
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passthrough PTPs as corporations, reflections on policy and study 
of the past indicate that both Treasury and the courts should and 
will be reluctant to effectuate what Congress has failed to do.80 
Congress provided relatively generous rules for inadvertent fail-
ure to meet the 90% passive-type income floor. If the IRS deter-
mines the failure was inadvertent, the partnership takes steps 
within a reasonable time (one year, except to the extent the regula-
tions provide otherwise81), and the partnership and each unit 
holder during the failure period agree to make "adjustments,"82 
the partnership will be treated as meeting the 90% floor during 
the failure period. 83 
B. PTPs and PAL Provisions 
1. Active Business PTPs 
The legislative history explains that income from PTPs classi-
fied as corporations generally is treated as dividend or "portfolio 
income,"84 which passive activity losses may not offset.811 According 
to a recent House report, "regardless of whether such income is 
characterized as income or gain (e.g., depending on whether it rep-
resents a distribution of earnings and profits under section 301), 
80 See, e.g., Achiro v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881, 884-95 and n.17 (1981) (court notes that 
Congress is aware of disparate treatment of self-employed individuals and corporate share-
holder-employees and has not chosen to change the situation through legislation); 1987 Sen-
ate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 46 (statement of Mentz). 
•• See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
•• The nature of the adjustments is not described in new section 7704(e), only that the 
adjustments will be made "as required by the Secretary." I.R.C. § 7704(e). 
•• See id. See also 1987 Conference Report, supra note 59, at 944. 
84 According to one commentator, 
Portfolio income includes, as a general rule, the following types of income derived 
directly or indirectly through a pass-through entity: 
(1) Income from interest, dividends, annuities and royalties not derived in the or-
dinary course of a trade or business. 
(2) Gain attributable to the disposition of property producing income of a type 
described in (1), above. 
(3) Gain attributable to the disposition of property held for investment (other than 
an interest in a passive activity). 
Mertens Law of Federal Income Tax § 24C.09 (1986) (footnotes omitted). See I.R.C. § 
469(e)(l)(A)(i)(I), (ii)(I), (ii)(II). 
•• Under the PAL rules, losses from a passive activity generally cannot offset positive 
income sources such as portfolio income or salary prior to a taxable disposition. See 1986 
Bluebook, supra note 51, at 212-13, 215. See generally Rock & Shaviro, Passive Losses and 
the Improvement of Net Income Measurement, 7 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (1987). 
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income from such entities is properly treated as portfolio income 
for purposes of the passive loss rule. "88 Presumably such owner-
level realization of portfolio income is triggered by actual distribu-
tions and not by the mere presence of a "distributive share" with-
out distribution, which is the partnership rule.87 Entity-level losses 
from such a corporate PTP are not passed through to shareholders 
but instead are carried back and forward under the NOL rules.88 
2. Complete Separate Basket Treatment for Passthrough PTPs 
New section 469(k)(l) mandates complete "separate basket" ap-
plication of the passive loss rules to each passthrough publicly 
traded partnership. 89 In essence, this PAL passthrough PTP rule 
results in losses from a pas'sthrough PTP being offsettable against 
income from that PTP only. Moreover, passive losses inside a pass-
through PTP cannot offset its own inside portfolio income.90 (This 
theme runs throughout the PAL provisions.91) Finally, positive in-
come from a pass through PTP is treated as portfolio .income. 92 
The intended overall result is that net losses and credits of a part-
ner from each publicly traded partnership be suspended at the 
partner level, carried forward (not back) and netted against in-
come, other than the partnership's portfolio income, from (or tax 
liability attributable to) that publicly traded partnership, and that 
suspended losses are allowed upon a complete disposition of the 
partner's interest in the partnership. [And a partner's distributive 
share of a passthrough PTP's income cannot soak up, i.e., be offset 
by, passive activity losses].93 
The drafters of the House PAL-PTP provision reasoned that 
while a non-passthrough PTP would be treated as a corporation 
for all purposes, including the PAL rules, with any distributions 
treated as portfolio income and its losses not passing through, 9" 
"" 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1071. 
87 See I.R.C. § 702 (rules for accounting for partnership income). 
88 See I.R.C. § 172 (net operating losses). 
•• See I.R.C. § 469(k)(1). See generally Lipton, Section 469 and PTP's: Impact of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, 38 Tax Notes 183 (Jan. 11, 1988). 
00 See 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1074. 
" See 1986 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 728-30. 
•• See 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1071, 1073. 
•• 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1074 . 
.. See id. at 1071. 
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PTPs not treated as corporations or passthrough PTPs could 
maintain (absent regulatory recharacterization of their income as 
"portfolio income" (i.e., as not passive activity gain) under original 
section 469(k)) that their income constituted "passive income," 
thus soaking up PALs.90 The House separate basket PAL rule was 
designed to forestall both use of income from a passthrough PTP 
to soak up PAL losses and generation of PAL losses by a pass-
through PTP. Treatment of other PTPs as corporations and their 
income as portfolio income achieves roughly the same result. The 
same result will occur at the owner level as to income from pass-
through and separate entity PTPs only if the owners' distributive 
share of taxable income from a passthrough PTP and actual (cash 
flow) distributions from a corporate PTP can be made to coincide. 
The inside loss regimes for active and passive activity PTPs, how-
ever, may vary substantially, creating horizontal disparities, at 
least as to non-portfolio income activities. 
Whether the passthrough-PAL-suspension-of-losses model or the 
model incorporating limited NOL carryback and carryover, with no 
direct offset against disposition of gain, applies to corporate PTPs 
is hard to judge, based on the statutory language and legislative 
history. The 1987 conference report flatly states that it follows the 
Senate amendment of the House bill (with modifications not here 
relevant),96 but the Senate amendment did not treat any PTPs as 
corporations.97 Hence, the conference PAL-PTP rule ended up en-
compassing all PTPs, not just passthrough (i.e., passive-type in-
come) PTPs. Finally, new section 469(k)(l) speaks only of publicly 
traded partnerships, without further limitation as to passthrough 
PTPs. (The House provision was similarly worded.) If the PAL-
PTP rule encompassed all PTPs, the PAL-PTP inside portfolio in-
come passive loss separate basket rule literally-but not logi-
cally-would apply under section 469(k) inside to a corporate 
•• See id. at 1072. While testimony at the 1987 House MLP Hearings implied this stance, 
see 1987 House MLP Hearings, supra note 16, at 366 (statement of Jeffrey Rosenthal on 
behalf of the National Association of Realtors and Real Estate Securities and Syndication 
Institution), the legislative history to the 1986 Code suggests otherwise. See 1986 Senate 
Report, supra note 8, at 730 (example of roll-out MLP distributed by C corporation); 1986 
Bluebook, supra note 51, at 234; 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 12-13 
(statement of Mentz). 
08 See 1987 Conference Report, supra note 59, at 952. 
•• See S. Rep. No. 63, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Senate Report]. 
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PTP. But this reading would produce conflicts between the envi-
sioned individualized suspension of PAL-PTP losses98 and corpo-
rate-NOL rules.99 Obviously a technical correction is in order. 
The final OBRA provision100 excepted from the passthrough 
PTP separate PAL basket the $25,000 (deduction equivalent) per 
natural partner offset under the then-existing PAL rules for rental 
real estate losses (with a waiver for low-income housing of an oth-
erwise applicable "active participation" requirement).101 According 
to the 1987 conference report, "a partner in a publicly traded part-
nership may utilize his share of partnership low income housing 
credits and rehabilitation credits against tax liability attributable 
to non-partnership income to the extent of his unused $25,000 (de-
duction equivalent) allowance."102 
3. Definitional Conflict 
The new PAL passthrough PTP provision contains a more fun-
damental technical flaw which is possibly fatal. Section 469(c) pro-
vides the definition of the centerpiece of the PAL regime: "passive 
activity," which it defines as "any activity ... (A) which involves 
the conduct of any trade or business, and (B) in which the tax-
payer does not materially participate. moa PAL was thus aimed at 
active business/passive owner combinations. In contrast, pass-
through PTP provisions were targeted at passive activity/passive 
owner combinations. The 1986 Senate legislative history focuses al-
most exclusively on "material participation" or passivity of owner-
ship, with no amplification of the first part of the definition: "con-
duct of a trade or business." Historically a passive operation, such 
as net leasing of real estate or mere collection of income, did not 
08 See supra note 93. 
08 See I.R.C. § 172(b). 
100 See I.R.C. § 469(i)(1), (6)(8) and (k)(1) (last sentence). 
101 See I.R.C. § 469(i)(1), (2), and (6)(8). 
101 1987 Conference Report, supra note 59, at 952. This carve-out for low income housing 
and rehabilitation credits was strongly supported by Ways and Means Subcommittee Chair-
man Rangel. See Hearings on Tax Shelters, Accounting Abuses, and Corporate and Securi-
ties Reforms before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1984) 
[hereinafter Tax Shelter Hearings] (exchange between Rep. Rangel and Assistant Secretary 
for Tax Policy John Chapoton); Matthews, Treasury Opposes Expansion of Low-Income 
Housing Credit, 38 Tax Notes 1014 (Mar. 7, 1988). 
103 See I.R.C. § 469(c). 
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attain trade or business status, but mere investment status. 104 The 
1986 Code provides an ad hoc regulatory remedy, which encom-
passes most rental real estate, for this conceptual defect.1011 Section 
469(c)(6) authorizes regulations which are to include in the term 
"trade or business" any activity in connection with the section 212 
production of income. But the legislative history indicates that a 
narrow reading of section 469(c)(6) is in order, such that activities 
generating more than portfolio income but not rising to trade or 
business status are considered passive activities.108 The result is 
that while Congress intended that section 469 apply separately to 
items attributable to a pass through PTP, the section read literally 
would not apply at all to losses from a passthrough PTP if 90% of 
its gross income is derived from interest or dividends, i.e., portfolio 
income, since the generation of such income does not constitute a 
"passive activity."107 Thus losses from an interest or dividend 
earning pass through PTP appear not to be subject to any PAL 
rules. Note that real estate and natural resource income passth-
rough PTPs would appear to be ideal candidates for treatment as 
section 212 activities in connection with a trade or business. On 
the other hand, income from an interest-dividend income PTP 
would constitute portfolio income not offsettable by losses from a 
passive activity. Again, a technical correction is in order, prefera-
bly by statute rather than regulation. 
C. Personal Service Corporations 
The new PSC inside tax rate rule is starkly simple: PSCs are not 
eligible for section ll(b)(1) graduated inside corporate rates and 
instead are subject to a flat rate of 34%.108 Congress failed to pro-
vide any special one-time disincorporation relief, as it did in 1982 
104 See supra note 78; infra note 107. 
100 In drafting section 469 in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress included any rental 
activity in the term passive activity regardless of whether the owner materially participated. 
See 1986 Senate Report, supra note 7, at 720. 
106 See H.R. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-138 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Conference 
Report]. 
107 While certainly passive at the owner level, generating such portfolio income cannot 
satisfy the "activity portion;" it constitutes neither a trade or business nor a covered section 
212 activity greater than mere collection of portfolio income. See Lee, supra note 78, at 109-
11. 
108 See I.R.C. § ll(b)(2). 
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in connection with the enactment of legislative parity in retirement 
plans. 109 The apparent expectation is that most, if not all, PSCs 
will elect S corporation status. 110 
III. DEEP STRUCTURE CLASSIFICATION, INTEGRATION AND PASSIVE 
Loss PoLICY 
A. Classification 
Historically, both the courts and Treasury regulations classified 
entities as separate, i.e., as "associations" taxable as corpora-
tions, 111 on the basis of the Morrissey112 "corporate resemblance" 
factors: (1) continuity of the entity's life,118 (2) centralized manage-
100 See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. 97-248 § 247, 
95 Stat. 172. 
11° Conversation of author with Robert Leonard, Majority Chief Counsel to House Ways 
and Means Committee at College of William & Mary Annual Tax Conference on December 
5, 1987. Such a pro-S corporation slant may fit a Staff hidden agenda; former Assistant 
Secretary of Treasury Mentz and Chief of Joint Committee Staff Pearlman are on record as 
favoring an S-like approach to passthrough entities. See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, 
supra note 8, at 15, 36 (statement of Mentz); Goodley, Treasury Officials Discuss 1987 Act 
Partnership Provisions and Tech Corrections, 38 Tax Notes 432, 434 (Feb. 1, 1988) (Pearl-
man support for approach). Congress may also have thought that because disincorporation 
relief had been made available in 1982 but was little utilized, pre-1982 PSCs already had 
their chance to take advantage of the relief, and subsequently formed PSCs should have 
been on notice that the continued tax benefits of PSCs would someday be ended. 
111 For authorities and development of classification regulations, see Sexton & Osteen, 
supra note 9; Rustigan, Effect of Regulation Definitions on Real Estate Syndicates, 19 
N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 1065 (1961). 
111 Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935). The predecessor to the Tax 
Court mechanically applied the Morrissey factors in determining status of a family limited 
partnership, when the Service sought corporate reclassification instead of generic realloca-
tion arguments. See Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), acq. 1942-2 
C.B. 8. Glensder Textile has been criticized, see Peel, supra note 9, at 99, but unfortunately 
became the model for the limited partnership provisions of the final 1960 Kintner regula-
tions. In Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1, the Tax Court 
majority suggested that the Kintner regulations be revised to reflect more faithfully the 
Morrissey resemblance approach, disapproving of the "thumb on the scales" in favor of 
partnership treatment requiring that the entity possess three of the four corporate charac-
teristics and that these characteristics were to be equally weighted. See 66 T.C. at 185. The 
proposed and withdrawn 1977 regulations were intended as a response to this criticism. See 
Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 7, n.8 . 
... See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b). The Board of Tax Appeals in Glensder Textile, supra, 
mechanically extended the Morrissey focus on technical entity classification under local law, 
for example, whether the organization dissolved upon the death, retirement, or incapacity of 
the general partner, or where a surviving general partner could elect continuation in such 
event. The Board reasoned that "continuity is not assured by this power [power of surviving 
general partner to elect continuation], for it is one vested in the several general partners, 
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ment,114 (3) limited liability of the owners,116 and (4) free transfer-
apparently, and not in the partnership as an entity." 46 B.T.A. at 185. 
The early professional corporation cases went the opposite way, finding continuity by 
agreement despite dissolution under local law. See Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th 
Cir. 1936); United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). Not surprisingly, the 
current Kintner regulations adopt a technical dissolution without regard to contingent con-
tinuity life test. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3). The Tax Court majority in Larson, 66 
T.C. at 175, suggested administrative substitution of a "termination of the business" stan-
dard encompassing the life of the enterprise. The 1977 Service proposals did so, fleshing out 
that standard. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2), 42 Fed. Reg. 1041 (1977). First, a 
majority interest would have had the power to prevent interruption of business operations 
despite a local law dissolution due to change in status or identity of one or more members, if 
in such event that interest could preclude liquidation and withdrawal of capital, and with-
drawal of capital would significantly impair the continuation of the business. See id. 
§ 2(d)(2)(i). (Under examples the withdrawal of forty percent would impair but twenty per-
cent would not. See id.) Secondly, following the advanced letter ruling requirements of the 
early 1970s, Rev. Procs. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735; 75-16, 1975-1 C.B. 676, while overturning 
this aspect of the Court of Claims decision in Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. 
Cl. 1975), the 1977 proposals would have found continuity of life where the only general 
members were corporations controlled by one or more of the limited members. See Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(ii), 42 Fed. Reg. 1041 (1977). 
114 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c). Here too the Kintner regulations following the for-
malistic Glensder Textile approach distinguish centralized control in the general partner of 
a limited partnership from corporate centralized control subject to the control of sharehold-
ers so long as the general partner owns a "meaningful" or substantial proprietary interest 
and is not removable by the limited partners. If the general partner fails either test under 
Glensder Textile or both under the Kintner regulations, the general partner's management 
was in a "representative capacity," a corporate characteristic. See id.; 46 B.T.A. at 185. 
The 1977 proposals basically would have adopted the Kintner regulations' focus on repre-
sentative capacity, but would have restored the disjunctive insubstantial interest or remova-
ble standards. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1), 42 Fed. Reg. at 1041 (1977). Never-
theless, this residuum of the mechanical Glensder Textile approach still ignores the reality 
that 
[m]anagement is in reality equally centralized whether a general partner has a per-
sonal stake or not. The general partner has the same fiduciary duties to the limited 
partners regardless of the size of his own investment. Not only does the extent of his 
holding have little practical import for a limited partner, it is not a feature which 
empirically distinguishes limited partnerships from corporations. Even in many large 
publicly traded corporations, it is quite common for an officer or director to own a 
large portion of the equity. 
Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 745, 752 (1977) [herein-
after Tax Classification] (footnotes omitted). 
110 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d). The Kintner regulations once again extended a mis-
take made in Glensder Textile. Talking in generalities, the Board of Tax Appeals in Glens-
der noted that resemblance to corporate form would be great where "the general partners 
were not men with substantial assets risked in the business, but were mere dummies with-
out real means acting as the agents of the limited partners .... " 46 B.T.A. at 183. The 
better reading of the Kintner regulations required both insubstantial assets and control by 
the limited partners. The Tax Court in Larson did not address the appropriateness of these 
regulations. The Court of Claims in Zuckman went further, as Glensder Textile had inti-
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ability of ownership interests.118 Tax administrators have sought to 
mated, and applied a "Catch-22" logic against the Commissioner. If the general partner had 
an insubstantial interest or acted only as a dummy general partner, then the limited part-
ners in effect controlled the partnership and would be liable as generals under local law. See 
524 F.2d at 738. Thus the corporate limited liability factor would never be present in a 
limited partnership. In this context, the Service established minimum net worth floors and 
maximum cross-ownership of general limited partnership interest ceilings for advanced rul-
ing purposes. See Rev. Procs. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735; 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438. See generally 
Tax Classification, supra note 114, at 754-55. 
The 1977 proposals and various commentators would base limited liability upon a com-
parison of the interests subject to personal liability and those not, looking at practical liabil-
ity. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(0(2), 42 Fed. Reg. at 1041-42; Postlewaite, Dutton & 
Maggette, A Critique of the ALI's Federal Income Tax Project-Subchapter K: Proposals 
on the Taxation of Partners, 75 Geo. L.J. 423, 459-61 (1986). Thus in most traditional tax 
shelter limited partnerships, limited liability would be present. Some commentators would 
make limited liability determinative of corporate status unless the general partners hold at 
least a fifty percent interest in capital and losses and profits. See Postlewaite, Dutton & 
Maggette, supra, at 461. The inappropriateness of liability alone as determining separate 
entity or corporate status is implied in the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
See 1986 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 717 (discussing material participation and liabilily 
as factors for PAL rule). 
118 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e). Both Glensder Textile, 46 B.T.A. at 184, and the 
Kintner regulations adopted a mechanical, unrealistic approach focusing on whether the 
limited partner had the right to assign all of his or her rights without the consent of others, 
thereby making the assignee the "substitute limited partner" versus the more limited power 
to assign profits, distributions and tax losses-surely all that the limited partner really 
cared about anyway. Earlier, Glensder Textile went even further to discount the right to 
transfer all partnership rights, and characterized that right as analogous to a corporate as-
pect, since no such transfers were in fact contemplated. See 46 B.T.A. at 186. 
The 1977 proposals adopted the more practical approach of focusing on assignability of 
rights to share in profits and return of capital. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g)(2), 42 
Fed. Reg. at 1042 (1977). This is consistent with the case law under which an assignee part-
ner, although not substituted, constitutes a partner for tax purposes. See Evans v. Commis-
sioner, 447 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1971). Thus transferability of interest, a purported corporate 
factor, would generally be considered present. 
As early as 1975, the Joint Committee Staff proposed, as part of an anti-tax shelter cam-
paign, corporate treatment for any partnership with membership units registered as a public 
offering with the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxa-
tion, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Shelters: Use of Limited Partnerships, Etc. 12, 13 (1975). 
The House Ways and Means Committee failed to act on this and a similar 1978 proposal. 
See Peel, supra note 9, at 1004. President Carter's 1978 tax proposals then advocated a 
numerical ceiling on the number of limited partners, roughly corresponding to the then S 
corporation ceiling on number of shareholders as a determinant for corporate treatment. See 
supra note 9. In 1983, the Senate Finance Committee Staff, following an earlier draft of the 
ALI Federal Income Tax Project, Subchapter K 383, 392 (1984), proposed that limited part-
nerships with partnership interests publicly traded on an established securities market be 
treated as corporations. See Preliminary Subchapter C Report, supra note 9, at 80. This 
proposal generated more political interest than any other provision. See Reform of Corpo-
rate Taxation Hearings, supra note 9, at 7-8 (remarks of Chairman Dole). Treasury opposed 
the proposal this time principally because classification went beyond the scope of Sub-
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quantify the degree of resemblance that requires corporate treat-
ment.117 However, the Joint Committee staff believes, correctly, 
that the presence of these factors only overlaps the passive/active 
participation-by-owners dichotomy which supports separate entity 
treatment.118 Ironically, most large limited partnerships manifest 
chapter C simplification. See id. at 11 (statement of Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Ron-
ald Pearlman). However, it set the standard for later study. 
Questions such as how a type of organization should be taxed, whether a so-called C-
corporation, an S-corporation or as a partnership or, for that matter, as a real estate 
investment trust or a regulated investment company, require, we believe, an analysis 
of all of those classification situations. We suspect that if that analysis were under-
taken, we would not agree to base tax classification on the degree of marketability of 
an organization's equity interests. 
ld. at 11 (statement of Ronald Pearlman). 
117 Prior to the Kintner regulations, the Service for ruling purposes held that an organiza-
tion would not be treated as an "association" if any one of the four essential characteris-
tics-(1) associates, (2), objective to carry on a business and divide its profits, (3) central-
iied management, and (4) continuity of life)-were not present. See I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 
126; Rev. Rul. 57-341, 1957-2 C.B. 884; Rev. Rul. 57-607, 1957-2 C.B. 887; I.T. 3948, 1949-1 
C.B. 161; Rev. Rul. 54-484, 1954-2 C.B. 242. The Kintner regulations, in order to provide 
certainty and weight the balance against corporate status, according to some, made corpo-
rate treatment turn on the presence of three or more of the four corporate resemblance 
factors. Thus this "thumb upon the scales," Larson, 66 T.C. at 185, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, was not designed to stop corporate tax treatment for professionals, but instead was 
intended to provide certainty and liberalization of the prior Service requirement of four out 
of four corporate requirements (which varied from the Kintner listing). See supra note 113 
for a discussion of Larson. 
The 1977 proposed amendments adopted the Morrissey resemblance test, specifically 
abandoning the Kintner three-out-of-four factors to be a corporation in favor of a prepon-
derance test. Thus, the proposed amendments illustrated "how classification [was] deter-
mined when an organization resembles a corporation with respect to two of the four charac-
teristics but not with respect to the other two." Notice of Proposed Regulations, 42 Fed. 
Reg. 1039 (1977). The examples set forth in the proposed regulations made use of a sophisti-
cated weighting system such as called for in Larson. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h), 
42 Fed. Reg. at 1042-44 (1977); supra note 113. 
The 1977 proposals would have classified most tax shelter limited partnerships as associa-
tions and, therefore, are much broader than the OBRA PTP provisions. This article argues 
that the broader approach is more appropriate than narrow publicly traded factor. However, 
the fundamental defect in the four factor resemblance approach is that the factors only 
indirectly reflect the underlying policy: limitation of aggregate pass through to owners who 
materially participate. 
118 The Joint Committee Staff and commentators have come to recognize that whether an 
entity should be treated as a separate taxable unit should turn on the relationship between 
the individual and its owners. "In particular, to the extent that an entity is viewed as acting 
separately from its owners, rather than merely as their agent or alter ego, an argument can 
be made that it should be treated as a separate taxable unit." Pas5through Entity Hearing 
Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 13. See Sheppard, Walk This Way, 35 Tax Notes 86, 87 (April 6, 
1987); Faber, Entity-Level Taxation: Drawing the Line, 35 Tax Notes 413 (Apr. 27, 1987). 
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all four characteristics, 119 whereas most close corporations possess 
none;120 hence the misplacement of both on the tax entity 
The underlying policy question is whether the owners are the parties that actually earn the 
income of the entity in a realistic and substantial economic sense. This determination 
should turn in large part on whether the owner is active in management. See Passthrough 
Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 14-15. The 1977 proposed amendments them-
selves identify the core of the partnership as this aggregate characteristic. 
A partnership is usually characterized by the partners' personal identification with 
the partnership, their personal participation in its decision-making, and their per-
sonal responsibility for its obligation. 
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2), 42 Fed. Reg. at 1040 (1977), withdrawn, 42 Fed. Reg. 
1489 (1977). The basic problem is that a limited partnership generally does not have this 
participation characteristic, and the four factors are not directly tied into this policy of 
basing corporate treatment on participation. 
"" See Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 16-17; 1986 Passthrough 
Entity Hearing, supra note 8, at 19, 28 (statement of Mentz); 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, 
supra note 7, at 50 (statement of Mentz). For industry counterarguments, see 1987 Senate 
. MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 110-11 (statement of Lewis Sandler) (large limited partner-
ships do not possess continuity of life and limited liability). Others have pointed to the 
functional differences between large limited partnerships and corporations in cash-flow 
yield and in the diversity of the enterprise. See id. at 89, 167-68 (statements of James Mof-
fett and Barry Miller). Such traditional uses of the partnership are by and large covered by 
the passthrough PTP exception, but the more recent trend to active, continuing business 
partnerships requiring reinvestment, see Sheppard, supra note 72, at 1255, will generally 
result in such partnerships not passing the 90% passive-type income or natural resource 
development requirement. 
110 See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 19, 28 (statement of Mentz), 
43, 51 (statements of McKee and Kuller). First, notwithstanding the perpetual continuity of 
a corporate charter, when an active principal dies, the business will terminate or be sold 
unless management succession has been or can be soon arranged. See generally Kessler & 
Yorio, Choosing the Appropriate Form for the Small Business, 1 Corp. L. Rev. 291, 298 
(1978). In close C corporations with very narrowly held stock, key shareholders are also 
often members of the board of directors and/or key officers-a pattern of overlapping posi-
tions reaching its extreme usually in sole shareholder operations where complete identity 
between the board, officers and owners commonly exists. Thus, centralized management is 
non-existent in most close corporations. Similarly, limited liability is often a chimera for 
close C corporations. Significant third party creditors (except perhaps in real estate ven-
tures) usually require guarantees by principal shareholders and their spouses. See 1986 
Passthrough Entity Hearing, supra note 8, at 19 (statement of Mentz); The Subchapter S 
Revision Act of 1982: Hearings on H.R. 6055 before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Mea-
sures of the House Ways and Means Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 263 (1982) [hereinafter 
Subchapter S Revision Hearings] (statement of Chairman Stark); Kessler & Richmond, Has 
Congress Made the C Corporation Obsolete for the Small Business?, 7 Corp. L. Rev. 293, 
294 (1984). Furthermore, an active shareholder may be personally liable for his/her own 
torts in the scope of his/her employment and possibly in the supervision of others. See Kess-
ler & Yorio, supra, at 302-04. The assets of the corporate business itself, always subject to 
the entity's liabilities, are often the principal asset of the entrepreneur. Close corporations 
also miss the mark as far as free transferability is concerned, as there is a real problem in 
finding any secondary market at all for minority close C corporation stock. A buy-sell option 
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continuum. 121 
Currently the only policy-based, functional entity classification 
distinction is between an aggregate approach, which treats an en-
tity as a collection of its owners banded together for profit and 
treats the owners as if they owned proportionate shares of the en-
tity's assets, 122 and a separate entity approach under which owners 
have an interest only in the entity and not in its assets.123 A sepa-
rate entity approach does not necessarily mandate a double taxa-
tion regime. Integration of a separate entity's income (or loss) with 
its owners' income turns on other policies.12" Under a deep struc-
ture analysis, the aggregate approach treats the owner of an inter-
est in an entity as an entrepreneur owning a portion of the entity's 
assets and earning a portion of its income, all apart from the entity 
which in turn serves only as a mere collection, reporting and audit 
device.125 Current Subchapter K, which deals with taxation of 
partnerships, roughly reflects this distinction, 128 but allows a part-
with the corporation and/or co-shareholders and right of first refusal are standard. 
••• See supra note 8 and accompanying text. More significantly, PTPs are not function-
ally aggregates and PSCs are not functionally separate entities. 
111 See Holiday Village Shopping Center, Inc. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 566, 570 (1984), 
affd, 773 F.2d 276 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See Wolfman, Level for Determining Character of Part-
nership Income-"Entity" v. "Conduit" Principle in Partnership Taxation, 19 N.Y.U. Inst. 
on Fed. Tax'n 287 (1961); Fellows, Partnership Taxation: Confusion in Section 762(b), 32 
Tax L. Rev. 67 (1976). 
118 Most commentators have focused on the owner's interest in the business as to charac-
ter of income. See Wolfman, supra note 122, at 288; Fellows, supra note 122, at 79. 
,.. See infra notes 176-189 and accompanying text. 
110 See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 Code Senate 
Report]; Department of Treasury, The President's 1978 Tax Program 118 (January 30, 
1978), reprinted in 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 277 (1978); Pratt v. Commis-
sioner, 550 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1977). See generally, Lane, Sol Diamond: The Tax 
Court Upsets the Service Partner, 46 So. Cal. L. Rev. 239, 253-61 (1973). Cf. Staff of the 
Joint Comm. on Taxation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the Revenue Provi-
sions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 238 (1985); Holiday Village Shopping Center, 773 
F.2d at 282. 
110 Subchapter K is generally described as manifesting a hybrid or mix of "entity" and 
"aggregate" features, see Bennet v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 470, 479 (1982), (citing I W. Mc-
Kee, W. Nelson & R. Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners 'II 1.102 
(1977)); J. Crane & A. Bromberg, Law of Partnership 16-29 (1968), with the relative empha-
sis shifting according to the prevailing legal thought at the time. See Canellos, supra note 
24, at 1006. However, the legislative history·and background of Subchapter K, as well as the 
better reasoned decisions, establish that the aggregate core predominates. See supra note 
125. The mandatory entity features are properly and largely limited to determining and 
reporting income and more recently, audit. See 1954 Code Senate Report, supra note 123, at 
93. See infra note 127. 
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nership to elect entity treatment for some purposes. This election 
feature is intended to simplify transactions for large businesses, 127 
The aggregate approach rests on a view of a partnership for tax purposes as a collection of 
individuals banded together for a profit. See Weidner, Pratt and Deductions for Payments 
to Partners, 12 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 811, 812 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 59 (1954); Holiday Village Shopping Center, 5 Cl. Ct. at 571 (1984); 1953 House Hear-
ings, supra note 31, at 1369 (statement of Mark Johnson for the American Bar Association, 
Section of Taxation); 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 277 (statement of Treasury 
representative). Functionally, the aggregate approach endeavors to tax a partner "in the 
same manner as if there were no partnership." H.R. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 58 
(1954) [hereinafter 1954 Code Conference Report]. See 1954 Code Senate Report, supra note 
125, at 93. Aggregate passthrough taxation is the functional equivalent of direct or single 
taxation of the owner-partner, according him or her "the same tax consequences which 
would be accorded an individual entrepreneur.'' 1954 Code Senate Report, supra note 125, 
at 99. See H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 Code House 
Report]; Lane, supra note 125, at 259-60. The aggregate approach essentially treats the part-
nership form of doing business as no more than a recordkeeping or accounting convenience. 
See 1954 Code House Report, supra, at 65; 1953 House Hearings, supra note 31, at 1370, 
1378 (statement of Mark Johnson); 1959 Advisory Group Hearings, supra note 23, at 20 
(statement of Willis) (use of aggregate approach to determine character "is carrying through 
the basic concept of the partnership, that it is in a very substantial sense an aggregate of 
individuals and we are taxing income back to them and we use the partnership merely as a 
pooling source of information"), 27. 
The drafters of the 1954 ALI draft revision of the tax treatment of partnerships and part-
ners explained that the "basic pattern" of the draft was "to treat the partnership as a con-
duit through which the individual partners are regarded as receiving the income computed 
by the partnership as if they had earned it individually.'' Jackson, Johnson, Surrey & War-
ren, A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Partnerships and Part-
ners-American Law Institute Draft, 9 Tax L. Rev. 109, 113-14 (1954) [hereinafter ALI 
Partnership Proposals). The rationale of this aggregate approach in the 1954 Code, however, 
was not based on policy so much as "on the assumption that this approach most nearly 
conforms to the understandings of the parties of the usual small business." Id. at 113; 1953 
House Hearings, supra note 31, at 1370 (statement of .Mark Johnson for the American Bar 
Association, Section of Taxation). However, later administrative developments centered on 
the participation policy basis for the aggregate approach. The Service's aborted 1977 pro-
posed revision of the entity classification regulations, which would.have classified most lim-
ited partnerships as associations taxable as corporations reveals the policy basis for aggre-
gate passthrough taxation. See supra note 118. After this unsuccessful attempt to deny the 
limited partnership vehicle to tax shelters, the next administration shifted in 1978 to a legis-
lative proposal to treat a limited partnership with more than fifteen limited partners as a 
corporation tax purposes. See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 11. The stated pur-
pose of the 1978 proposals was to end the use of syndicated partnerships as tax shelter 
vehicles, see id., but the Treasury explanation also looked to the aggregate policy underlying 
current Subchapter K. Treasury pointed out that the Code treatment of "a partnership 
largely as an aggregate of individuals" was intended to offer flexibility, "and to preserve 
some degree of individuality, for the members of small partnerships.'' Id. at 277. Treasury 
believed that large syndicated partnerships with many passive investors, however, compli-
cated the law and were both unnecessary and inappropriate. See id. 
127 Although the 1954 ALI partnership proposals generally treated partners "as co-owners 
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of the partnership property, ... in the interest of flexibility ... a series of elective rules 
based upon the entity theory [were] provided to take care of those partnerships which have 
had numerous partners or a complex variety of assets." ALI Partnership Proposals, supra 
note 126, at 113. In presenting these views to the House Ways and Means Committee, Mark 
Johnson, testifying on behalf of the American Bar Association's similar proposal, argued 
that all of the rules, whether entity or aggregate based, should be tied together in a single, 
coordinated pattern affording predictability. Establishment of some set of clearly-defined 
rules was more important than developing any one particular set of rules, entity or aggre-
gate. See 1953 House Hearings, supra note 31, at 1369-71 (statement of Johnson and collo-
quy with Representative Mason); Rabkin & Johnson, The Partnership Under the Federal 
Tax Law, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 949 (1942) 
Against this background, the House, while generally following the ALI proposals, by-and-
large chose the entity approach in the interest of simplification of the partnership provi-
sions as to transfers of interests, pro rata allocations of built-in gains and losses, distribu-
tions of property, self-dealing, and in part retirement payments with limited elective aggre-
gate features, generally affecting all partners, and an ordinary income partial aggregate 
override as to transfers of partnership interests and certain distributions. See 1954 Code 
House Report, supra note 125, at 67. 
In Hearings on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 before the Senate Finance Committee, 
testimony by the ABA representatives criticized the various entity theory choices of the 
House Bill and recommended enactment of a provision "setting forth a general rule as to 
whether the aggregate or entity theory of partnerships is to be applied in areas not specifi-
cally covered by statutory provisions." Hearings on H.R. 8300 (the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954) before the Senate Finance Comm. Part 1, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 459 (1954) [hereinaf-
ter 1954 Senate Code Hearings] (Report of ABA Section of Taxation). See also ALI Partner-
ship Proposals, supra note 126, at 170. The ABA also recommended that as to many of the 
areas where the House chose an entity approach, it ought to instead follow the ABA and 
ALI Draft and provide entity-aggregate elections. See 1954 Senate Code Hearings, supra, at 
460-70. The Senate Bill and ultimately the Conference Bill responded to these requests, and 
while in many instances the bills adopted the House's entity rules for simplicity, they also 
provided elections for "use of the so-called aggregate rule." 1954 Code Senate Report, supra 
note 125, at 90. The Senate and the Conference bills followed more of an aggregate ap-
proach as to contributions and distributions. See id. at 93, 97, 95-96, 98-99. See generally 
Jackson, Johnson, Surrey, Tenen & Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Partner-
ships, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 1183 (1954) [hereinafter The Code of 1954: Partnerships]. Further-
more, the 1954 Code Conference Report states that while the 1954 Code uses an "entity" 
approach in section 707 transactions, "[n]o inference is intended, however, that a partner-
ship is to be considered as a separate entity for the purpose of applying other provisions of 
the internal revenue laws if the concept of the partnership as a collection of individuals is 
more appropriate for such provisions." 1954 Code Conference Report, supra note 126, at 59. 
The Conference Report also provides an illustration contained in the ABA Section of Taxa-
tion Report to the Senate Finance Committee. Compare 1954 Senate Code Hearings, supra, 
~~ . 
In summary, the 1954 ABA and ALI proposals generally adopted the aggregate approach 
as the standard approach, particularly for small businesses, but allowed an elective entity 
approach as to certain transactions for simplicity with large businesses in mind. See The 
Code of 1954: Partnerships, supra, at 112-13; 1953 House Hearings, supra note 31, at 1369-
71 (statement of Mark Johnson for the ABA). Carrying simplicity further, the House bill 
further would have applied an entity approach particularly as to shifts in interests alloca-
tions and inside adjustments arising from and in-kind distributions. Subchapter K as en-
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but is based upon unsound policy considerations.128 Subchapter S 
instead (ostensibly for the sake of simplicity,129 but more likely to 
encourage C to S corporation conversions130) provides a pass-
through separate entity approach, which hardly produces simplic-
ity in actual operation and often creates inequities or business 
planning hardships. 131 These more subtle horizontal non-pass-
acted by-and-large returned to the ABA-ALI model in this context, but reversed the elec-
tions so that the entity approach was the standard with an elective aggregate approach. In 
essence Subchapter K still follows an aggregate approach. 
••• The premise of the 1954 ALI-ABA drafts was that Treasury was merely an arbitrator 
or,stakeholder as to such partnership tax policy issues under the rationale that either the 
entity or the aggregate approach would in the long run produce about the same amount of 
taxes, because the only question was which partner was to be taxed and when. See 1953 
House Hearings, supra note 31, at 1369-70 (statement of Mark Johnson). The time value of 
money and low tax high income taxpayers proved this premise erroneous. Indeed, thirty 
years later, the 1984 partnership tax revisions largely reversed the various tax consequences 
of this premise. 
••• Chairman Mills in 1959 Hearings on Subchapter K viewed the Subchapter S entity 
approach as to characterization of income passthrough as a simplification for the conve-
nience of small taxpayers. See 1959 Advisory Group Hearings, supra note 23, at 13; S. Rep. 
No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 C.B. 1009 (modified entity 
approach as to passthrough of income, i.e., ordinary income to shareholder except for capital 
gains "adopted so that this provision can operate in as simple a manner as possible"). 
no See Compendium, supra note 23, at 1742. The overwhelming majority of the firstS 
Corporation elections were by taxpayers which had previously reported as C corporations. 
See 1959 Panel Discussions, supra note 23, at 92 (statements of Karl Price and Chairman 
Mills), probably reflecting the paradigm 1954 Code tax life cycle of a corporation beginning 
with an S election during the initial loss stage. See Compendium, supra note 23, at 1726, 
1741 (statement of Driscoll); Carlin, Partnership v. Corporation; Non-Tax Shelter Business 
Enterprise, 34 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 741, 749-51 (1977); Kanter, To Elect or Not Elect 
Subchapter S-That is a Question, 60 Taxes 882, 917 (1982); Kessler & Yorio, supra note 
120; O'Connor, Selection in the Form of Business or Professional Organization: A Need for 
Clairvoyance, 56 Taxes 880, 884-85 (1978). Once the profit stage is reached, the S election is 
then terminated and the organization operates as a C corporation to accumulate earnings 
taxed at lower graduated corporate rates. See Compendium, supra note 23, at 1686-87, 1726 
(statements of Janin and Caplin); Dial, When to Put Real Estate in a Corporation-Tax 
Considerations, 32 S.C. L. Rev. 319, 328-29 (1980); Mullaney & Blau, An Analytic Compari-
son of Partnerships and S Corporations as Vehicles for Leveraged Investments, 59 J. Tax. 
142, 148-49 (1983); O'Connor, supra, at 885. But see Kessler & Richmond, supra note 120. 
·Finally, S status is again elected, generally at least five years after termination, see I.R.C. § 
1362(g), when accumulated earnings or unreasonable compensation problems arise. See 
Compendium, supra note 23, at 1741 (statement of Nicholson); Starr, S Corporation: Is It 
the Right Choice?, 43 N.Y.U. lnst. on Fed. Tax'n 5-1, 5-36 (1985). In short, deep policy had 
not yet prevailed . 
.., See Coven & Hess, The Subchapter S Revision Act: An Analysis and Appraisal, 50 
Tenn. L. Rev. 569, 622-31, 647-57, 666-70, 694-94, 702-06 (1983) (discussions of income de-
termination and character of income; allocations of income; entity level debt and loss pass-
through; cash distributions; owner retirements; and distributions of appreciated property); 
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through disparities between Subchapters K and S create traps for 
the unwary and tax planning opportunities for the aware132, which 
is bad, if lucrative; tax policy.188 
At the deep structure level, the hallmark of an entrepreneurial 
situation requiring aggregate passthrough treatment is the inter-
est-holder's active, or "material," participation in the business184 
Coven, Subchapter S Distributions and Pseudo Distributions: Proposals for Revising the 
Defective Blend of Entity and Conduit Concepts, 42 Tax L. Rev. 381 (1987); Eustice, supra 
note 8, at 353-54, 362-67, 372-78, 381-94, 396-400, 404-10, 433 (discussions of aggregate vs. 
entity overview, capital structure limitations; income character limitations; entity level 
treatment; ordinary distributions; liquidating distributions and sales; inside asset basis ad-
justments; conversions of status and form; outside basis for loss; extraordinary distributions; 
sales of owner interests; comparison of Subchapters C, S and K). 
182 See Eustice, supra note 8; Greenberg, Form of Organization for Holding and Develop-
ing Real Estate, 29 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 1129 (1971); Mullaney & Blau, An Analytic 
Comparison of Partnerships and S Corporations as Vehicles for Leveraged Investments, 59 
J. Tax 142 (1983); Thompson, Tax Policy Implications of Contributions of Appreciated and 
Depreciated Property to Partnerships, Subchapter C Corporations and Subchapter S Corpo-
rations in Exchange for Ownership Interests, 31 Tax L. Rev. 29 (1975). 
183 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Staff Recommendations for Simplification of 
Tax Rules Relating to Subchapter S Corporations 8 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter Staff S 
Recommendations]; Subchapter S Revision Hearings, supra note 120, at 71 (statement of 
David Glickman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Legislation). 
Unfortunately, the approximately 20-year history of subchapter S attests to many 
traps for those not extremely familiar with its provisions. The traps most often fallen 
into involve: (1) unintentional violation of the continuing eligibility rules (particularly 
the restriction on passive investment income), resulting in retroactive terminations of 
elections; (2) the making of taxable distributions which were intended to be tax free 
distributions of previously taxed income; and (3) a shareholder having an insufficient 
basis to absorb his share of the corporation's loss, resulting in the permanent disal-
lowance of that part of the loss. 
The 20-year history of subchapter S also indicates that knowledgeable taxpayers 
and tax counsel have derived some unintended benefits from the subchapter S provi-
sions. Examples of these benefits include the deferral of income resulting from the 
selection of a taxable year for the corporation which is different from that of the 
majority of its shareholders and the use of the retroactive termination provisions of 
subchapter S to prevent the passthrough of a substantial amount of income to the 
shareholders. 
The Staff has reviewed subchapter S from the perspective of simplifying its opera-
tion (particularly in the area of distributions), removing both the traps for the un-
wary and the few unintended tax avoidance benefits, and eliminating (where practi-
cal) some of the unwarranted differences in tax consequences under the partnership 
and subchapter S provisions. 
Staff S Recommendations, supra, at 8 (footnote omitted). 
184 See supra note 12; supra note 125; Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 
8, at 14-15, 17 (criterion for separate entity treatment whether owners have full control over 
process of earning income or over use and disposition of amounts earned by the entity); cf. 
1986 Senate Report, supra note 7, at 717. 
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and perhaps, in a small enough venture, his acting as the finan-
cier. m Basing aggregate passthrough treatment on a reasonable 
numerical ceiling on the number of owners or size of the enterprise 
instead would achieve rough justice and would be infinitely easier 
to administer. 136 
Measured against this conceptual framework, the pre-OBRA tax 
treatment of both PTPs and most close C and S corporations was 
wrong. Prior law, inappropriately relying on state law classifica-
tion,137 largely treated PTPs (whose limited partner owners do not 
materially participate) as aggregates, creating some administrative 
difficulties,138 but far greater tax policy conflicts. Under a deep 
180 The United States Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286 
(1946), stated that a partnership is created "when persons join together their money, goods, 
labor or skill for the purpose of carrying on a trade, profession or business and when there is 
community of interest in the profits and losses." ld. (footnote omitted). See also Commis-
sioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 740 (1949) (quoted definition in Tower constitutes appli-
cation of standard definition of income "-the gain derived from capital, from labor, or both 
combined-to a particular form of business organization") Id. (footnote omitted). 
186 The Department of Treasury in 1978 supported a numerical reclassification rule with 
an aggregate analysis. See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 277. A material participa-
tion standard would be very difficult to apply according to a witness at the House MLP 
hearings. See House MLP Hearings, supra note 16, at 357-58 (statement of Lewis Sandler). 
The detail presented in the first wave of PAL regulations suggests that a numerical test 
would be far easier to administer. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.469 OT- llT, 53 Fed. Reg. 5686-
5732 (1988). Alternatively, a size test of earnings or assets would also be easier to adminis-
ter. Professor Ginsburg opposes both an active business criterion and a numerical test. See 
1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 72 (statement of Prof. Ginsburg). 
137 See supra notes 38, 120. 
188 The ALI 1984 Subchapter K study lists some of the administrative problems with 
taxing publicly traded corporations under a system like Subchapter K. See ALI, Federal 
Income Tax Project, Subchapter K, Proposals of the American Law Institute on the Taxa-
tion of Partners 384 n.39 (1984) (The ALI study derived this list of problems from McLure, 
Must Corporate Income be Taxed Twice? 154-66 (1979)). But procedural amendments au-
thorizing entity-level audits of passthrough entities, nominee reporting and computer 
software programs have answered most of these objections, or so industry spokespersons 
claim. See 1987 House MLP Hearings, supra note 16, at 38 (statement of Mentz) (computer 
software), 75-76 (statement of Herbert Lerner) (daily allocation problems), 87 (statement of 
John Jones, Chairman of ABA Section of Taxation) (fungibility of units traded), 205-209 
(statement of James Lovett of Coopers & Lybrand) (nominee reporting and computer 
software); 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 53 (statement of Mentz), 134-35 
(statement of John Neafsey of Sun Company, Inc.), 217 (statement of an American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants representative as to "simplifying assumptions"); Keyser, 
supra note 12, at 10-3; McKee, Master Limited Partnerships, 45 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 
(Part I) 23-1, 23-14-15 (1987). The reality seems to be that most problems arose from the 
termination rule of section 708, I.R.C. § 708, and attendant revaluation of capital accounts 
under Treasury Regulation 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(e), and the meshing of inside basis adjustments 
under I.R.C. §§ 742, 755, upon transfers of partnership interest with the marketing goal that 
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structure analysis, PTPs and similar large, limited partnerships 
should be treated as separate entities if most of their owners do 
not materially participate.139 
Conversely, prior law, relying equally on form,140 incorrectly 
treated a small, usually close C corporation in which most of the 
owners materially participated as a separate tax entity (with a 
all interests be fungible, that is, that they carry the same "inside" basis adjustment. See 
1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 181 (statement of Richard Cohen); Marich & 
McKee, Sections 704(c) and 743(b): The Shortcomings of Existing Regulations and the 
Problems of Publicly Traded Partnerships, 41 Tax L. Rev. 627 (1986). Committee Chairman 
Rangel did not believe that administration of MLP's was the major problem. See 1987 
House MLP Hearings, supra note 16, at 247. 
Ironically, the drafters of the 1954 Code probably assumed that large entities would 
choose the entity approach here for simplicity. See supra note 127. Certainly Treasury is 
correct that the aggregate treatment found in some Subchapter K provisions is inappropri-
ate as a matter of tax policy where the owners do not materially participate. See 1978 House 
Hearings, supra note 23, at 277 (Treasury explanation of Carter Administration Proposals). 
130 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
140 The Kintner classification regulations define unincorporated organizations treated as 
"associations taxable as corporations," as distinguished from partnerships, limited partner-
ships or trusts. Implicit in this approach and the reliance upon local law for establishing 
legal relationships is that "the artificial entity usually known as a corporation," is treated as 
a corporation for tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-l(c). Thus, state law corporate form 
is respected as long as the "corporation" was formed or used for a business purpose. See 
1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 28 (statement of Mentz); Strong v. Com-
missioner, 66 T.C. 12 (1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977). While functionally close cor-
porations are indistinguishable from sole proprietorships or partnerships depending on the 
number of shareholder-employees, courts refuse to look at substance, probably reasoning 
that since "incorporation" and the legal entity are all matters of form, see Keller v. Commis-
sioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1024, 1031 and n.20 (1981), aff'd, 723 F.2d 58 (lOth Cir. 1983), changes 
should be made by the legislature. 
The Supreme Court recently allowed the owners (a limited partnership) of a "nominee" 
corporation (holding the title and signing the mortgage) to treat property titled in the nomi-
nee corporation's name as owned by the shareholder who might enjoy its tax losses, "when 
the fact that the corporation is acting as agent for its shareholders with respect to a particu-
lar asset is set forth in a written agreement at the time the asset is acquired, the corporation 
functions as agent and not principal with respect to the asset for all purposes, and the cor-
poration is held out as the agent and not principal in all dealings with third parties relating 
to the asset." Commissioner v. Bollinger, 108 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 (1988). A more direct and 
forthright approach would have been to disregard the nominee corporation for tax purposes 
due to the shareholder's control. That, of course, would have overturned sub rosa Moline 
Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943), as. well as National Carbide Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949). As it is, the Court has given renewed life to a legal fiction of 
agency in this context that the taxpayer may use. But cf. Spector v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 
376 (5th Cir. 1981) (while Commissioner may challenge and look through the chosen form of 
a transaction as lacking economic reality, taxpayer may not do the same, absent a showing 
of unjust results). 
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lower inside tax rate on its retained earnings). 141 Considerations of 
horizontal and vertical equity, as well as economic efficiency, man-
date that both a close C and an S corporation in which most of the 
owners materially participate be treated as an aggregate of its own-
ers as to income and losses. 142 Deep structure analysis also requires 
an aggregate approach as to ownership shifts, liabilities, contribu-
tions and distributions. 143 In both cases, the current entity pass-
through approach has not yielded the anticipated simplicity and 
should be discarded for S corporations. 
Although the OBRA PTP and PSC provisions suffer from fre-
quent technical144 and occasional conceptual deficiencies/411 they 
are fundamentally aimed at the proper target of tax treatment on 
the basis of a deep structure analysis of organizational form. The 
problem lies not in the aim, then, but in the scope: the provisions 
are too restricted in that they fail to treat large limited partner-
ships consistently with PTPs and inequitably tax corporate PTPs 
and their owners more heavily than large C corporations and their 
shareholders combined, creating schedular horizontal distortions in 
both cases. Moreover, large limited partnerships and passthrough 
PTPs inappropriately retain aggregate Subchapter K treatment, 
causing administrative and policy problems; and the corporate tax 
treatment of actively participating owners in non-professional close 
corporations continues to contravene deep structure ideals. 
141 For criticism of this result, see 1987 House MLP Hearings, supra note 16 at 341, 346-
347 (statement of John Lee); 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 136 (statement of Blu-
menthal); 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 3517-19 (statement of Dr. Gaffney), 6240-
42 (statement of Rep. Mikva); 1959 Panel Discussions, supra note 23, at 854-55, 860-61 
(statement of Paul Ziffren); Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 17; Cor-
porate Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 33, at 4; 1984 Treasury Proposals, supra note 9, at 
128-29. The final result in OBRA was the repeal of the inside graduated brackets for PSCs 
only. 
,.. See supra note 30; McLure, infra note 165, at 535. 
m In the context of close corporations most commentators have focused only on the sepa-
rate taxation issue. See, e.g., Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 17. 
However, in the 1987 House MLP Hearings, the author argued that aggregate passthrough 
should apply to close corporations whose owners materially participate. See 1987 House 
MLP Hearings, supra note 16, at 343-350. And Subchapter S in its still-born 1954 Senate 
version simply applied subchapter K, 1954 Code Senate Report, supra note 125, at 119, 123, 
as some continue to advocate. See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 95 
(statement of John Pennell). 
,.. See supra notes 98-99, 105·107, and infra notes 189-198 and accompanying text. 
,.. See infra notes 280-283 and accompanying text. 
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B. Integration 
1. PTPs and Large Limited Partnerships: Corporate Sector Tax 
The bulk of the debate concerning classification of large limited 
partnerships has failed to separate the issues of classification and 
integration.146 As shown above, separate entity treatment is appro-
priate where most of the owners are passive, as in most large lim-
ited partnerships. However, such a separate entity should not nec-
essarily be taxed as a separate taxpayer and its owners then taxed 
on distributions or other realizations of entity level profits. Where 
a passive-owner entity's "business" is passive, the Code tradition-
ally has afforded conduit separate entity treatment as to income, 
but not losses.147 OBRA in its exception from corporate treatment 
of PTPs of activities generating 90% passive income loosely re-
flects this policy/"8 but errs in permitting continued aggregate 
treatment. 149 
The more difficult integration issue concerns a large aciive busi-
ness with inactive owners. Treatment of an entity not formally or-
ganized as a corporation as an "association," thereby triggering 
two-tier corporate taxation, historically has turned on the Morris-
sey corporate resemblance factors. 1110 But these same factors would 
••• See, e.g., Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 17; Sheppard, supra 
note 118, at 86; Faber, supra note 118, at 413. 
147 Integration as to RICs and REITs is obtained through an entity-level dividends paid 
deduction with a limited passthrough of capital gains character at the owner level. See 
I.R.C. §§ 852(b)(2)(D), 857(b)(2)(B). Retained earnings are taxed at the entity level. See 
I.R.C. §§ 852(b), 857(b); Passthrough Entity Hearings Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 10-12, 18. 
These conduit entities do not pass through losses. See supra notes 7, 66-67. The Senate 
REMIC provision similarly employed a limited entity conduit with conventional dividends-
paid deduction integration of income only. See 1986 Senate Report, supra note 7, at 796. In 
many ways the Senate REMIC provision appears the ideal conduit separate entity with its 
prescribed accounting period and method, a 100% penalty prohibited transaction provision, 
mandatory distribution of cash flow, and partnership-like carryover basis tax-free liquida-
tion provisions. See id. at 794-800. The Conference instead provided that a "REMIC is not 
treated as a separate tax entity. Rather the income of the REMIC is allocated to, and taken 
into account by, the holders of the interests therein .... " 1986 Bluebook, supra note 51, at 
412, 417. Possibly its rationale was that the existing conduit entity models of RICs and 
REITs were overly detailed and inflexible. See 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 
199 (statement of John Chapoton). 
148 See 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1066; supra notes 63-70 and accompanying 
text. 
148 See infra notes 280-283 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text. 
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apply to most if not all large limited partnerships. The advantages 
afforded by the Morrisey corporate characteristics were once 
thought justification enough for the corporate income tax. The ar-
gument that the privilege of the corporate franchise1111 is the reason 
for the imposition of a corporate tax is no longer suggested as the 
policy basis for corporate taxation, save in an attenuated fash-
ion. 1112 In fact, commentators historically have had difficulty in 
'"' See Staff of Joint Comm. on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., The Federal 
Revenue System: Facts and Problems 75-76 (1956) [hereinafter Federal Revenue System]. 
The proper role of the corporate income tax in the Federal revenue system has long 
been the subject of dispute among students of taxation. It is argued by some that the 
sole basis for taxing corporations is the benefit derived from the privilege of doing 
business in the corporate form. Exponents of this view hold that the corporate tax 
should properly be regarded as a franchise tax which should be imposed at rates far 
more modest than those in effect in recent years. Others maintain that the position of 
corporate enterprise in the national economy requires a more intensive use of corpo-
rate income taxation, particularly with a view to reaching monopoly profits. Between 
these two extremes, a widely held view is that because incorporated business controls 
the use of a substantial portion of the economy's resources, corporate profits are nec-
essarily an important subject of income taxation. According to this view, corporate 
income-tax policy should be based on broad economic objectives such as smoothing 
out fluctuations in the level of economic activity and improving income distribution 
in order to maintain a steady rate of economic growth. 
ld. See also Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 33, at 17 -20; 1978 House Hearings, 
supra note 23, at 3419 (statement of Ernest Christian). 
••• See Canellos, supra note 24, at 1000 ("Under the classic view, the increase in economic 
power represented by earnings of corporations (particularly public companies) can be con-
sidered an appropriate base for corporate taxation."); supra note 151. The author has always 
favored, at least for pedagogical rhetoric, the argument that publicly traded C corporations 
should be separately taxed because they disproportionately benefit from our overseas mili-
tary and economic presence necessary for their penetration of markets abroad. Cf., Kies, 
supra note 51, at 188 n.42. A more balanced presentation is offered by the Joint Committee 
Staff: 
Advocates of the two-tier tax generally argue that the corporate tax not only is a 
source of revenue that might not easily be replaced if the corporate tax were elimi-
nated either directly or indirectly, but also is a tax imposed on an appropriate income 
base. Imposing a separate corporate income tax is supported by those who view cor-
porations as vehicles for accumulating capital that are entities distinct from the indi-
viduals who contributed the capital and who enjoy limited liability with respect to 
the corporation's obligations and activities. 
In many cases, corporations are viewed as not being effectively controlled by share-
holders but rather by the corporate officers and directors. It is argued that it is ap-
propriate to treat the earnings on accumulations of capital in such circumstances as a 
proper base of taxation. In contrast, certain corporations that may be considered as 
directly controlled by shareholders are permitted to elect treatment under subchapter 
S, which permits the S corporation to avoid being taxed as a separate entity. 
Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 33, at 17 (footnotes omitted). 
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finding any benefit associated with the corporate tax.1113 (When 
first imposing a separate corporate income tax in 1909, Congress 
provided no principled analysis as to the tax policy basis for im-
posing the tax, 1114 perhaps because the tax was initially de 
minimis. 11111) 
Preservation of the integrity of taxing individuals at progressive 
rates of tax is often offered as a policy basis for the corporate 
tax. 1116 Obviously this could not have been the original congres-
sional intent since there was no individual income tax when the 
••• See supra note 152; Federal Revenue System, supra note 151, at 75; McLure, Integra-
tion of the Personal and Corporate Taxes:· The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform 
Proposals, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 532, 536 (1975). As Representative Noah Mason stated in the 
1953 House General Revenue Revision Hearings, 
When individual income taxes were down very low, we seemed at that time-and that 
was yeats ago-to favor the partnerships and proprietorships and encouraged them. 
They only became corporations in order to get rid of their personal liability, and so 
forth, and were willing to pay a little something for that privilege. But now the thing 
[i.e., the inside tax shelter] is reversed and it is working the other way. 
1953 House Hearings, supra note 31, at 1368. 
, .. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Re-
form, 87 Yale L. J. 90, 97 and n.20 (1977). The Supreme Court, however, analyzed the 1909 
excise tax as a tax on the privilege of conducting a business in the corporate form with the 
benefits of continuity, limited liability, centralized management, etc. See Flint v. Stone 
Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 161-162 (1911). 
, .. See Clark, supra note 154. The tax rate was one percent of net income in excess of 
$5,000. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, Ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112. 
Historically, no doubt, the first rather nominal corporate income taxes were moti-
vated by a combination of the desire to raise revenue and the realistic perception of 
corporations as legal entities which, independent of their shareholders, bought and 
sold, generated large amounts of revenue and income, and reported the results. It is 
no accident that corporate taxes began to appear just as industrial corporations first 
began to occupy major independent roles in the economy. The legalistic theory of a 
privilege or franchise tax would not justify the present 48 percent tax, which is out of 
proportion to the benefit conferred. On the other hand, the demand for tax revenues 
has continued to increase through wars and growth in the size of government, and 
today corporations are larger, account for a substantial portion of the national in-
come, and in many cases are so widely held that few shareholders have more than a 
minute percentage of ownership. 
1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 3419 (statement of Ernest Christian). 
, .. See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 3420 (statement of Ernest Christian); 
Graetz, Introduction to the Edwin S. Cohen Tax Symposium: An Overview of Business Tax-
ation, 5 Va. Tax Rev. 577, 583-84 (1986) [hereinafter Cohen Symposium]; Corporate Taxa-
tion Reform Proposals, supra note 33, at 17-18; Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 23, at 59 
(architects of 1984 Treasury Proposals believed that as an ideal, the corporate rate should 
not be much lower than maximum individual rate to avoid use of corporations for inside 
shelter). 
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modern corporate income tax was first imposed. 1117 Furthermore, a 
far more efficient means of backstopping the individual rates 
would have been a mandatory passthrough of the entity's income 
whether or not distributed.168 Indeed, as long as the maximum in-
dividual rate was considerably higher than the maximum corporate 
rate (until 1981), many high-bracket taxpayers actually used 
closely held and publicly traded C corporations as inside tax shel-
ters. m As one student of taxation pointed out, use of corporations 
in such circumstances to retain earnings rendered "[t]he high rates 
that our tax laws now have for individuals . . . simply a facade. "~60 
While for the lower bracket individual taxpayer the burden of 
double taxation is far greater, so that a C corporation does not 
serve as an inside tax shelter for him/61 the reality is that the typi-
cal lower bracket taxpayer does not own corporate stock. 162 
Commentators have also rationalized the inside corporate tax as 
a tax on the "deferral value" of not taxing the shareholders on the 
entity's earnings until distributed or realized through a capital 
transaction. 163 Given widespread deferral and realization through 
••• See Clark, supra note 154, at 97 and n.23. Indeed, in the early years in this century 
when the federal corporate and individual tax rates were equal, the Revenue Acts in effect 
provided for a shareholder-level partial dividend exclusion from the "normal" tax, recogniz-
ing that such income had already been taxed at the corporate level at the "normal rate." See 
Holland, Stockholder Differential Taxation and Tax Relief, Compendium, supra note 23, at 
1551, 1552. 
166 Economists opposed full-integration because corporate sector income would then be 
taxed at excessive individual rates. See 1955 Tax Policy Hearings, supra note 7, at 554-55 
(colloquy Drs. Hall and Lindner), 565 (statement of Dr. Adelman). The answer was to lower 
the artificially high and easily avoided individual rates. See id. at 521, 554-55 (statement of 
Harry Rudnick). Additionally, full integration would entail repeal or at least modification of 
the capital gains preference. See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 94 (statement of 
Blumenthal), 6144-45, 6152 (statement of Professor Graetz). Unfortunately, when all these 
preconditions occurred in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the historic opportunity for complete 
integration (with a corporate sector imputed schedular income tax bearing the estimated 
corporate sector tax plus an allowance for estimated owner-level realization to be collected 
at the entity level) was lost, possibly because Senator Bill Bradley had not included integra-
tion in his proposals in part due to difficulty of explanations to Congressmen and voters. 
See Minarik, supra note 40, at 1365. 
160 See generally supra note 141. 
180 1958 Mills Hearings (Part 3) supra note 23, at 3443 (statement of Paul Ziffren). 
••• See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 6079 (statement of Martin Feldstein). 
••• See id. at 6106-07 (statement of Sheldon Cohen); supra note 7. 
••• See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 3421 (statement of Ernest Chris-
tian)(contrary arguments preferred by industry witnesses); Corporate Tax Reform Propos-
als, supra note 33, at 17-18. 
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capital transactions (historically afforded preferential treat-
ment),164 either the inside corporate level tax, or perhaps more log-
ically .the outside shareholder level tax, could be so rationalized. 
But if, as has historically been the case, the combined effective in-
side and discounted outside tax rates are less than the effective 
rate of current direct taxation at the owner level (full integra-
tion)1611 would yield, 166 full pass through would be more effective. 
During the House Ways and Means Committee hearings on the 
President's 1978 tax program, a witness stated that "the need for 
tax revenues is the only reason for the [then] 48-percent 
nonintegrated tax on corporations.11167 In other words, politics, not 
policy, supported and supports the corporate tax. A refrain in the 
commentary is that the corporate tax is an easy source of revenue 
because it is "hidden," i.e., its incidence is unclear.168 Because over 
60% of taxable corporate income is earned by one-tenth of 1% of 
active corporations/69 large C corporations are thought by popu-
184 Sales and certain redemptions, see I.R.C. § 302(b), and liquidations, see I.R.C. § 331, 
treated as sales or exchanges and which generated capital gain, except to the extent the 
collapsible corporation rules of I.R.C. § 341 applied, were taxed at varying preferential rates 
prior to enactment of the 1986 Code. · 
18° Full integration refers to elimination of the two-tier corporate and shareholder tax by 
taxation of shareholders alone on both distributed and undistributed corporate earnings. 
Under this approach, a corporation's undistributed earnings would be deemed to have 
been distributed to and reinvested by the shareholders each year. Tax could be col-
lected at the corporate level, in effect using the corporation as a withholding agent for 
the shareholders, or tax could be collected solely at the shareholder level without 
withholding. Shareholders would be subject to income· tax on the allocated earnings 
and would adjust their basis in their shares accordingly. 
Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 33, at 14. See generally, McLure, Integration 
of the Personal and Corporate Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Propos-
als, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 532, 549-50 (1975) (refers to such allocation method as the "partner-
ship method"). 
In contrast "partial integration" methods focus on two-tier relief only for dividends paid 
and generally only with respect to corporate earnings that have been taxed at the corporate · 
level. The proposed methods by which to effect partial integration are the dividend-received 
exclusion, the dividend-received credit, and the dividend-paid deduction. See id. at 552-554; 
1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 3432-63 (statement of Ernest Christian), 6152 (state-
ment of Professor Graetz). 
188 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
187 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 3419 (statement of Ernest Christian). 
188 See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 41 (statement of McKee); 
Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, the Proper Way to Eliminate the Corporate Tax, 27 
Tax Notes 637, 639-40, 647 n.15 (May 6, 1985); Smith, Tax Treatment of Dividends, Com-
pendium, supra note 23, at 1543-54. 
188 In 1984, 3,170,743 corporate returns reported a total of $257,054,060 in taxable income; 
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lists to be an easy source of revenue. 170 This aspect of corporate 
taxation was articulated by a witness at Congressman Mills' 1959 
tax revisions hearings as "corporations do not vote,"171 and Con-
gressman Byrnes added that this aspect "adds to the ease of 
collection. "~72 
These arguments historically appear to be variants of the pre-
1986 double taxation "briarpatch" argument.l78 Like a rabbit in a 
briarpatch, a shareholder of both a publicly and closely held corpo-
ration had always believed that the double tax "thorns" of the 
1954 Code "briarpatch" would never prick him. The inside corpo-
rate tax was less than direct taxation and outside realization was 
usually in the form of long-deferred capital gains, of de minimis 
present value impact.174 If this argument is correct, the apparent 
true aim of the separate entity tax regime appears to have been to 
afford a tax subsidy to corporate sector income and entrepreneurs 
for capital formation, while preserving the facade of progressive in-
dividual taxation. 1711 
3,663 returns (each with $250,000,000 or more in assets) reported a total of $158,875,836 in 
taxable income. Dep't of Treasury, Source Book Statistics of Income, Active Corporation 
Income Tax Returns July 1984 - June 1985 8 (1987). 
170 
"Some also contend that given the distribution of ownership of corporate equity, the 
two-tier tax adds to the progressivity of the income tax system, and that relief from the two-
tier tax would disproportionately benefit wealthy taxpayers." Corporate Tax Reform Pro-
posals, supra note 33, at 18. See 1978 House Hearings supra note 23, at 3504 (statement of 
Sheldon Cohen), 6119-20 (statement of Hickman). This thought lies at the core of this arti-
cle's horizontal-schedular equity model. Treasury described the public and political support 
for a corporate income tax as follows: 
Corporations, and large corporations in particular, are widely viewed as separate enti-
ties that should contribute, through tax payments, to the cost of government. It is 
noteworthy as well that prior integration proposals have not received strong support 
from the corporate sector. Many corporate managers may prefer either reduced in-
come tax rates on all corporate earnings or increased tax preferences for investment 
over dividend relief or other methods of integration. Some may also be concerned 
that integration in the form of dividend relief would force larger distributions of cor-
porate income and thus reduce the capital available to corporations for reinvestment. 
1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 26 (statement of Mentz). Mentz also 
pointed out the revenue costs of integration. See id. at 25-26. 
171 1959 Panel Discussion, supra note 23, at 871. 
172 ld. 
173 See supra note 34. 
174 See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 6155 (statement of Professor Graetz). 
170 While corporations do not vote, they and their unionized employees often do contrib-
ute to political action committees, which may help explain why the rabbits escaped the 
thorns until 1986. See supra note 160. For populist criticism of this situation, see Future 
Implications of 1986 Act Hearings, supra note 49, at 15 (statement of Robert S. Mcintyre, 
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Although not the double tax it purports to be, the actual antici-
pated large C corporate sector tax of 25% of economic income, 178 
plus the tax on owner-level realizations, can be justified as a rough 
surrogate for the policy ideal of full integration in a truly progres-
sive income tax system.177 Let us make the unprovable assump-
tion178 that corporate taxes are borne in the short run by share-
holders, albeit possibly in the long run by owners of capital in 
general.179 We know that ownership of publicly held C corporations 
is concentrated in upper income individuals180 and tax-exempt en-
tities, predominantly qualified retirement plans, 181 which also are 
Director 9f Federal Tax Policy, Citizens for Tax Justice); Sheppard, supra note 168, at 637, 
646. Using a "tax contracts" analysis, see supra note 34, it can be argued that corporate 
management, small businessmen and union members participating in qualified plans would · 
have the most to gain in maintaining the corporate tax status quo and hence could be ex-
pected to contribute heavily to members of Congress on the tax writing committees. 
178 Teuber, Study Finds That Some Profitable Firms Will Escape Taxation Under Re-
form, 33 Tax Notes 893 (Dec. 8, 1986). 
177 See 1987 House MLP Hearings, supra note 16, at 342, 351-352 (statement of John 
Lee); Brooks, A Proposal to Avert the Revenue Loss From "Disincorporation", 36 Tax 
Notes 425, 427-28 (July 27, 1987). Cf. Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 33 at 17-
18. 
178 See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 41 (statement of William Mc-
Kee); Future Implications of 1986 Act Hearings, supra note 49, at 15, 72 (statement of Rob-
ert Mcintyre); Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 33, at 21; Ballentine, Where Is 
the Income Tax Rationale for the Shift to Higher Corporate Rates?, 30 Tax Notes 443, 445-
46 (Feb. 3, 1986); Kies, supra note 51, at 184. A survey of the literature and Hearings leads 
to the conclusion that those in favor of vertical equity assume that the corporate tax is 
borne by the owners or capital in general long-term. See, e.g., Cohen Symposium, supra note 
156, at 579; Sunley, supra note 23, at 63. (For an exposition of the economic theory that the 
corporate sector tax in the long run is borne by capital in general-by lowering the return 
on non-corporate investments.:._see Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and 
Corporate Income Taxes, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 719, 725 (1981)). But a largely Democratic Con-
gress was not willing to count such income taxes as imputed to high income owners for 
purposes of "distributional acceptability." See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra 
note 8, at 41 (statement of William McKee); Feldstein, supra note 7, at 37. Conversely, 
those favoring the status quo argue that the incidence is unknown. See 1986 Passthrough 
Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 41 (statement of William McKee); Cohen Symposium, 
supra note 156, at 589 (statement of Dr. Charls Walker). 
170 From a populist schedular income point of view, it should make little difference 
whether the corporate tax is borne by shareholders or capitalists in general. Both groups are 
not taxed in a sufficiently progressive manner, see Sunley, supra note 23, at 63, and are 
ultimately the same people. See Concentration of Wealth, supra note 7, at 24. 
180 See Concentration of Wealth, supra note 7, at 24 (top half of one percent of owners of 
income own 46.5% of personally held corporate stock; next half of one percent own 13.5% 
and next nine percent own 29.3%). 
101 See supra note 7. 
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largely the owners of capital in general.182 As a practical matter, 
such individuals' income from noncorporate sources is not taxed at 
very progressive effective rates (about 22% of economic income), 
thus violating vertical equity.183 And if the individuals earned the 
corporate sector income directly, due to the preferences and lever-
age discussed below,11w any tax on such income would arise only 
under the individual minimum tax regime.1811 As to large C corpo-
ration stock held by tax-exempt shareholders, e.g., retirement 
plans, less than half the work force is covered by qualified retire-
ment plans, so that additional tax benefits there too violate hori-
zontal equity.186 Consequently, separate entity taxation as to large 
active businesses with inactive owners yields rough justice, if this 
income is attributed to the owners, by partially offsetting the lack 
of vertical or horizontal equity in the existing system.187 In short, 
the corporate sector tax can be justified as effecting in a "schedu-
lar fashion" the horizontal and vertical equity principle that all 
large active business/passive owner income should be treated 
equally.188 
As a matter of tax policy, both large limited partnerships and 
PTPs conducting an active business should be treated as separate 
entities, and such entities should proportionately carry the corpo-
182 See Concentration of Wealth, supra note 7, at 24; Feldstein, supra note 7. 
188 See 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 227 (statement of Richard Gordon); 
see supra note 43. 
1 
.. See infra notes 191, 192, 233 and 322 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
preferences and leveraging. 
186 See infra notes 189-192 and accompanying text. 
188 As of 1983, only 56% of non-agricultural workers were covered by employer-sponsored 
qualified retirement plans, with more highly paid employees much more likely to be covered 
(82% of employees earning above $25,000 were covered). See Concentration of Wealth, 
supra note 7, at 17; Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Poli-
cies, 135 U. Penn. L. Rev. 851, 876 n.87 (1987). 
187 See supra note 177; Kasten & Sammartino, The Distribution of Federal Taxes 1975 
Through 1990, 38 Tax Notes 77 (Jan. 4, 1988). 
188 Integration is the ideal means for ending any inside shelter, see generally Sheppard, 
supra note 168, hut so long as it is not obtainable, economic efficiency and vertical equity 
mandate that all large corporate sector income (income of large active businesses with inac-
tive owners) carry the large corporate sector effective rate, plus some load for anticipated 
effective rate on owner-level realizations. See Cohen Symposium, supra note 156, at 586-87 
(statement of Professor Graetz). Schedular income does raise the issue of compartmentaliza-
tion of income-the Mexican model. See Future Implications of 1986 Act Hearings, supra 
note 49, at 63 (statement of Rep. Archer). 
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rate sector tax burden.189 However, OBRA's straight imposition of 
the current large C corporation double tax regime on PTPs itself 
violates such horizontal schedular equity. In large C corporations, 
classic "double taxation" under the regular income tax regime is 
virtually non-existent (as Treasury and others have repeatedly 
pointed out to Congress190) due to the cumulative effect of lever-
age, 191 preferences192 and low rates of earnings distributions, with 
shareholder realizations arising more frequently through capital 
transactions such as sales (possibly after basis step-up due to the 
prior owner's death).198 Consequently, the true large C corporation 
inside tax often is the alternate minimum tax, 194 with an effective 
181 See authorities cited in supra note 188. 
100 See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 22 (statement of Mentz). 
Corporations taxed under Subchapter C typically operate in a manner that postpones 
or avoids double taxation of their income. Thus, double taxation encourages corpora-
tions to retain rather than distribute income, so as to defer the second level of tax 
and give shareholders the opportunity to realize such income through a sale of stock, 
gain on which is generally taxed at favorable rates. In addition, double taxation en-
courages corporations to raise new capital through the issuance of debt, interest pay-
ments on which are deductible, rather than through the issuance of stock, dividend 
payments on which are not deductible. Similarly, closely held corporations are en-
couraged to distribute income to their owners in the form of deductible salary or 
rental payments. Although current law attempts to restrict avoidance or postpone-
ments of the double tax on corporate income (for example, through the collapsible 
corporation provisions, the personal holding company tax, the accumulated earnings 
tax, rules characterizing debt as equity, and rules limiting the deduction of unreason-
able compensation), the double tax is, in practice, to some extent mitigated. 
Id. See also 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7 at 63 (statement of Mentz), 114 (state-
ment of Lawrence Cohen); 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 67-68 (state-
ment of Professor Ginsburg); 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 3517, 3521-24 (state-
ment of Dennis Gaffney); Lewis, A Proposed Treatment for Corporate Distributions and 
Sales in Liquidation, Compendium, supra note 23, at 1643. 
181 See Acquisitions and Mergers Hearings, supra note 27, at 120-25, 130-37, 161-62 
(statement of Brockway), 612 (statement of Rep. Flippo), 762-64 (Professor Eustice), Staff 
of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Federal Income Tax Aspects of Mergers 
and Acquisitions 4 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter Mergers & Acquisitions Hearings Pam-
phlet]; 1984 Treasury Proposals, supra note 9, at 193-194. 
18
• See Acquisitions and Mergers Hearings, supra note 27, at 191 (statement of Ronald 
Pearlman); Mergers & Acquisitions Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 191, at 5; see 1984 Trea-
sury Proposals, supra note 9, at 156, 162. 
103 See Acquisitions and Mergers Hearings, supra note 27, at 191-92, 205-06 (statement of 
Ronald Pearlman); Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 33, at 20. 
1 
.. By substantially broadening the laundry list of tax preferences and adding 50% of 
corporate book income over taxable income as a preference, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
defined a comprehensive income base under the minimum tax regime, for the first time 
approaching the measurement of economic income. See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 51, at 
433-34. 
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rate for large C corporations in general of 25% of economic in-
come.191j Moreover, estimates of outside shareholder level realiza-
tions through dividends range from 7% to 50%.196 By and large, 
PTPs with active businesses differ substantially from large C cor-
porations as to at least two of these factors, both of which contrib-
ute to the immunity of large C corporations from double taxation: 
PTPs have lower leverage rates197 and higher rates of distribution 
than do large C corporations. 198 These differences result in a sub-
The 1986 Act elevates the minimum tax from a backstop for the regular tax to an 
integral part of the tax system. The old add-on minimum tax for corporations is re-
placed with a new alternative tax. The expanded list of tax preferences includes 50 
percent of the difference between pre-tax book income and minimum taxable income. 
With the advent of the book income preference, the corporate income tax can be 
viewed as involving three tax systems, with three different depreciation rules and 
three different tax rates. Specifically, there is a regular tax with ACRS depreciation 
and a 34 percent tax rate. There is a regular minimum tax with non-incentive depre-
ciation and a 20 percent tax rate. There is a third tax on excess book income with 
book income depreciation and a 10 percent tax rate. 
Sunley, supra note 23, at 65. 
While no data seems available as to the number of corporations now paying taxes under 
the alternate minimum tax {"AMT") rather than the regular tax regime, commentators us-
ing computer simulations have concluded that the AMT under the 1986 Senate bill {largely 
followed by the Conference, see 1986 Conference Report, supra note 106, at 11-263-11-283) 
has its greatest impact on young, growing, capital intensive corporations. See Lucke, Eisen-
ach & Dildine, The Senate Alternate Minimum Tax: Does it Snare only the Tax "Abuser"?, 
32 Tax Notes 681 (Aug. 18, 1986); Harter, How Tax Reform Would Affect Companies with 
Different Growth and Profitability Characteristics, 31 Tax Notes 297, 300 (Apr. 21, 1986). 
100 See Teuber, Study Finds That Some Profitable Firms Will Escape Taxation Under 
Reform, 33 Tax Notes 893 (Dec. 8, 1986) {thousand largest corporations had average effec-
tive rate of 20.91 percent of economic income in 1985; under 1986 rules the average effective 
rate would have been 25.6%). 
''" See 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 76 (Table 1 of Treasury statement 
assumes that 93% of the retained corporate equity is taxed as a capital gain and 7% as a 
dividend). Based on Treasury statistics of corporate ·earnings and dividend income, an 
amount equal to 50% of current corporate taxable earnings has been annually distributed. 
See id. at 226 (based on 1985 Statistical Abstract of the United States); Lewis, A Proposal 
for Corporate Distributions and Sales in Liquidation, Compendium, supra note 23, at 1643. 
The latter approach fails to account for erosion of the corporate base. 
107 See 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 79 {appendix to Treasury statement). 
Industry witnesses stated that low PTP debt-equity ratios reflected a yield orientation of 
investment. See id. at 89-90, 138, 146, 168, 197, 213-14. 
••• See id. at 70, 90, 135, 138, 168, 197, 213. Cash flow appears greater than taxable in-
come {13 to 15% vs. 2.4% return on investment). See id. at 89, 79. Undoubtedly, this differ-
ence reflects heavy use of tax preferences by PTPs, as should be expected in that many of 
the PTPs are in the natural resource business. See id. at 77. Oil and gas PTPs show a 1.4% 
taxable income return while real estate and timber MLP's show a 5.8% return. See id. at 79. 
From this yield orientation, commentators and Congress concluded that the PTP structure 
favored mature businesses with a steady cash flow. See id. at 36. However, in 1987, Treasury 
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stantially greater incidence of double taxation and higher effective 
rates when the tax burdens on the owners and the entity are 
combined.199 
Thus, true horizontal schedular equity would call for taxation of 
PTP limited partners and limited partners in other large limited 
partnerships conducting active businesses at a rate equal to the 
anticipated large C corporate rate (25% of economic income) plus 
the anticipated tax on outside large C corporation shareholder re-
alizations of such income. A roughly equivalent and nicely sym-
metrical rate might be 28% of entity-level net economic income or 
perhaps of the corporate alternate minimum tax base, which also 
neatly solves the historical integration problem of preferences.200 
Owner withdrawals of this income would not trigger a second tax 
argued that a more recent trend was for PTPs to distribute only amounts equal to unit 
holder-level taxes or entity-level tax savings (PTP and owners as contrasted with C corpora-
tion tax). See id. at 68-69. 
'
08 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 114 (statement of Lawrence Cohen) 
(describing tax burden of master limited partnership as equivalent to double taxation of 
corporations). 
100 See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 6145, 6148-49, 6161-63 (statement of Pro-
fessor Graetz). The Joint Committee Staff raises the following issues as to whether to pass 
through preferences: 
If the purpose for granting relief from the two-tier tax is to eliminate corporate level 
tax entirely and to treat corporate income as earned directly by shareholders, it could 
be argued that all preference items of a corporation should be attributed directly to 
its shareholders, regardless of whether they are individuals or other corporations. 
On the other hand, relief from the two-tier tax may be considered simply an effort 
to eliminate the burden of any existing corporate level tax, at least so long as funds 
remain in corporate solution. Although most preference items are available both to 
corporations and individuals, it may be argued the effect of various preferences in the 
Code is largely to reduce corporate taxes. For example, even though the investment 
credit and ACRS are available to both corporations and individuals, these provisions 
benefit corporations in overwhelming proportions. Under this view, it would be inap-
propriate to permit provisions that reduce corporate income taxes to reduce the in-
come taxes of a corporation's individual shareholders as well. Nevertheless, it may be 
considered appropriate to assure that the benefit of a preference item is continued so 
long as the related income remains in corporate solution (even though distributed to 
a corporate shareholder that has made a portfolio investment and is otherwise unre-
lated to the distributing corporation). 
Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 33, at 27 n.42. Implicitly this distinction un-
derlies the PAL provisions generally inapplicable to corporations. The essence of the 28% 
alternative minimum tax rate for corporations was apparent to industry lobbyists who op-
posed the proposed model when presented at the 1987 House master limited partnership 
hearings. See 1987 House MLP Hearings, supra note 16, at 361-62 (statement of Jeffrey 
Rosenthal of the National Association of Realtors and the Real Estate Securities and Syndi-
cation Institute). 
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under this model, and losses would not pass through. Of course, if 
this worked for active business PTPs, the model could then be ex-
tended to large C corporations with no revenue loss. 201 
2. Small C Corporations: Inside Tax Shelter 
The integration debate usually has focused on double taxation as 
a violation of horizontal equity and especially as encouraging debt 
over equity financing.202 The reality too often under the 1954 
Code, occasionally as to large C corporations203 and usually as to 
small, and hence close C corporations, 204 was that double taxation 
provided an inside tax shelter. Under such a tax shelter, the own-
ers and the C corporation, in the aggregate, using well-publicized 
tax planning techniques,2011 paid less income taxation than the 
owner would have paid in direct taxation under full integration. 
This inside shelter was thought by some to continue under the 
1986 Code, at least as to small C corporations.206 The shelter may, 
however, be subject to substantial transactional tax costs, which 
create most of the complexity in tax practice as to small busi-
nesses.207 Moreover, the second, outside tax on shareholder realiza-
10
' Id. at 342, 351 (statement of author). 
••• See supra notes 23 and 29 and accompanying text. 
••• See authorities cited in supra note 141. The highest marginal individual rate under the 
original 1954 Code was 91 o/o on taxable income in excess of $300,000, see Int. Rev. Code of 
1954 § 1(a), while the maximum corporate rate was 52%. Id. § ll(b) and (c) . 
... See 1978 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 6155 (statement of Professor Graetz). 
••• See supra note 130. 
•oe See Kramer, Take a Hard Look Before Electing S Corporation Status, 1 Tax Times 
No. 4, p. 14 (Dec. 1986). But see Magette & Rohman, Choice of Business Entity After the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986: The Brave New World, 12 Rev. of Tax'n of Indivs. 38, 62 (1988); 
Bogdanski, Using Corporations for Tax Savings-A Reappraisal, 14 J. Corp. Tax'n 160 
(1987). 
107 For example, balancing income from a business venture between compensation to 
principal and retained taxable income not exceeding the lowest corporate graduated rate 
brackets generates the problem of "unreasonable compensation" not deductible by the cor-
poration under § 162 of the Code. Retention of corporate earnings to obtain the lower inside 
tax rate, rather than payment to shareholders which triggers true double taxation, poses 
"accumulated earnings tax" problems, see Watkins & Jacobs, Closely Held Businesses: Tax 
Planning After ERTA, Tax Adviser 516 (1982); Hearings on Tax Shelters, Accounting 
Abuses, and Corporate and Securities Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1984) (statement of Professor Ginsburg). Retention of 
earnings inside the corporation to carry on a personal investment program causes personal 
holding company tax problems as well. See Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 33, 
at 4. Furthermore, particularly in service organizations, splitting personal service income 
between the C corporation and the shareholder-employee gives rise to intense problems re-
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tions often proved mythical. Only a small portion of corporate 
earnings was intentionally distributed as dividends208 and share-
holder realization of built-in gain or retained earnings was more 
commonly affected through sales (or perhaps redemptions or liqui-
dations in a close C corporation context).209 Such capital transac-
tion realizations yielded no revenue if carried out by the owner's 
estate or heirs after a date-of-death income tax-free step up to fair 
market value.210 This sort of use of the corporate entity to produce 
less tax liability than would be owed in direct taxation of the 
owner violates sound tax policy, particularly where the owner ac-
tively participates.1111 Horizontal equity and economic efficiency 
are violated because the same source income earned by a sole pro-
prietor or partner would be taxed at a higher rate.212 Additionally, 
since the owners of close C corporations are higher income taxpay-
ers than the owners of C corporation stock in general (themselves a 
high income class), vertical equity is violated as well.213 Again, the 
true issue is not whether there is double taxation, but whether 
there will be even one full tax collected at least once. 214 
PSCs constitute the most glaring abuse of graduated inside 
rates, since most owners of PSCs actively participate in the busi-
ness. Indeed, stock ownership is usually restricted to those licensed 
to practice the profession. 2111 But wherever the owners materially 
participate, the abuse occurs, whether by corner druggist, grocer, 
lating to I.R.C. § 482 deemed arm's-length reallocation of income or deductions. Even where 
the retention of profits at the corporate level is ultimately respected, attempts to realize the 
economic benefit at the shareholder level prior to the sale of the business often gives rise to 
new sets of tax problems, e.g., whether withdrawals structured as "loans" constitute con-
structive dividends, sale/exchange or dividend treatment applies to redemption payments 
upon retirement, and whether the "collapsible" corporation provisions will apply. The latter 
two problem areas should disappear, except for basis recovery in redemptions, if the 1988 
elimination of the capital gains preference remains in the 1986 Code. Finally, offsetting the 
use of a close C corporation as an inside tax shelter was one of the primary post-facto justi-
fications for the 1986 repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. See Sheppard, General Utili-
ties Repeal, 33 Tax Notes 183 (Oct. 13, 1986). 
••• See supra note 174. 
••• See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
21° Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 33, at 17-18, 49. 
111 Cf. Preliminary Subchapter C Report, supra note 9, at 88. 
212 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
113 See supra notes 30-32. 
214 See supra note 35. 
210 Eaton & Church, Professional Corporations and Associations, 17 Bus. Orgs. (MB) § 
9.04[10] (1987). 
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small manufacturer or builder, as the 1984 Treasury proposals rec-
ognized. 216 Yet OBRA's denial of graduated rates to PSCs alone is 
too narrow and generates only a fraction of the revenues that 
would arise from repeal of the graduated corporate rates for small 
C corporations in general.217 
C. Passive Activity Loss Provisions 
The deep structure policy supporting many of the PAL rules is a 
corollary of basic classification policy. If an owner does not actively 
or materially participate in the management or operations of an 
entity, the entity should be taxed as separate.218 Losses of a sepa-
rate entity should not immediately flow or pass through to its own-
ers; rather, an owner should realize and recognize any decline in 
value of his interest in a separate entity only upon disposition of 
such interest or its becoming worthless.219 This has long been the 
case as to shareholders and C corporations, 220 as well as to inves-
tors in passive income, separate conduit entities such as REITs 
and RICs. 221 
Deep structure analysis demonstrates that aiming the PAL pro-
visions at passive owners of active businesses was too narrow as a 
matter of policy. And, indeed, Congress gave Treasury in the 1986 
Code the authority to bring within the PAL provisions a passive 
activity that does not rise to "trade or business" status,222 so long 
as the activity does not produce "portfolio income."228 But the net-
ting among different passive activities contravenes this deep struc-
ture policy. 
In addition to tax policy reasons, Congress also based the 1986 
Code PAL provisions on political considerations. Preservation of 
116 See 1984 Treasury Proposals, supra note 9, at 128-29. 
211 The denial of graduated rates for personal service corporations is expected to increase 
revenues by $75 million in 1988, $125 million in 1989 and $140 million in 1990. See 1987 
Senate Report, supra note 97, at 219. The author estimated at the 1987 House MLP Hear-
ings that the range of revenue in denial of graduated brackets for all close C corporations 
with profits would be $1 to $5 billion a year. See 1987 House MLP Hearings, supra note 16, 
at 34 (statement of author). 
118 See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text. 
''" See 1986 Senate Report, supra note 7, at 717. 
••• See I.R.C. § 165(g); 1986 Senate Report, supra note 7, at 717. 
••• See supra notes 66 and 67. 
••• I.R.C. § 469(c)(6)(B). 
••• 1986 Conference Report (vol. II), supra note 106, at 138. 
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the corporate sector tax base was not the goal here, since most pas-
sive-type income enterprises traditionally have chosen the partner-
ship form. 224 Congress' focus instead was on curbing expansion of 
tax shelters.2211 Thus, Congress' most obvious concern was stem-
ming loss of faith in the federal income tax system due to wide-
spread awareness of tax shelter abuses. The public apparently per-
ceived that high-income individuals were using tax shelters to 
reduce or even eliminate the current incidence of taxation on their 
portfolio income and salaries.228 But more importantly, 
a provision significantly limiting the use of tax shelter losses [was] 
unavoidable if substantial rate reductions [were] to be provided to 
high-income taxpayers without disproportionately reducing the 
share of total liability under the individual income tax that [was] 
borne by high-income taxpayers as a group.u7 
This policy would dictate complete separate basket treatment for 
each PAL activity or at least each entity conducting the activity. 
Thus, the passthrough PTP separate-basket PAL rule is correct as 
a matter of policy, but the general PAL netting rule is incorrect, 
with the end result of horizontal inequity turning solely on the fact 
of public trading. The political reality which better effected policy 
considerations in 1987 than in 1986 was that the revenue generated 
114 See 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1066. See also 1987 House MLP Hearings, 
supra note 16 at 364-65 (statement of Rosenthal). 
11
" See 1986 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 714. 
118 ld. at 713-14. 
117 Id. at 714. The Minority Tax Counsel to the House Ways and Means Committee ex-
plained, during the gestation of the 1986 Code, that the goal of "distributional acceptabil-
ity," i.e., that "the direct effect of the individual tax changes [would] ... not result in a 
larger percentage tax decrease for higher income taxpayers than for middle- and lower-in-
come taxpayers," mandated reaching five major individual taxpayer-side decisions necessary 
to offset enough of the top marginal rate reduction benefits to higher-income taxpayers to 
achieve this result. Kies, supra note 51, at 183; see also Ballentine, The Short-Run Distribu-
tional Effect of Tax Reform, 31 Tax Notes 1035, 1037 (June 9, 1986). 
Those major changes included (1) the elimination of the preferential capital gains 
rate, (2) the passive loss rules on a generally retroactive basis, (3) the provisions 
which phase out the benefits of the 15 percent marginal rate bracket and the stan-
dard deduction for higher-income taxpayers, (4) the elimination of individual retire-
ment accounts generally for taxpayers with over $50,000 of income, and (5) limits on 
the deductibility of investment interest. These decisions, while difficult for the con-
ferees, were essential to achieve a distributionally ac.ceptable package. 
Kies, supra note 51, at 184 (footnotes omitted). 
The legislative history explicitly confirms this trade-off as to passive losses. See 1986 Senate 
Report, supra note 8, at 716-17. 
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by the PTP changes was provided primarily in the PAL 
provisions. 228 
IV. CoNGRESSIONAL RATIONALES FOR OBRA CHANGES AND 
CRITIQUE 
A. PTPs: A Classification Issue 
1. Reclassification of Active Business PTPs 
Congress based its classification of active business PTPs as C or 
regular corporations on preservation of the "corporate sector tax 
base"229 and two horizontal equity arguments: functional resem-
blance to corporations;230 and practical availability only to mature 
cash flow ventures, as contrasted with start-up or capital intensive 
ventures, which had created an unlevel playing field231 (i.e., hori-
zontal disparity or "economic inefficiency"232). 
118 See 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 78 (statement of Mentz). Industry 
witnesses heavily emphasized this fact. ld. at 157 n.5. Treasury's response was that it was 
concerned about future erosion. ld. at 47 (testimony of Mentz); id. at 179 (statement of 
Richard Cohen). 
The real estate and natural resources lobbies had acquiesced in the idea of PAL portfolio 
income treatment of PTP income from such sources by the time of the 1987 MLP hearings. 
See 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 177, 304. But see id. at 219, 272-73. 
••• 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1065; 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, 
at 72-73 (statement of Mentz). 
••• 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1066. 
I d. 
Publicly traded partnerships resemble publicly traded corporations in their business 
functions and in the way their interests are marketed, and limited partners as a prac-
tical matter resemble corporate shareholders in that they have limited liability, may 
freely transfer their interests, generally do not participate in management, and expect 
continuity of life of the entity for the duration of the conduct of its business 
enterprise. 
111 1987 House Report, supra note 21 at 1066. 
••• The "overriding objective" of the 1984 Treasury proposals as to reform of capital and 
business income was "to subject real economic income from all sources to the same tax 
treatment." 1 U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic 
Growth-Overview xii (1984) [hereinafter Overview of 1984 Treasury Proposals]. 
Implementation of the reforms proposed by the Treasury Department would cause 
improved reallocations of economic resources. The lower tax rates made possible by 
base-broadening and the more realistic rules for the measurement of income and cal-
culation of tax liabilities will increase the attractiveness of industries that suffer 
under the weight of the current unfair and distortionary tax regime. Both established 
industries and new "high-tech" industries will benefit from tax reform. But the ulti-
mate beneficiaries will be the American public. No longer will the nation's scarce 
economic resources-its land, its labor, its capital, and its inventive genius-be allo-
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a. Corporate Sector Tax Base 
The 1986 Act constituted a marked and important transition 
cated by the tax system, instead of by market forces. The result will be more produc-
tive investment, greater opportunities for employment, more useful output, and faster 
economic growth. 
Id. See also id. at 13. 
The Overview then described the erosion of the tax base during the 1954 Code by tax 
preferences, which required high, progressive rates and which resulted in diminished saving 
and investment: 
The lack of a comprehensive income tax base has two obvious and important adverse 
effects on the ability of the marketplace to allocate capital and labor to their most 
productive uses. First, the smaller the tax base, the higher tax rates must be to raise a 
given amount of revenue. High tax rates discourage saving and investment, stifle 
work effort, retard invention and innovation, encourage unproductive investment in 
tax shelters, and needlessly reduce the Nation's standard of living and growth rate. 
Second, tax-preferred activities are favored relative to others, and tax law, rather 
than the market, becomes the primary force in determining how economic resources 
are used. Over the years, the tax system has come to exert a pervasive influence on 
the behavior of private decision-makers. The resulting tax-induced distortions in the 
use of labor and capital and in consumer choices have severe costs in terms of lower 
productivity, lost production, and reduced consumer satisfaction. 
The existing taxation of capital and business income is particularly non-neutral. It 
favors capital-intensive industries over others, such as services. The tax system favors 
industries that are unusually dependent on equipment over those-such as wholesale 
and retail trade-that rely more heavily on other forms of capital, including invento-
ries and structures. High technology companies are put at a particular disadvantage. 
Since they do not require large capital investments that benefit from preferential tax 
treatment they bear the full brunt of high tax rates. A tax system that interferes less 
with market forces in the determination of what business should produce-and 
how-would be more conducive to productive investment and economic growth. 
Id. at 4-5. 
The 1984 Treasury Proposals consistently applied the ideal of economic efficiency in ana-
lyzing 1954 Code tax preferences. For example, the proposals argued that a host of taxpayer 
favorites hindered economic efficiency: tax-free fringe benefits and deductible business 
travel and entertainment expenses encourage consumption, 1984 Treasury Proposals, supra 
note 9, at 21, 23, 29, 33, 36, 82 and 87-88; double taxation of C corporations and deductibil-
ity of interest encourage financing by. retained earnings and debt and increase the cost of 
capital, id. at 135; low or negative effective tax rates from 1954 Code capital recovery 
(ACRS and lTC) schemes distort investment decisions in a variety of ways, id. at 156, 173-
74; the capital gains tax preference distorts investment decisions by providing a potentially 
lower effective tax rate on asset appreciation (including retained corporate earnings) than 
on current earnings from dividends or interest, id. at 180; failure of tax accounting and tax 
treatment of indebtedness rules to accurately account for inflation produces a host of eco-
nomic inefficiencies, see id. at 190, 193-94; lack of uniform capitalization rules encourages 
self-construction and gives own-use producers and tax shelters with multi-period costs a 
competitive advantage, id. at 205-06, 210; various rules give financial institutions low rates, 
id. at 219, 253, 256 and 259; and rapid amortization results in distortions. Id. at 227, 241 and 
305-09. 
For a critical view of the supposed increase in economic efficiency of the 1986 Code as 
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from the traditional 1954 Code tax reform process to the less tax 
preference- and leverage-driven 1986 Code tax reform process, at 
least for the near term. Tax reform in the 1970s and the first half 
of the 1980s consisted primarily of disbursing unlegislated revenue 
increases, which resulted from inflation-driven bracket creep, in 
the form of individual tax cuts and increased availability of tax 
preferences. 233 The 1986 Act retained the traditional individual tax 
cut feature (without any substantial increase in tax expenditures), 
but was funded by a seemingly equivalent increase in the large C 
corporate sector tax burden. 234 Thus, according to Assistant Secre-
tary Mentz, the goal of preserving the corporate tax base rested on 
the 1986 Act's attempt to balance individual rate reduction by an 
equal and "substantial increase in revenues from the corporate sec-
tor."2n In reality, the erosion of the corporate sector tax base, 
which accelerated during the decade prior to the 1986 Act, would 
not have occurred through post-1986 "disincorporation" of large C 
corporations. 236 Instead such erosion would have occurred over the 
finally enacted, see Future Implications of the 1986 Act Hearings, supra note 49, at 98-99 
(statement of Jerry Jasinowski). 
••• See Leonard, supra note 47, at 971 (tax expenditures rose from 50% of total income 
tax revenues in 1974 to over 100% in 1986); Verdier, The Prospects for Tax Stability, 35 
Tax Notes 171, 172 (April 13, 1987). 
••• The individual side estimated tax cuts total $122 billion dollars over the 5 year win-
dow period (1986-90) while the corporate side increase over the same period is estimated to 
be $120 billion. Sunley, supra note 23, at 63. However, a substantial part of the corporate 
side changes are accounting period changes accelerating income from the out years (beyond 
1990), and hence could' be said to reduce corporate side taxable income then. See Kiefer, 
The Progressivity Effects of the Finance Committee Tax Reform Bill, 31 Tax Notes 1031, 
1034 (June 9, 1986). 
Moreover, the large C corporations undoubtedly have the greatest access to tax planning. 
Already, preliminary data indicate that for the federal fiscal year ending September 30, 
1987, the corporate sector tax receipts were $21 billion below projections ($84 billion vs. 
$105 billion). See Business as Usual: Under New Tax Law, Corporations Still Find Ways to 
Reduce Rates, Wall Street J., June 2, 1988, at 1, col. 6 and at 12, col. 1. While a slow 
economy contributed to the short-fall, the blunting of the minimum tax also appeared to 
have played a significant role. ld. at 1, col. 6. 
••• 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 73 (statement of Mentz). 
••• Congress did mention "disincorporation," i.e., conversion of a large C corporation into 
a publicly traded partnership and, hence, elective integration of the corporate and share-
holder levels of tax circumventing the congressional intent to preserve the corporate level 
tax, See 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1066. But Treasury and other witnesses 
agreed that the IBMs and General Motors's of the world would not shift to the PTP form. 
See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 39 (statement of Mentz); 50-51 
(statement of McKee & Kuller); 72 (statement of Professor Ginsburg). Under the 1986 
Code, the immediate cost of full inside recognition of built-in gain to the liquidating corpo-
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long run through the structuring of new ventures as limited part-
nerships, with a view to going public later as PTPs,237 and the 
shifting of future appreciation in existing C corporation assets to 
limited partners in PTPs, utilizing the "frozen" general partner-
ship interest technique.238 
Ironically, the 1986 Act made a number of changes which, Trea-
sury and Congress believed, made 
conduit entities more attractive as vehicles for business activity 
than corporations. For example, under the 1986 Act, the maximum 
regular corporate tax rate is higher than the maximum individual 
tax rate. Thus, in addition to the fact that corporate earnings bear 
a second level of tax when distributed, retained earnings are gener-
ally taxed at a higher rate than amounts directly earned by an in-
dividual. In addition, by increasing the tax rate on capital gains 
and making that rate generally equivalent to the rate on ordinary 
income, the Act reduced an investor's incentive to realize income 
through sales of appreciated stock rather than in the form of cur-
rent income. 
Further, the 1986 Act generally imposed a corporate level tax on 
certain liquidating sales and distributions that were not taxed 
under prior law. Appreciation in corporate assets is thus now sub-
ject to a corporate level tax on the ultimate disposition of the busi-
ness. The 1986 Act also included a new corporate minimum tax 
regime that includes as a preference item a portion of the excess of 
ration under § 336, plus outside owner-level recognition under §§ 331 and 1001 of apprecia-
tion, less the inside tax, outweighed the present value of a step-up of-depreciable assets to 
fair market value in the PTP's hands. Even under the 1954 Code, ihe current tax costs of 
the "recapture incoine" overrides to the General Utilities shield against recognition of built-
in gain upon liquidation, a sale pursuant to liquidation, or a deemed sale pursuant to a 
deemed liquidation (Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 336, 337 and a later version of 338, respec-
tively), often outweighed the present value of the step-up. See Cohen Symposium, supra 
note 156, at 700 (comments of Sam Thompson); cf. Sheppard, Mirror Moves: Life Without 
the General Utilities Rule, 32 Tax Notes 847 (Sept. 1, 1986) . 
• ., "The recent proliferation of publicly traded partnerships has come to the committee's 
attention. The growth in such partnerships has caused concern about long-term erosion of 
the corporate tax base." 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1065; see also 1987 Senate 
MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 55 (statement of Mentz) (new ventures would find their way 
into MLP form), 141 (statement of John Chapoton) (existing corporate tax base protected 
from erosion by repeal of General Utilities). 
•aa See Freeman, Some Early Strategies for the Methodical Disincorporation of America 
Mter the Tax Reform Act of 1986: Grafting Partnerships Onto C Corporations, Running 
Amok with the Master Limited Partnership Concept, and Generally Endeavoring to Defeat 
the Intention of the Draftsmen of the Repeal of General Utilities, 64 Taxes 962, 967-90 
(1986). 
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the income that is reported for financial purposes over the amount 
of corporate alternative minimum taxable income.189 
Indeed, in the 1986 passthrough entity hearings, Assistant Secre-
tary Mentz stated that if he were in private practice advising a 
client starting a business, "I would advise him to start in limited 
partnership form, because that way you get to the one level of tax-
ation right away. "240 
The above-mentioned factors of a maximum inside corporate in-
come tax rate higher than the outside maximum individual rate 
(often actually a "phantom" rate of 33% rather than 28% would 
apply at the individuallevel),1141 and a corporate level tax on liqui-
dating and non-liquidating sales and distributions of appreciated 
assets and deemed sales of such assets upon a deemed liquidation, 
pr9bably are not very significant in reality as to most large C cor-
porations (other than non-leveraged and non-capital intensive en-
terprises in the case of the rate differentials). 
First, as to rate differentials, due to leverage and capital recov-
ery deductions, most large C corporations are not taxed under the 
regular corporate income tax regime. 242 Indeed, at the same time 
the 1986 Act reduced the maximum corporate rate 26% (from 46% 
to 34%), it actually increased the projected corporate sector tax 
burden by a net 22% through alternate minimum tax and tax ac-
counting changes (from 21% to 25% of economic income).243 Thus, 
the more valid comparison is between the corporate ·and individual 
minimum tax regimes,2"" and the major "tax preference" item dif-
••• 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1065-66. The lOOth Congresa drew from these 
changes and the repeal of General Utilities "an intent to preserve the corporate level tax," 
id. at 1066. Cf. 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 31-32, 59-64 (hearing pamphlet 
and statement of Mentz, respectively) . 
... 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 39 (statement of Mentz). Cf. 1987 
Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 55-56 (statement of Mentz), 164 and 197-98 (state-
ment and testimony of Barry Miller) . 
.. , The humpback 5% rate begins at $71,900 of taxable income for a married taxpayer 
filing a joint return. I.R.C. § ll(g). This asymmetric technique was necesaary to maintain 
the fiction of the 28% "maximum" rate and meet the "distributional equitability" require-
ment that the maximum rate reduction benefit be offset. See Kies, supra note 51, at 184; 
Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 23, at 220. 
••• See supra note 194. 
••• See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
••• The 1986 Senate Report, supra note 7, at 521-40, analyzes the corporate and individ-
ual minimum tax regimes, describing some common tax preferences for individuals and cor-
porations, principally BURB for the latter. These preferences are added back to taxable 
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ference between the two regimes-50% of the excess of book over 
taxable income or BURP2411-may be more cosmetic than real.248 
As to the new "liquidating sales" corporate level tax (i.e., the 
1986 Code repeal of the General Utilities doctrine) 247 referred to 
by the House Budget Committee report on OBRA,248 today most 
acquisitions of large C target corporations are not cast as asset ac-
quisitions from a liquidating target.249 Instead, in a tender offer, 
the acquisition is cast as a stock purchase for control of the target 
corporation,2110 after which the acquiring corporation rarely elected 
the section 338 step-up before the advent of the 1986 Code and 
rarely has elected it since.2111 (Section 338 now triggers the target 
income, adjusted by certain items, and then the alternate minimum rate, 20% for corpora-
tions and 21 o/o for individuals, is applied. ld. at 521-22. 
••• I.R.C. § 56(0(1); see generally Leder, Giving Rise to BURP's (and Other Preferences) 
Under the New Corporate Minimum Tax: Selected Aspects, 40 Tax Law. 557 (1987). 
148 The Committee reports do not break out revenue estimates for BURP from the esti-
mates for revenue increases in general from the corporate minimum tax changes. 
147 The General Utilities doctrine shielded inside appreciation, except for "recapture in-
come" upon a liquidation, liquidating sale, or deemed sale pursuant to a deemed liquidation. 
See Corporate Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 33, at 33-43. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
repealed this exemption. Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, § 63(a), (b) and (d). See generally 
Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquidations (and Related Matters) After the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, 42 Tax L. Rev. 573 (1987). 
••• 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1065. 
••• Acquisitions of closely held targets often are accomplished as asset acquisitions. Ac-
cording to the author's conversations with tax professionals, the difference probably lies in 
the virtual impossibility of carrying out a tender offer for assets in the large C corporation 
context. 
••• Double taxation and its avoidance through interest deductions is the principal tax fac-
tor encouraging purchases. See Acquisitions and Mergers Hearings, supra note 27, at 120-21, 
134-35, 161-62 (testimony and statement of David Brockway); 191-93 (testimony of Ronald 
Pearlman); 612 (testimony of Preston Martin, Vice-Chairman, Board of Governors of Fed-
eral Reserve System). 
101 Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation Staff believe that the 1954 Code en-
couraged leveraged acquisitions of lower-leveraged C corporations, especially those with low 
base, high current value depreciable assets, due to the 1954 Code feature of deductibility of 
interest but not dividends. (Note that the same is true of the 1986 Code.) See pages cited in 
Acquisitions and Mergers Hearings, supra note 250. See also Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxa-
tion, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Federal Income Tax Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions 4-5 
(Comm. Print 1985). While they do not discuss whether such acquisitions are cast as cost or 
carry-over basis acquisitions, witnesses at other hearings and other commentary suggest that 
purchasers rarely elected cost basis treatment under the 1954 Code. This was evidently the 
case because "recapture income," taxable to the target under the 1954 Code upon a liquida-
tion, or sale pursuant to a liquidation triggered upon a stock acquisition and § 338 election, 
often equalled the present value of any step up in basis of the depreciable asset. See Reform 
of Corporate Taxation Hearings, supra note 9, at 518-21 (statement of David Glickman); 
Philadelphia Tax Conference Focuses on Business Planning Mter the 1986 Act, 35 Tax 
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corporate level tax on all appreciation2112.) Thus, the target's assets 
generally retain their old, presumably lower than fair market value 
basis after acquisition. Theoretically, the acquiring corporation 
would reduce its purchase price to reflect the loss of step-up in 
basis, 2113 but the practical reality is that the target's purchase price 
often is based on a multiple of its earnings;2114 and earnings are 
Notes 934, 935 (June 8, 1987). 
Conventional wisdom had it that the purchaser and seller could carve out of the purchase 
price any costs attributable to such "customer base intangible" assets as goodwill, 1987 
House Report, supra note 21, at 1058-59, amortizable by the purchaser and purportedly not 
triggering "recapture income" to the seller. Query whether application of the tax benefit 
doctrine to recovery of the seller's costs of creating such intangible assets, at one time cur-
rently deductible as advertising or other ongoing business expenses, id. at 1059, and based 
on a premise now known to be inaccurate, viz., that such intangibles should give rise to a 
current deduction, would not produce distortion of income. See Lee & Bader, Contingent 
Income Items and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions: Correlative Adjustments and Clearer 
Reflection of Income, 12 J. Corp. L. 137, 204-09 (1987). This shield was repealed in 1986. 
See authorities cited in note 247 supra. Now the target will recognize all built-in gain upon a 
liquidation, asset sale pursuant to a liquidation, or § 338 election. See Yin, supra note 247. 
(Of course, where the target's NOLs equalled the built-in gain or recapture income, election 
might be advisable.) Nevertheless, Treasury's interest in purchase price allocations and 
amortization of customer base intangibles once attracted is not easily abated. See I.R.C. § 
1060 and H.R. 3545, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10120 (1987) (included among revenue provi-
sions of OBRA, as passed by the House Ways & Means Committee). 
••• See generally Yin, supra note 247. 
••• Where the stock is sold rather than redeemed the effect of a "double tax" would occur 
only where the purchaser's price was discounted for the burden of corporate taxation on 
future earnings . 
... There have been four merger waves since the late 1890s: 1890-1904, 1919-1929, 1960-
1969, and 1974 to present. See Corporate Takeover Hearings, supra note 7, at 147-48 (collo-
quy between Sen. Riegle and Martin Lipton; Mr. Lipton characterized the present period as 
a "liquidation wave"). Prior to the mid-1960s, businesses typically combined by merger, sale 
of assets, consolidation, or through proxy contests. ld. at 452 (statement of John Shad, 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission [the "SEC")). In the current wave of 
mergers, the form of acquisition has shifted to the tender offer, typically using borrowed 
cash, which results in leveraged takeovers, id. at 285, 310 (SEC staff report). See also id. at 
451 (statement of Shad); 733-36, 742-46 (statement of Preston Martin). The shift has been 
from the conglomerate merger era of the 1960's to the large, often hostile takeover bids of 
the 1980's. Id. at 668-69 (statement of Felix Rohatyn). While merger transactions in recent 
years are fewer than in the 1960s, the dollar size of the recent transactions is far larger. ld. 
at 576, 581, 591-93 (statement of Preston Martin). These tender offers average a 30% to 
50% premium above current trading value of the target shares (which reflect a multiple of 
earnings). Id. at 240 (statement of John Shad). See also Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and 
Science, 62 Harv. Bus. Rev. 109, 112 (1984). This premium may reflect the shelter of the 
purchaser's interest deductions (for the borrowed purchase price) against the target's earn-
ings or a greater value for the sale of much of target's assets than the stock price. See 
Corporate Takeover Hearings, supra note 7, at 45, 137, 157, 596, 672, 751-52, 884, 1101-03. 
For a case history see id. at 1102-03 (statement of Sir James Goldsmith). 
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actually increased by any lower basis due to lessened capital recov-
ery deductions. In short, the only real factors weighing towards the 
choice of a passthrough entity for conducting a large active busi-
ness in the traditional pattern are the higher corporate than indi-
vidual tax rate in service industries, different corporate and indi-
vidual alternate minimum tax rules in capital-intensive businesses, 
and "double tax" on owner level realization of gain in capital 
transactions (or, more rarely, dividend distributions in high profit 
distribution ventures). · 
As discussed previously,21111 PTPs often do not fit the traditional 
large C corporation pattern. Instead, the limited partners' equity 
traditionally served as an alternative to conventional debt financ-
ing, with resultant lower PTP debt-equity ratios and higher rates 
of PTP distributions (corresponding to debt amortization in con-
ventional large C corporations) than those of large C corporations 
in general.2116 Treatment of active business PTPs as corporations 
undoubtedly will lead to substitution of conventional financing to 
buy up the limited partners' interests.2117 
b. Functional Corporate Resemblance 
Congress took a broad approach to functional corporate resem-
blance, echoing the recent Treasury2118 and Joint Committee staff 
studies:2119 
Publicly traded partnerships resemble publicly traded corporations 
in their business functions and in the way their interests are mar-
keted, and limited partners as a practical ~atter resemble corpo-
rate shareholders in that they have limited liability, may freely 
transfer their interests, generally do not participate in manage-
ment, and expect continuity of life of the entity for the duration of 
the conduct of its business enterprise.280 
However, all of these factors merely embody aspects of the deep 
••• See notes 111-143 and accompanying text. 
""" See supra notes 197 and 198 and accompanying text. 
107 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 185-95 (statement of Ballentine); 1987 
House MLP Hearings, supra note 16, at 338 (statement of Wilson). 
1118 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 70-71 (Treasury statement); 1986 Passth-
rough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 30-31 (statement of Mentz). 
••• 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 30 (hearing pamphlet). 
100 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1066; see also 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra 
note 7, at 137. 
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structure issue: whether the owners of the entity have control over 
the process of earning the entity's income or control the use and 
disposition of such earnings.281 The Joint Committee staff in the 
1986 passthrough entities hearing pamphlet described the relation-
ship between these factors and the deep structure issue well: 
Certain factors identified as relevant by applicable case law or 
regulations have a direct bearing on whether an entity is acting 
separately from its owners, or as their agent or alter ego. For exam-
ple, each of the four factors relied upon by Treasury regulations to 
determine whether an entity is taxed as a corporation or as a part-
nership is relevant to this issue. 
The existence of either continuity of life or free transferability of 
interests suggest that an entity has legal significance substantially 
separate from the interest of a particular owner. For example, 
when an entity has these two characteristics, amounts earned while 
one is an owner may never be distributed to such owner, and 
amounts distributed to an owner may not have been earned during 
his period of ownership. Thus, if these two characteristics are pre-
sent, it can be argued that taxing the entity is appropriate. More 
generally, such continuity and transferability suggest that the en-
tity is not wholly dependent for its existence on the continuing in-
volvement of current owners, and may continue to exist even if any 
of such owners cease to possess ownership interests. 
The existence of centralization of management suggests that 
owners of an entity may not, at least by reason of their ownership 
interests, guide the activities of the entity on a regular and contin-
uous basis. The presence of centralized management suggests at 
least some separation between the activities of the entity and those 
of owners, even though the management may be viewed, in some 
respects, as the agent of owners. In particular, it can be argued 
that an owner who is not involved in managing the entity is not 
properly viewed, in a realistic and substantial economic sense, as 
the party responsible for earning the income of the entity. 
For several reasons, the fact that owners have only limited liabil-
ity with respect . to an entity suggests that the entity should be 
treated as a separate taxpayer. To begin with, limited liability es-
tablishes a potentially substantial economic distinction between 
owners and the entity itself. Limited liability may lessen the de-
gree to which the economic resources of the owners themselves, 
rather than solely those of the entity, are critical to the conduct of 
181 See Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 14. 
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the business. In addition, when the liability of owners is limited, 
the owners may never have to bear losses incurred by the entity in 
excess of the entity's capital resources. Accordingly, in such a cir-
cumstance, it may be inappropriate to view losses of the entity as 
realized by owners. 262 
Although Congress concluded that public trading involved a lack 
of identity of the owner with the entity, which particularly justi-
fied separate taxation of the entity,268 Treasury itself admitted in 
the 1986 passthrough entity hearings that public trading may be 
"indicative of the existence of the other, more relevant, classifica-
tion factors ... that may, to a lesser extent, be present in many 
other partnerships."264 Assistant Secretary Mentz apparently 
based selection of public trading as the sole criterion for corporate 
treatment of limited partnerships upon political considerations, 
such as the repeated lack of success of earlier and broader reclas-
sification proposals.266 However, Treasury's reading of political his-
tory in this instance myopically overlooked the fact that the ear-
litJr, unsuccessful attempts had been aimed at problems (first 
retirement plans for self-employed persons and then tax shelters) 
now resolved by Congress,266 so that the political pressure against 
re-classification may have lessened. 267 Had Treasury and then 
Congress distinguished the question of separate entity treatment 
from integration/separate taxpayer treatment,268 the goals of deep 
structure policy might have been attained. Instead, Congress sacri-
ficed good policy and allowed political considerations to carry the 
day. 269 Congress should have coupled separate entity treatment 
with a horizontally equitable, schedularly equivalent tax rate, 
which would have served a broader and more equitable policy than 
••• Id. at 14-15. 
••• See 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1067 . 
... 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 31 (statement of Mentz). 
••• Id. at 11 (testimony of Mentz) . 
... In 1982 Congress provided parity for self-employed persons and qualified corporate 
retirement plans. See Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 235-54, 96 Stat. 324, 505-33 (1982). And in 
1986 Congress finally began to stanch the tax shelter hemorrhage through newly enacted 
PAL provisions. See I.R.C. § 469. 
187 See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 38 (statement of Mentz); 55-56 
(statement of Joel Rabinovitz). 
••• See supra note 146. 
••• See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
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is presently the case.270 
c. Economic Efficiency 
The PTP legislative history underscores one of the great contri-
butions of Reagan era tax reform: articulation of deep structure 
policy principles, such as economic efficiency (i.e., "economic neu-
trality"271 or horizontal equity). During the Reagan era, serious 
consideration of tax policy issues evolved from being solely an aca-
demic and ideological concern to being a broad-based congressional 
concern, arguably for the first time. 272 The pre-1987 PTP format 
favored less leveraged, mature enterprises with earnings available 
for high rates of distributions over start-up and capital intensive 
(leveraged) enterprises, thus creating "new economic inefficiencies 
of the type the 1986 Act was designed to reduce."273 The 1987 
changes eliminated some of these inefficiencies through the reclas-
sification of PTPs as regular corporations; but by limiting corpo-
rate separate entity treatment to publicly-traded, active businesses 
conducted in partnership form, Congress left in place the horizon-
tal disparity between large but not publicly-traded corporations 
and large but not publicly-traded limited partnerships. 
170 See supra note 200, accompanying text and preceding sentence in text. 
271 See supra note 232. Horizontal equity is defined as equal treatment of taxpayers with 
equal income. Economic efficiency in turn is the principle that a market economy operates 
most efficiently if all business activities are subject to the same rate of tax, see, e.g., 1986 
Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 10 (statement of Mentz); 1984 Treasury Pro-
posals, supra note 9, at 442; Simmons, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: An Overview, 1987 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 151, 153. As Representative Downey of the House Ways & Means Committee 
stated, "(O]ne of the things I learned when I came on this Committee is the desire on our 
part, especially when you deal with economic matters, to be economically neutral." Tax 
Shelter Hearings, supra note 102, at 31. See also id. at 26-27. This emphasis is a turnaround 
from earlier Congressional reliance upon ability to pay coupled with economic incentives. 
See Simmons, supra at 151, 167-71. This shift has been explained in an ideological sense by 
Professor Ott. See Ott, supra note 50, at 1223 (sees more balance than Simmons); see also 
Hettich & Winer, Blue Prints and Pathways: The Shifting Foundations of Tax Reform, 38 
Nat'l Tax J. 423 (1985). For a brief but cogent statement of the view that the federal tax 
code should be "neutral," see Corporation Takeover Hearings, supra note 7, at 449 (state-
ment of Shad). 
272 See Proceedings of Symposium on the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 31 Viii. L. Rev. 1787, 
1791-92 (1986) [hereinafter Symposium on 1986 Act) (statement of Brockway); cf. Minarik, 
supra note 23, at 1360. 
273 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1066; cf. 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 
7, at 49, 141-42. 
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2. Passthrough (Passive Income) PTPs 
Congress based its exception to corporate treatment for "passive 
income" or passthrough PTPs on two rationales. The first was that 
investors could choose to acquire, directly and independently, in-
vestments generating passive income, such as interest and divi-
dends, from activities not conducted in corporate form. 274 The sec-
ond rationale was based on political considerations and applied to 
the exceptions for real estate and natural resource development ac-
tivities. In the case of these activities, political considerations pre-
vailed. Although it acknowledged that a higher level of entity ac-
tivity might be present in the areas of real estate and natural 
resource development, Congress reasoned that such activities 
"have commonly or typically been conducted in partnership form, 
and . . . disruption of present practices in such activities is cur-
rently inadvisable due to general economic conditions in these 
industries. "2711 
Traditionally, Congress has permitted limited integration as to 
entity income (but not losses) between a separate entity and its 
numerous passive owners where the conduit entity conducted only 
limited business activities in the form of, e.g., REITs and RICs.276 
The rationale given for such integration generally has been to en-
able middle income taxpayers, who are of course numerous, to ac-
quire liquid and diversified passive investments without incurring 
double income taxation. 277 However, the level of permissible activ-
ity as to rental real estate and natural resources has been substan-
tially lower than that allowed for passthrough PTPs,278 suggesting 
that political, rather than policy, considerations dominated Con-
gress' consideration of the treatment of such activities. 279 
••• 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1066 . 
... Id. at 1066. 
178 See supra notes 66 and 67. 
177 See 1959 Panel Discussion, supra note 23, at 899-90 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen). 
178 See supra note 78. 
270 Treasury suggested consideration of continued passthrough treatment, ideally more a 
limited income integration, along the RIC-REIT model for real property rental and natural 
resource development activities, see 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 31, 
because activities of holding relatively passive assets and distributing the income to owners 
traditionally were conducted in non-corporate form and a "similar rationale has supported 
passthrough treatment for publicly traded entities organized as REITs, RICs, and, more 
recently, REMICs." 1987 Senate MLP Hearing, supra note 7, at 73 (Treasury statement). 
Treasury's numbers show that roughly a third (42) of the 126 PTPs in existence on June 29, 
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More significantly, passive-owner entities which conduct passive 
activities generally have been treated as separate entities as to all 
aspects, other than limited integration of income. 280 Along these 
lines, Treasury advocated in 1986281 (although not in 1987)282 that 
instead of the (aggregate) partnership model, Congress should em-
ploy a dividend relief provision, comparable to the RIC and REIT 
approach, such that natural resources development, housing devel-
opment, and other research and development activities conducted 
in PTP form be excepted from regular PTP double taxation. In-
stead, Congress structured OBRA so that it inappropriately per-
mitted continued aggregate treatment (except as to passthrough of 
some losses under the separate-basket PAL rules) for "passive" ac-
tivity pass through PTPs. 283 This congressional structuring could 
only be due to a failure to separate the entity classification and 
owner-entity integration policy issues. Nevertheless, this aggregate 
treatment is consistent with the final 1986 Code REMIC provision, 
which passes through both income and losses. 284 
3. PALs and PTPs 
a. Active Business PTPs 
In characterizing active business PTPs as corporations for tax 
1987 carried on business in natural resources, id. at 77; and thus were presumably eligible 
for continued passthrough treatment. The author recalls that one of the members of the 
Select Revenue Measures Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee in the 
1987 MLP Hearings suggested that politics was the basis for such a passive-type income and 
traditional partnership activity carve out. See also id. at 48, 55. Then Assistant Secretary 
Pearlman had earlier suggested, sotto voce, the possibility of special classification treatment 
for such traditional partnership activities. See infra note 281. 
180 See supra notes 66 and 67 . 
.. , 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 31 (statement of Mentz). Assistant 
Secretary Pearlman too had been earlier concerned about the impact of reclassification 
upon capital formation "for natural resource exploration, research and experimentation and 
housing development." Reform of Corporate Taxation Hearings, supra note 9, at 63. 
••• 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 73 (Treasury statement). Perhaps Assis-
tant Secretary Mentz divined some political message in the Conference Committee's failure 
to follow traditional separate entity policy, as the Senate provisions had, in the REMIC 
provisions which it adopted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See supra note 147. Cf. 1987 
Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 199 (statement of John Chapoton) (unknown prove-
nance of REIT rules) . 
... See supra note 138 and accompanying text. See also sentence following text accompa-
nying note 145, supra. 
184 See supra note 147. Of course, REMICs also contravene the pattern and deep struc-
ture policy with their aggregate-like treatment of losses. 
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purposes, Congress treated PTP income (presumably only to the 
extent distributed) as portfolio income for purposes of the passive 
loss rule,28G consistent with the deep structure policy underlying 
the PTP and PAL provisions.288 An entity should be treated as a 
separate entity,287 and its distributed income treated as portfolio 
income, if the owners do not materially participate in its opera-
tions or management. Additionally, economic losses tied to an in-
terest in such a separate entity should not be realized by an owner 
until he disposes of the interest. 288 
b. Passthrough PTPs 
The House of Representatives gave both policy and political ra-
tionales in designating special PAL provisions for pass through 
PTPs, such as passive-income PTPs. The policy rationale was that 
such PTPs functionally resemble corporations. The political ra-
tionale was the House's desire to reduce the availability of tax 
shelters. Neither purpose holds up under examination. 
Regarding the policy rationale, the House reasoned that pass-
through PTPs resemble C corporations in their marketing methods 
and their accessing of capital markets (on the basis of hoped-for 
positive current yield on investment).289 The return on investment 
of such a PTP 
is essentially comparable to the return on an investment in corpo-
rate stock. Under the passive loss rule, passive losses cannot be ap-
plied to offset dividend income. Similarly, the passive loss rule 
treats as portfolio income [return] from other investments such as 
interest-bearing obligations. The committee believes that income 
from all publicly traded partnerships should be treated similarly to 
income from investments in corporations for purposes of the pas-
sive loss rule. 280 
This rationale for applying the PAL rules to PTPs conflicts with 
the rationale given for the passive income exception to corporate 
treatment. The passive income exception is based on the idea that 
••• 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1071. 
288 See supra notes 139 and 218-219 and accompanying text. 
••• See supra note 218. 
288 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
••• 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1073. 
••• Id. 
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the taxpayer could otherwise directly acquire these investments 
(which, if held by a PTP, would generate portfolio income291) with-
out falling under the passive activity classification. This would be 
true because the PTP would not be conducting a trade or busi-
ness292 or be engaged in a section 212 activity rising above the 
portfolio investment threshold, and yet the PTP's activity would 
not rise to the level of a trade or business.293 Similarly, the stated 
political rationale of retarding expansion of tax shelters294 cuts too 
broadly in that it would not support any exceptions to the tax 
shelter rules. Nevertheless, the basic "separate basket" concept of 
the PAL rules as applied to passthrough PTPs2911 is sound as a 
matter of tax policy. Under the separate basket rule, net income 
from a passthrough PTP is treated as "portfolio income" and not 
as "passive income" for purposes of the passive loss rule;296 thus, 
such income may not be offset by passive losses from a passive 
activity. 297 Also, net losses from a passthrough PTP cannot offset 
the partner's positive income, whether portfolio income, compensa-
tion or passive activity gain; but are instead suspended, offsetting 
future income from that PTP or being realized upon a complete 
disposition of the taxpayer's interest in the passthrough PTP.298 
This separate basket treatment is consistent with treatment for 
PAL purposes of the passthrough PTP as a separate entity, due to 
the owners not materially participating. 
Such complete separate basket treatment of passthrough PTPs 
is much more restrictive than the general passive activities netting 
rule, which states that losses from one passive activity currently 
offset income from another passive activity.299 The separate entity 
analysis presented above shows that such a netting rule is concep-
••• Id. at 1066. 
••• I.R.C. § 469(c)(1)(A). 
••• I.R.C. § 469(c)(6)(B). 
184 See 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1073 . 
... See I.R.C. § 469(k)(1); 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1073; see also supra notes 
89-93 and accompanying text . 
... See 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1073; see supra note 92 and accompanying 
text . 
• .., See generally I.R.C. § 469; 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1073; 1986 Senate 
Report, supra note 7, at 716, 718-19. 
108 See 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1073. 
108 See I.R.C. § 469(d)(1); 1986 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 722 ("Losses arising from 
a passive activity generally are deductible only against income from that or another passive 
activity."). 
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tually unsound, due either to overemphasis on schedular income 
concepts300 or, more likely, political considerations. Unfortunately, 
the end result either way is schedular horizontal inequity. Similar 
passive activities (for example, rental of apartments) are treated 
differently, depending on whether they are conducted by a large 
limited partnership (which may even be publicly offered) or by a 
passthrough PTP, even though a given activity produces the same 
income and losses. 
C. PSCs 
The OBRA explanation for eliminating inside graduated income 
tax rates for PSCs is overly terse, probably due to the inherent 
difficulty in distinguishing PSCs from close C corporations in gen-
eral under a deep structure analysis. 
The personal service income of a corporation owned by its employ-
ees is taxed to the employee-owners at the individual graduated 
rates as it is paid out as salary. The committee believes that it is 
inappropriate to allow the retained earnings to be taxed at the 
lower corporate graduated rates. 301 
The 1984 Treasury proposals would have repealed the graduated 
corporate rates for all corporations in order to fund a general re-
duction of corporate rates302 and to eliminate the use of closely-
held corporations as inside tax shelters. 303 These proposals pro-
vided no deep structure analysis, but simply stated that a progres-
sive corporate income tax served no affirmative purpose. 304 
The Joint Committee staff, however, exposed the deep policy 
considerations in the 1986 passthrough entities hearing pamphlet: 
In the absence of the factors noted above [continuity of life, cen-
tralized management, limited liability, and free transferability of 
interest], it may be viewed as inappropriate to treat an entity as a 
separate taxable unit. For example, to the extent that the entity is 
merely an agent or alter ego of the owner, it may be argued that 
the owner truly earns any income nominally earned by the entity, 
300 See Rock & Shaviro, supra note 85, at 12-15, 26-27. 
301 1987 House Report, supra note 21, at 1081. 
302 See 1984 Treasury Proposals, supra note 9, at 128. 
303 See id. 
304 Id. Actually, the graduated inside corporate brackets were enacted as an aid to capital 
formation in small corporations. See authorities cited in supra note 28. 
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and that the owner controls both the process of earning it and the 
income itself. Similarly, when an entity has relatively few owners, 
the audit and administrative difficulties of imposing taxation on 
the owner level are relatively manageable. 8011 
In short, the application of inside graduated corporate rates to an 
entity in which the owners materially participate violates horizon-
tal equity by generating less current taxation on retained earnings 
than does direct taxation of the owners. To make matters worse, 
the second-tier shareholder tax on owner-level realizations of such 
earnings is often de minimis. 
OBRA's failure to provide any special one-shot, tax-free dis-
incorporation provision to accompany the repeal of graduated rates 
for PSCs (as Congress provided in 1982 when it eliminated there-
tirement plan incentive for professional service corporations)306 in~ 
dicates that Congress expected PSCs to elect S corporation sta-
tus. 307 In the absence of such election, the penalty for disallowed 
deductions by a PSC operating as a C corporation will be high. 308 
However, S corporations are treated as separate entities as to pass-
through of income and losses and in other ways. In contrast to 
partnerships, "corporate liabilities are not included in a share-
holder's basis for his interest in the [S] corporation, and special 
allocations are not [permitted.]" Also unlike partnership treat-
ment, a "transferee of an S corporation interest is not entitled to 
'step-up' the basis of his share of the entity's assets to reflect his 
purchase price."309 Thus, the post-OBRA tax treatment of PSCs 
still ignores the deep structure of entity classification. 
More significantly, elimination of the inside corporate graduated 
rates was too narrow. Assistant Secretary Mentz acknowledged in 
the 1986 passthrough entity hearings that many close C corpora-
tions as a practical matter do not manifest the traditional corpo-
rate characteristics of continuity, centralized management, limited 
liability and free transferability,310 but he rationalized continued C 
corporation treatment on the certainty and fairness of objective 
••• 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 17. 
308 See supra note 109. 
301 See supra note 110. 
308 Since the owner controls the business and the entity, expenditures for a non-business 
purpose should be taxed at the owner's marginal rate. 
309 1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 11. 
310 See 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 19, 28. 
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rules. 311 The apparent political reality is that once Congress had 
fashioned the graduated small C corporate rates as a subsidy for 
capital accumulation,312 small business was determined to keep the 
subsidy. Indeed, the political response to the 1984 Treasury pro-
posals to impose a flat corporate tax was quick;313 the President's 
proposals of 1985 abandoned the idea, 314 and the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 actually increased the subsidy by doubling the base (from 
$25,000 to $50,000) for the lowest corporate rate (15%),316 violating 
horizontal and vertical equity principles. The stated rationale of 
the President's proposals of 1985 for retaining a graduated rate 
structure was specious, given that the various proposals and the 
final bill increased the corporate tax load to varying degrees. 3141 
The proposal retains a modified graduated rate structure for small 
corporations in recognition of the fact that complete elimination of 
the graduated rate structure would dramatically increase effective 
tax rates for many smaller corporations, thus nullifying the posi-
tive effects, for such corporations, of the proposed reduction in the 
maximum marginal rate. 817 
V. TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: POLICY AND POLITICS 
A. 1954 Code General Pattern 
The 1986 Code marks the end of one era of tax reform and the 
beginning of another. The second half of the 1954 Code era (com-
prising the 1970s and 1980-81), encompassed a period in which in-
flation-driven individual bracket creep318 permitted Congress to 
enact current spending programs depending on the revenue wind-
fall of expected future bracket creep to produce a balanced 
budget.319 Congress periodically used budget surpluses produced 
811 See id. at 27-28. 
311 See authorities cited in supra note 28. 
••• See Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 23, at 80. 
814 See 1985 President's Proposals, supra note 9, at 117. 
"" See I.R.C. § 11(b) .. 
818 See 1986 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 28 (H.R. 3838 as passed by the Senate); H.R. 
Rep. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 House Report] (H.R. 3838 as 
passed by the House); 1984 Treasury Proposals, supra note 9, at 461. 
817 1985 President's Proposals, supra note 9, at 119. 
••• See Simmons, supra note 271, at 156-57. 
110 See Leonard, supra note 48, at 972; Proceedings of Symposium on the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, 31 Viii. L. Rev. 1787, 1791-1792 (statement of David Brockway, Chief of Joint 
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by such bracket creep to fund "tax reform." Thus, for example, the 
bottom two million or so working poor were periodically removed 
from the federal income tax roll820 (but bracket creep promptly 
would put them back on the roll), middle-income individuals were 
given cosmetic tax cuts,821 and large, capital-intensive corporations 
and high-income individuals were provided increasing "tax ex-
penditures" or preferences822 (the preferences in both cases usually 
enhanced by leveraging techniques828), thereby reducing the tax 
base.82• 
As a result of these preferences, by the end of the 1954 Code era, 
many large C corporations and their shareholders had gone beyond 
integration (where at least one tax is collected) to the enjoyment of 
a practical repeal of the progressive rate feature of the income tax 
system, which traces its origins to the populist movement of the 
early twentieth century.825 Neither large corporations nor their 
shareholders (which included high-income individuals and tax-ex-
empt organizations) paid much tax during the last years of the 
1954 Code.826 The middle-income individual taxpayers bore the 
brunt of erosion of the corporate tax and high-income individual 
tax bases under the 1954 Code era. 827 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,828 President Reagan's 
Comm. StafO [hereinafter Symposium on 1986 Act]. 
120 See Simmons, supra note 271, at 158. 
au See Kies, supra note 51, at 181; Simmons, supra note 271, at 158, 160; Verdier, supra 
note 233, at 172. Tax expenditures or preferences are discussed infra note 322 . 
... See Kies, supra note 51, at 180; Leonard, supra note 49, at 971-972. 
818 Many commentators believed that the combination of leverage and preferences consti-
tuted the core of tax shelter abuse. See infra note 333. Not surprisingly loss partnerships 
tend to be highly leveraged. See High-Income Taxpayer Hearings, supra note 46, at 11 
(statement of Ronald Pearlman). 
••• See Chirelstein, supra note 32, at 219-21; Simmons, supra note 271, at 198. The corpo-
rate income tax declined between 1950 and 1985 from 27% to 8% of total budget receipts 
and from 40% to 16% of total income tax receipts. See 1985 House Report, supra note 316, 
at 55. 
su See Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 23, at 6-8; Simmons, supra note 271, at 154, 168-
69. 
••• See, e.g., Chirelstein, supra note 32, at 211; supra note 43. 
317 See Future Implications of 1986 Act Hearings, supra note 49, at 49 (statement of Law-
rence Chimerine); Simmons, supra note 271, at 155-62. 
••• "The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ... gave taxpayers the largest tax cut in 
American history .... " Doernberg & McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well? Congress 
and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 891, 894 n.19 (1987). 
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first step in his tax policy revolution,329 which shifted the focus of 
taxation from the ability to pay and use of tax preferences to flat 
rates and level playing fields, contained three changes which ulti-
mately set the stage for the reforms of the 1986 Code. 33° First, the 
indexing of brackets for inflation and personal exemptions would 
eliminate bracket creep after the 1985 effective date. 331 Second, the 
combination of rapid capital recovery under ACRS and lTC (which 
were designed to approximate complete expensing of equipment in 
the year of acquisition),332 plus leverage,333 virtually eliminated the 
tax base for many large corporations and half of high-income indi-
viduals. 334 So that large loss corporations could enjoy the stimulus 
••• See Chirelstein, supra note 32, at 208; Simmo.ns, supra note 271, at 168-169 (explaining 
how the revolution commenced in 1981 continues to work under the 1986 Code). See gener-
ally Minarik, supra note 23, at 1372. 
330 See Chirelstein, supra note 32, at 219; Minarik, supra note 23, at 1363, 1372 (1987). 
331 See Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 1(0 (1985); Symposium on the 1986 Act, supra 
note 319; Chirelstein, supra note 32, at 219 and n.32; Leonard, supra note 48, at 972; Ver-
dier, supra note 233, at 172. 
332 See Steines, Income Tax Allowances for Cost Recovery, 40 Tax L. Rev. 483, 537-538 
(1985); Warren, Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 Tax Law. 549, 
554 (1985). 
333 See Cohen Symposium, supra note 156, at 593 (statement of Alvin Warren) ("if you 
move towards expensing, to be consistent you also have to set up a regime in which there is 
no deductibility of interest"); Warren, supra note 332, at 554. 
334 In a recent study by a public interest group of 275 selected large corporations, almost 
half (129) managed to pay no federal income tax in at least one of the four years from 1981 
to 1985, and the average effective rate for the four year period was 15%. See Citizens for 
Tax Justice, Corporate Taxpayers & Corporate Freeloaders, reprinted in 29 Tax Notes 947, 
948, 949 (Dec. 2, 1985). The industry response that such studies ignore deferred tax liabili-
ties, see Egger, Citizens for Tax Justice's Latest Misrepresentation of Corporate Tax Bur-
dens, 29 Tax Notes 956 (Dec. 2, 1985), is misplaced if such liabilities can be deferred for 
sufficiently long periods or the liability constantly increases. Accelerated depreciation and 
the investment tax credit accounted for the lower effective rates for most of the surveyed 
corporations. See Citizens for Tax Justice, supra at 951. Similarly, a Treasury study of high 
income individual taxpayers found that 11% paid less than 5% of their total positive in-
come in taxes, over one-half paid less than 20%; over 75% paid less than 30% and only 5% 
paid taxes of a least 40% of total positive income. See High-Income Taxpayer Hearings, 
supra note 46, at 18 (statement of Ronald Pearlman) (1983 data). Among high income, low 
tax returns, partnership losses dominate, with 77% showing some partnership losses. See id. 
at 18. Sixty-four percent of all high income taxpayers in 1983 reported some partnership 
loss. See id. at 19. While Treasury data did not permit pinpointing the sources of tax prefer-
ence generating this pattern of partnership losses, interest, depreciation and mineral explo-
ration costs in the aggregate accounted for near 40% of all partnership sector deductions. 
See id. at 23. This suggests a possible basis for the similar pre-1986 Act effective tax rates 
for corporations and high-income individual taxpayers (21% for corporations and 19 to 22% 
for individuals), since both used leverage and preferences heavily, see supra note 43. See 
generally Future Implications of 1986 Act Hearings, supra note 49, at 15 (statement of Rob-
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of capital recovery, ERTA also authorized the "safe harbor" lease 
or sale of capital recovery tax benefits between corporate taxpay-
ers. 3311 Third, ERTA combined these "business" tax cuts with high-
and middle-income individual tax cuts.336 
The tax cuts and accelerated capital recovery, in combination 
with increased defense spending and the 1981-82 recession, pro-
duced unprecedented deficits and, without bracket creep as a 
source of payment, created the structural impetus for major tax 
change. 337 Perceived popular outrage grew as big ticket "safe har-
bor lease" tax benefit sales were widely publicized. 338 At about the 
same time, Robert Mcintyre, a public interest advocate, exposed 
avoidance of the corporate income tax by big corporate sector 
America.339 The 1981 capital recovery changes equally drove the 
individual side tax shelter explosion in the first half of the 
1980s. 340 These structural and political forces set the stage for tax 
reform which increased the corporate tax and finally eliminated in-
dividual passive use of tax preferences to shelter outside portfolio 
or business/professional income. 341 
Probably of the same order of importance in the drive toward 
eventual post-ERTA tax reform were the actors on the tax reform 
stage: a strong Republican president and a largely Democratic 
Congress.342 During the 1954 Code era, the major tax reform at-
ert Mcintyre). 
••• See Chirelstein, supra note 32, at 220; Minarik, supra note 23, at 1364. 
••• [T]his Congress has also cut taxes [in 1981]; and that is at is part of the reason why 
our Federal budget deficit is as high as it is. I am not saying it is the sole reason, but 
I think most honest observers conclude that it is part of the reason, in addition to 
defense spending, that has caused the high Federal budget deficit that we now have. 
1987 Senate MLP Hearings, supra note 7, at 140 (statement of Sen.Baucus). 
••• See Verdier, supra note 233, at 173. 
338 See Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 23, at 11. 
••• R. Mcintyre, Corporate Income Taxes in the Reagan Years: A Study of Three Years of 
Legalized Tax Avoidance (1984). See also Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 23, at 11-13; 
Minarik, supra note 23, at 1370. This not only disclosed the ready revenue increase source to 
pay for the traditional individual tax cut sweetener accompanying tax reform, see supra 
notes 318-322 and accompanying text, but also allowed Secretary of Treasury Donald Regan 
to sell the President on the corporate sector increase as resting on corporations who cur-
rently paid no taxes. See Minarik, supra note 23, at 1368. 
140 See Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 23, at 10; supra note 334. 
141 See generally Simmons, supra note 271. 
••• See Leonard, supra note 48, at 970 ("Republican Presidents have had far more succesa 
in the tax legislative process than Democratic Presidents over the last 30 years."); Minarik, 
supra note 23, at 1368 (describing President Reagan's ability to sell a significant increase in 
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tempts by Democratic presidents (Kennedy in 1964343 and Carter 
in 1979344), with their party in control of Congress, were unsuccess-
ful, probably due as much to the windfall revenue from bracket 
creep, which was used to fund tax expenditures, as to lack of con-
trol over their party. Nor was Congress able to slow down, much 
less completely halt shelter abuse when, due to the force of public 
opinion,346 it took the lead under Republican presidents (Nixon in 
1969346 and Ford in 1976347). The congressionally-dominated tax 
acts of 1982 and 1984 were the result of especially severe budget 
pressures and revenue reconciliation directives. 348 These latter two 
congressional acts, while raising large amounts of revenue, did not 
effectively halt shelter use and added great complexity with often 
ad hoc solutions.349 Significantly, the 1982 and 1984 acts did not 
the corporate sector tax to Republican Congressmen as a "Nixon Visits China" scenario), 
1369-70 (describing President Reagan's role in getting Chairman Rostenkowski's bill out of 
the House); Verdier, supra note 233, at 174 . 
... President Kennedy's first tax bill instituted the quintessential tax preference-the in-
vestment tax credit-and his 1963 structural reforms by-and-large failed in the Democratic 
controlled Congress. See 131 Cong. Rec. H12,243 (daily ed. Dec 17, 1985); Birnbaum & Mur-
ray, supra note 23, at 14; Leonard, supra note 48, at 970. However, in a sense, President 
Kennedy's reform efforts bore limited fruit during the first term of President Nixon in the 
Tax Reform Act of 1969. See infra note 346 . 
... President Carter's proposals through Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal in 1977, 
e.g., concerning integration and elimination of the capital gains preference, met fierce oppo-
sition from interest groups. This probably led to the legislative defeat of the modest propos-
als the President introduced in 1978. See Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 23, at 15-16; 
Leonard, supra note 48, at 970-71. 
... Leonard, supra note 48, at 971. 
••• At the conclusion of President Johnson's administration, and in response to public 
demand created by the publicizing of high income-low tax individual income taxpayer's by 
Secretary of the Treasury Barr and the 1969 release of Treasury's Tax Reform Studies and 
Proposals, prepared under Professor Stanley Surrey, the Assistant Treasury Secretary for 
Tax Policy, the House held tax reform hearings in the first month of President Nixon's first 
term, hearings which ultimately led to the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See Birnbaum & Mur-
ray, supra note 23, at 14 (Act "repealed the investment credit, ended or curtailed a number 
of other tax breaks, and cracked down on tax-exempt foundations"); Leonard, supra note 
48, at 971 (largely finding a policy foundation in Surrey tax reform studies); Verdier, supra 
note 233, at 174 ("The Tax Reform Act of 1969 gained its impetus from the sharp increase 
in tax burdens following the 1968 Vietnam War surcharge, and the revelation ... that hun-
dreds of wealthy Americans were completely escaping taxation.") . 
... "The Tax Reform Act of 1976 followed the sharp increase in Democratic majorities in 
the Congress and the weakening of the presidency produced by Watergate." Verdier, supra 
note 233, at 174 . 
... See id. 
••• The 1982 and 1984 tax acts and the 1983 Social Security Act were the largest tax 
increases in peace time history. See Symposium on 1986 Act, supra note 319, at 1791 (state-
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increase rates (recently cut in ERTA in 1981), nor did they repeal 
indexing. 3110 Against this backdrop, President Reagan and the tax 
writing committee chairmen helped produce the 1986 Act. 
B. 1986 Code General Pattern 
President Reagan, in 1985-86, was able to set the parameters for 
structural tax reform and hence the shape of the 1986 Code. First, 
there could be no net revenue increase over the base period. Sec-
ond, a corporate sector increase could carry an individual sector 
tax cut. Finally, top individual rates had to be lowered to no higher 
than 35% (the lowering of the corporate rate was largely symbolic 
for most, but not all, big C corporations).m Congressional political 
considerations added the proviso that individual tax cuts could not 
disproportionately benefit high-income taxpayers3112• This political 
reality had the effect of locking in the more recent erosion of 
progressivity as to high bracket taxpayers3113 (as former Senator 
Haskell pointed out3M), but may have been politically necessary to 
cut off an attack on the 1986 Act by such taxpayers as a "redis-
tributionist scheme."31111 Finally, Chairmen Rostenkowski of the 
ment of Brockway). 
300 See id. 
••• The proscription of no net increase in tax revenues from the individual and corporate 
tax sectors taken in the aggregate was indeed written in stone. See Birnbaum & Murray, 
supra note 23, at 87. The maximum individual rate of 35% was negotiable. See id. at 86, 
143, 153. Indeed, the President supported the House bill with a 38% maximum rate, albeit 
with the hope of doing better on the Senate side. See id. at 173-74. It is unclear whether the 
President fully understood the critical role of the offsetting corporate sector tax increase for 
an individual sector tax cut, at least at the beginning. See id. at 63, 77; Minarik, supra note 
23, at 1368. Whether it was understood or not by Reagan, that increase allowed a traditional 
individual sector tax cut, probably a necessary element to the passage of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. See Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 23, at 60. And probably only Reagan, a 
popular conservative Republican president, could persuade enough Republican Congress-
men to support such a corporate tax increase on one of their main constituent groups, busi-
nessmen. See id. at 60, 171; Minarik, supra note 23, at 1368 . 
... See Kies, supra note 51, at 183; 1986 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 714 ("[A] provi-
sion significantly limiting the use of tax shelter losses is unavoidable if substantial rate re-
ductions are to be provided to high-income taxpayers without disproportionately reducing 
the share of total liability under the individual income tax that is borne by high-income 
taxpayers as a group."). 
••• See Kasten & Sammartino, supra note 187, at 77 . 
... See Haskell, Tax Reform, 35 Tax Notes 301, 303 (Apr. 20, 1987). 
••• See Minarik, supra note 23, at 1365 (because the Bradley-Gephardt bill did not raise 
any income class of individuals or the corporate sector taken as a whole, it could not be 
attacked as a redistributionist scheme). 
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House and Packwood of the Senate tax writing committees 
adopted procedural rules in committee (and later used in the Sen-
ate) requiring that any revenue-losing amendments be offset by 
revenue raisers. 318 Add the ingredients of presumed popular out-
rage at high-income, low-tax individual and corporate taxpayers 
who paid little or no taxm and the political considerations already 
manifested in the President's 1985 proposals, including the reten-
tion of the home mortgage interest and accelerated capital recov-
ery deductions (provisions which were either "sacred cows"318 or 
"original sins,"m depending on one's point of view, but politically 
non-repealable in any event) and the final contours of the 1986 Act 
appear380 almost inevitable in retrospect. The actual story, as told 
in Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 381 is fascinating and might even be 
suspenseful if we didn't already know the ending. 382 
Structurally the 1986 Act presents many familiar 1954 Code tax 
reform features, but at the same time it constitutes something new. 
The 1986 Act contains the traditional individual tax reduction 
sweetener383 and again takes large numbers of working poor off the 
tax rolls. 384 The pattern as to preferences or tax expenditures is 
more complex, however. In comparison to the 1954 Code, the 
drafters of the 1986 Code substantially scaled back or eliminated 
some capital recovery tax expenditures, particularly the invest-
ment tax credit and capital recovery as to real estate,381 although 
the tax expenditures as to personal property remained about the 
... See id. at 1369, 1371. 
••• See id. at 1371. Clearly taxpayers have lost faith in the Federal tax system. See 1986 
Senate Report, supra note 7, at 713. The question is whether skepticism is now so rooted 
that the majority of individual taxpayers do not believe that the 1986 Tax Reform Act bene-
fits them. Cf. Future Implications of 1986 Act Hearings, supra note 49, at 46, 146 . 
... See generally 1985 President's Proposals, supra note 9, at 132-59. 
800 See Brannon, Tax Loopholes as Original Sin: Lessons From Tax History, 31 Vill. L. 
Rev. 1763 (1986). 
180 See Kies, supra note 51, at 184. 
801 See supra note 23. 
801 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was, indeed, a cliff-hanger at the time. See Yorio, supra 
note 30, at 395 n.2 ("The road through Congress was tortuous."). 
aoa See id. at 1372 . 
... See Future Implications of 1986 Act Hearings, supra note 49, at 15 (statement of Rob-
ert Mcintyre); Simmons, supra note 271, at 161, 164. 
ao• The lTC was repealed retroactively to the beginning of the 1986. The ACRS life for 
real estate was extended from approximately 50%, from 19 years to 29-30 years; and front-
loaded 175% declining balance rate slowed to straight line. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 
271, at 199. 
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same.866 Under Doernberg and McChesney's "tax contracts" analy-
sis, forestalling legislation more harmful to special interests· may be 
viewed as preferential treatment of such interests;867 and in this 
'" The ACRS deduction for personal property was actually accelerated through a more 
front-loaded rate to partially offset the repeal of the lTC. See 1986 Senate Report, supra 
note 8, at 96; Simmons, supra note 271, at 197-99; Sunley, supra note 23, at 64. Congress' 
rationale in the House paid lip service to economic efficiency and reasoned that accelerated 
depreciation had not stimulated investment in depreciable property, and, in turn had pulled 
the entire economic into more rapid growth. See 1985 House Report, supra note 316, at 145-
46. Nevertheless the House believed, without explaining why some preferences for invest-
ment in depreciable property should be maintained, that pre-1981 depreciation should be 
the right target. See id. The Senate supplied the why's, and like the final legislation, en-
riched personal property ACRS, while paying even less credible lip service to economic 
efficiency. 
The committee believes some further acceleration in the rate of recovery of deprecia-
tion deductions should be provided to compensate partly for the repeal of the invest-
ment tax credit. The committee is cognizant that other nations heavily subsidize bus-
iness investments through tax and other policies, and the committee does not believe 
such policies can be completely ignored. Therefore, it was the committee's judgment 
that to maintain the international competitiveness of U.S. business changes were nec-
essary to the accelerated cost recovery system which, in certain cases, provided 
greater incentives than those existing under present law. The bill increases the rate of 
acceleration from !50-percent declining balance to 200-percent declining balance for 
property in the 5-year and 10-year classes. Together with the large tax rate reduc-
tions, investment incentives will remain high and the nation's savings can be utilized 
more efficiently. 
The committee believes an efficient capital cost recovery system is essential to 
maintaining U.S. economic growth. As the world economies become increasingly com-
petitive, it is most important that investment in our capital stock be determined by 
market forces rather than by tax considerations. 
Under present law, the tax benefits arising from the combination of the investment 
tax credit and accelerated depreciation are more generous for some equipment than if 
the full cost of the investment were deducted immediately-a result more generous 
than exempting all earnings on the investment from taxation. At the same time, as-
sets not qualifying for the investment credit and accelerated depreciation bear much 
higher effective tax rates. The output attainable from our capital resources is reduced 
because too much investment occurs in tax-favored sectors and too little investment 
occurs in sectors that are more productive, but which are tax-disadvantaged. The na-
tion's output can be increased simply by a reallocation of investment, without requir-
ing additional saving. 
The committee believes the surest way of encouraging the efficient allocation of all 
resources and the greatest possible economic growth is by reducing statutory tax 
rates. A large reduction in the top corporate tax rate can be achieved by repealing the 
investment tax credit without reducing the corporate tax revenues collected. One dis-
torting tax provision is replaced by lower tax rates which provide benefits to all in-
vestment. A neutral tax system allows the economy to most quickly adapt to changing 
economic needs. 
1986 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 96 . 
... See Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 34, at 933-34, 942-45 (buying and selling 
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vein both the President's proposals and the Senate Finance Com-
mittee bill had convenient foils. 888 
The 1986 Code's direct treatment of these tax expenditures tells 
only half the story. Responding in part to the popular opposition 
to individual tax shelters and corporate giants who paid no tax,889 
and even more to the tax revenues inherent in indirectly curtailing 
the tax expenditures eroding the high income individual and cor-
porate sector tax bases, Congress enacted in the 1986 Act the pas-
sive loss rules, 870 repealed the capital gains preference871 and 
strengthened the individual and corporate alternate minimum 
tax. 872 Thus, in effect, the 1986 Act lessened the benefits of capital 
recovery and tax preferences.878 Moreover, these complex and often 
inelegant8 " provisions, indirectly producing base broadening, gen-
legislation). 
888 See Minarik, supra note 23, at 1368-69. 
880 See supra notes 339-341 and accompanying text. 
870 I.R.C. § 469. This provision is estimated to result in a $23.4 billion revenue increase 
over the years from 1987 to 1991. See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 51, at 254. 
871 Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 301 (repealing I.R.C. § 1202). Separate capital gains repeal reve-
nue figures are not broken out. See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 51. 
171 See Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 701. Individual and corporate minimum tax provisions 
should increase the fiscal budget receipts for the years from 1987 to 1991 by $8.2 billion for 
individuals and $22.2 billion for corporations. See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 51, at 473. 
878 See Yorio, supra note 30, at 439. In essence, the 1984 Treasury Proposals constitute a 
"free market manifesto" as to capital recovery, as well as most other tax rules. See McLure, 
Where Tax Reform Went Astray, 31 Vill. L. Rev. 1619, 1625 (1986) (a principal architect of 
the 1985 Treasury Proposals). Congress recognized the wisdom of economic efficiency in-
stead of preferential treatment, see supra note 308, but was subject to the intense lobbying 
by, and PAC contributions from, the special interests and yielded to them (other than real 
estate with its see-through office buildings). On the other hand, Congress effectively re-
stricted such capital recovery deductions to corporations and individual's actively partici-
pating in the activity; and even then, the tax preferred taxpayer must pay a "minimum 
tax." See High-Income Taxpayer Hearings, supra note 46, at 66-68, 98-99 (statements of 
Ronald Pearlman, Reps. Dorgan, Thomas, and Pease). Thus, the 1986 Code constitutes here 
a compromise between economic efficiency and tax expenditures for capital intensive activi-
ties, but at least rate reduction was achieved. See generally Future Implications of 1986 Act 
Hearings, supra note 49, at 67 (statement of Alan Greenspan). 
"" A leading commentator on tax reform (and consultant to Senator Bill Bradley on his 
rate-lowering through base broadening proposals) described the 1984 Treasury Proposals for 
dealing with inflation by indexing capital recovery, inventories, and loans as "elegant." See 
1984 Treasury Proposals, supra note 9, at 177-200; Minarik, supra note 23, at 1367. 
In these respects, Treasury I was the antithesis of Bradley-Gephardt's creed of prac-
ticality over purity. Many economists reacted that the Treasury was sending a 
Lamborghini out to race the Bradley-Gephardt Volkswagen Beetle. 
But Lamborghinis often fail to start on cold mornings, and what was picked apart 
in Treasury I, was for the most part, the elegant features. The financial community 
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erated the revenues to support Senator Bill Bradley's idea3711 of 
substantially lower marginal rates, the force of which ignited con-
sideration, passage and signing of the 1986 Act. 376 Such indirect 
base broadening rendered the 1986 Act palatable to both those 
who desired horizontal equity or fairness and those who desired 
economic efficiency.377 The cost was abandonment of vertical eq-
uity or progressivity,378 but vertical equity had long been unreal-
ized in any event, due to tax expenditures. 379 Some, including the 
author, fear that reintroduction of high rates would inevitably lead 
Congress to fashion more of such expenditures, which are utilized 
mostly by high-income individual taxpayers and corporate giants 
and which ultimately increase effective rates for middle-income 
taxpayers.380 In addition to its low rates (which more closely ap-
proached actual effective rates),381 the 1986 Act more importantly 
eased, although it did not erase, horizontal disparity at the high 
end of the individual and corporate taxpayer levels. 
C. OBRA PTP-PSC Changes and the Tax Legislative Process 
In 1983, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, 
Ronald Pearlman, testified at the Senate Finance Committee hear-
ings on reform of corporate taxation that study of any classifica-
tion issue should look at the entire business entity continuum: 
I d. 
argued against indexation of capital gains for the same reason that they had in 1978: 
they preferred an exclusion that would reward them for big gains accrued over short 
times, rather than inflation protection. The investment community railed against 
nonaccelerated indexed depreciation, asking for bigger up-front deductions that were 
not contingent upon inflation. Banks found that the streamlined indexation of inter· 
est income and expense would distort their profit margins. 
170 See id. at 1370, 1372, 1373. 
170 See Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 23, at 223, 228, 233, 259. 
177 See Bittker, Tax Reform-Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 44 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
11, 14 (1987); Zelinsky, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: A Response to Professor Yorio and 
His Vision of the Future of the Internal Revenue Code, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 885, 886-89 
(1987). 
870 See Haskell, supra note 354, at 303 . 
.,. See 1959 Panel Discussions, supra note 23, at 861 (statement of Paul Ziffren). 
800 See Symposium on 1986 Act, supra note 319, at 1792 (statement of Brockway) (1986 
Act promotes fairness); Cordes & Galper, Tax Shelter Activity: Lessons From Twenty Years 
of Evidence, 38 Nat'! Tax J. 305, 322 (1985). But c.f. Schurtz, A Critical View of Traditional 
Tax Policy Theory: A Pragmatic Alternative, 31 Vill. L. Rev. 1665, 1684 n.89 (1986) (fair-
ness is counterproductive). 
801 See supra note 43. 
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Questions such as how a type of organization should be taxed, 
whether as a so-called C-corporation, an S- corporation or as a 
partnership or, for that matter, as a real estate investment trust or 
a regulated investment company, require, we believe, an analysis of 
all of those classification situations. We suspect hat if that analysis 
were undertaken, we would not agree to base tax classification on 
the degree of marketability of an organization's equity interests.88z 
Similarly, Chairman Rangel in commencing the 1986 Select Rev-
enue Measures Subcommittee hearings on issues relating to pass-
through entities announced that the purpose of the initial hearing 
was "to obtain a broad overview of tax policy issues affecting pass-
through entities. . . . The subcommittee is particularly concerned 
that specific, ad hoc modifications in this area not be made with-
out consideration of the overall impact of such modifications on 
the passthrough entity area. "388 
The 1986 and 1986 Joint Committee staff hearing pamphlets on 
passthrough entitiesm and master limited partnerships,386 respec-
tively, and Assistant Secretary Mentz' 1986 statement,888 fortu-
nately do provide such a broad overview and analysis, which might 
have produced tax policy at its best. Unfortunately, politics domi-
nated as the specific, ad hoc modifications implemented in OBRA 
as to PTPs were put in place.387 Consequently, the criterion chosen 
(public trading of partnership units) was two steps removed from 
the deep structure ideal of material participation388 and the rem-
edy provided (corporate treatment) was deficient technically.389 
Similarly, the 1984 Treasury proposals pointed the way to a pol-
icy analysis of close C corporations,390 which the 1986 passthrough 
entity hearing pamphlet briefly provided, also properly resting on 
material participation.891 But again politics prevailed with the 
OBRA criterion for elimination of the inside shelter (professional 
881 Reform of Corporate Taxation Hearings, supra note 9, at 11. 
888 1986 Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 8, at 1. 
... See supra note 19. 
880 See id . 
..., See supra note 8. 
881 See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text. 
388 See supra notes 260-264 and accompanying text. 
388 See supra notes 189-198 and accompanying text. 
sO. See supra notes 216, 302-304 and accompanying text. 
••• See Passthrough Entity Hearing Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 17; supra note 305 and 
accompanying text. 
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services) being too narrow;392 and the remedy (elimination of grad-
uated rates) technically deficient.393 Standing alone, then, the 1987 
PTP and PSC provisions represent a failure of policy, possibly les-
sening the impetus for true deep structure, policy-based reform. 
One should not be overly pessimistic about future prospects, 
however. 394 OBRA's general tone may indicate the direction of tax 
revisions over the next five years or so. That direction should be: 
maintenance of low individual and corporate rates with incremen-
tal base broadening,396 directed by the budget revenue reconcilia-
tion process396 and derived (as in the case of the PTP and PSC 
provisions) from earlier, broader Treasury and Joint Committee 
studies.397 To the extent future tax revisions thus reverse the dom-
inant, but not exclusive pattern of 1954 Code "reform" by gradu-
ally broadening the base, rather than gradually narrowing it398 
(note that Chairman Rostenkowski now appears to favor the base 
broadening course399), consistent treatment of all large limited 
partnerships in which most owners do not materially participate 
and of all entities in which the owners do materially participate 
might at last be obtained. 
••• See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
••• See supra notes 306-309 and accompanying text . 
... "Hope springs eternal in the human breast. Man never Is, but always To be blest." 
Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man (1733-34) Epistle I, 1.95. 
••• This is the pattern of the 1982, 1984 and 1987 tax acts. See supra notes 48, 53 and 
accompanying text. 
'" See id . 
• .., See supra note 54. 
••• See supra notes 371-375 and accompanying text . 
... See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
